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Comparative Slavic Epic

ALBERT B. LORD

Oral epic poetry or, more precisely, oral traditional narrative song has been practiced by Slavs speaking Russian, Ukrainian, Serbo-Croatian, and Bulgarian. The primary concern of this essay is to investigate a few facets of the relationship between South Slavic — that is, Serbo-Croatian and Bulgarian — oral traditional epic and that of the Eastern Slavs — that is, the Russians and Ukrainians. It is proper to begin with a description of some outward manifestations of these four language traditions.

One of the most evident differences between the East Slavic and South Slavic epic traditions is that the metrical system of the former is basically tonic, or non-syllabic, whereas that of the latter is basically syllabic. Related to this difference is another: South Slavic epic songs are either accompanied by a bowed instrument or unaccompanied, whereas East Slavic epics are either accompanied by a plucked instrument or unaccompanied. The only instrument really strummed in the South Slavic epic traditions is the *tambura* in northern Bosnia. Specifically, the South Slavic musical instruments are the bowed one-stringed *gusle* and the bowed three-stringed *g'dulka.* The East Slavic instruments are the *kobza* or *bandura* and (formerly) the Russian *gusli.* It seems possible, then, for there to be an opposition between tonic or non-syllabic meter, accompanied by a plucked or struck musical instrument, and syllabic meter, accompanied by a bowed instrument. This principle seems to apply also to the relationship between the plucked harp of older Germanic poetries — or, at any rate, of Anglo-Saxon poetries — with their stressed/unstressed meter, as compared with the medieval French tradition's bowed *rebec,* a close relative of the *g'dulka,* with its decasyllabic/hendecasyllabic metrical base, similar, indeed, to the South Slavic decasyllable. Noteworthy, perhaps, is that the non-syllabic meter is found in northern Europe and Russia, whereas the syllabic occurs in southern Europe, including the Balkans.

Meter and the influences on it, such as music and musical instrumental accompaniment, are fundamental for a comprehension of the diction and style of any oral traditional narrative song. They provide the molds, or matrices, into which thought is poured, and they are an especially important part of the definition of a formula set down by Milman Parry in the late 1920s, as a "word or group of words regularly used to express a given essential idea *under given metrical conditions.*" In each of the four Slavic areas we are considering metrical conditions are different, except that in South Slavic, in both the Serbo-Croatian and Bulgarian traditions, the most commonly used epic line is decasyllabic, with a diaeresis after the fourth syllable. In short, the matrix of the two South Slavic traditions is of the same length and has somewhat the same content. The most significant second variable, however, is in all cases the specific Slavic language involved, with its distinctive accentual patterns and word lengths, as well as its characteristic syntactic patterns. The same essential idea in each of the four areas will be expressed in words and groups of words appropriate to each language and metrical base, or structure, in the broadest sense of "metrical." It is necessary to elaborate, briefly at least, on the formulaic language of the oral traditional narrative song of the four areas.

It is not sufficient to say merely that the epithet most often used for "horse" in three of our areas is "good." One must be much more precise. First, it is necessary to define the size of the matrices in each area and the accentual or other rhythmic patterns of the specific language that condition whether an epithet is needed or used in any given position, and then, to determine what those epithets, if any, are in the several languages.

For example, one of the frequent syntactic patterns of the *bylina* line in Russian begins with the verb and places either the subject, the direct object, a prepositional phrase, or some combination of these in the second part of the line. Thus one finds in Gil'ferding: Седлае уздае добра коня ("he saddles, bridles his good horse");[1] or in the plural: Седлайте уздайте добры́х коней ("saddle, bridle, your good horses");[2] or, combining a pronominal direct object with a prepositional phrase, Посадите ю на добра коня ("put her on a good horse");[3] or, combining a substantival direct object with the same

[1] *Onežskie byliny,* collected by A. F. Gil'ferding (in the summer of 1871), 4th ed., vol. 2 (Moscow and Leningrad, 1950), p. 408, line 161.
[2] *Onežskie byliny,* 2: 415, line 58.
[3] *Onežskie byliny,* 2: 418, line 146.

prepositional phrase, Посадил Настасью на добра коня ("he put Nastasja on his good horse").[4]

Clearly, in the Russian epic tradition the use of the epithet *dobry* ("good") makes a convenient formula for "horse" in the second part of the line, including the last main stress in the line.

In the Bulgarian tradition the syntactic situation is very similar — verb plus noun object or subject — except that in Bulgarian a definite number of syllables — namely, six — are needed at the end of the line. But the epithet is again *dob'r* ("good"); for example, Слезни, Груйо, от добрата коня ("descend, Grujo, from your good horse"),[5] where the postpositive article supplies the extra syllable; or Па стегнали до два добри коня ("then they tightened the girths on their two good horses"),[6] where the numerical phrase fills the two syllables needed to adjust *dobri konji* to the six-syllable slot; or, finally, я не лови наши добри конье ("Do not catch our good horses"),[7] where the possessive adjective does the same work.

In this same song there are many cases where the name of Krali Marko's horse supplies the needed syllables in the same position:

> Марко стегна *Шарка добра коня*[8]
> /"Marko tightened the girths on Šarko, his good horse"/
> ами земни *Шарка добра коня*[9]
> /"but take Šarko, your good horse"/
> и си стегна *Шарка добра коня*[10]
> /"and he tightened the girths on Šarko, that good horse"/

It is important to note that in these cases *dobri kon'e* or *dobra konja,* four syllable formulas which we know from the *bylina* tradition, are fitted into a larger slot. In other words, it would seem possible that the two-syllable epithet has been used to fit the two-syllable noun to a four-syllable matrix, and that the four-syllable combination thus formed was then adapted to six syllables. I do not mean to imply, of course, that the Bulgarian tradition took the Russian four-syllable formula and adapted it to six syllables. I do think that it is possible,

4 *Onežskie byliny,* 2: 420, line 217.
5 *B"lgarsko narodno tvorčestvo,* vol. 1: *Junaški pesni,* ed. Ivan Burin (Sofia, 1961), p. 276.
6 *B"lgarsko narodno tvorčestvo,* vol. 1: 272.
7 *B"lgarsko narodno tvorčestvo,* vol. 1: 273.
8 *B"lgarsko narodno tvorčestvo,* vol. 1: 272.
9 *B"lgarsko narodno tvorčestvo,* vol. 1: 275.
10 *B"lgarsko narodno tvorčestvo,* vol. 1: 275.

however, that a South Slavic development from an octosyllabic to a decasyllabic metrical base is reflected here.

The Serbo-Croatian tradition has assimilated many Turkish words for "horse" into its poetic vocabulary. While one can find the epithet *dobar,* as in the following line from the songs of Avdo Avdić in Gacko:

> "a junaci *bez dobrije' konja*"[11]
> /and heroes without good horses,/

more common are such formulas as:

> "birdem stiže *dva konja alata*"[12]
> /straightway two sorrel horses came up/
> "a izadje *do konja alata*"[13]
> /and he went out to the sorrel horse/
> "preturi se *na konja alata*"[14]
> /he placed himself on the sorrel horse/

where the Turkish *alat* (*al* 'red' and *at* 'stallion') are appositives. The Serbo-Croatian singer could, indeed, have used *dobroga* in the lines above: "a izadje *do dobroga konja*" or "preturi se *na dobroga konja,*" but he preferred the Turkish word for a "sorrel horse."

The Ukrainian tradition, the last of the four under consideration, is especially instructive because of its metrical variety. In a famous passage Alfred Rambaud described the singing of a *duma* to the accompaniment of a *kobza* or *bandura* as "un instrument à cordes qui rappelle la mandoline par son fond arrondi, mais qui est beaucoup plus grande."[15] Of the musical line he wrote:

> Une phrase musicale se compose pour ainsi dire de deux membres: le premier est une espèce de récitatif où la note fondamentale de la gamme se reproduit avec insistance autant de fois qu'il y a de syllabes dans les paroles à chanter, sauf pour les deux dernières syllabes qui s'achèvent en deux notes plus prolongées, sur le quarte ou la quinte; l'autre membre est, à proprement parler, la phrase musical; il est plus développé, le chanteur se plaisant à le moduler et à lui imprimer le caractère mélancolique qui domine dans toute cette mélodie.[16]

[11] The Milman Parry Collection of South Slavic texts, collected in Yugoslavia in 1933–1935, now in Widener Library, Harvard University: no. 903, line 892.
[12] Parry Collection, no. 6588, line 420.
[13] Parry Collection, no. 903, line 494.
[14] Parry Collection, no. 903, line 496.
[15] Alfred Rambaud, *La Russie épique* (Paris, 1876), p. 438.
[16] Rambaud, *La Russie épique,* p. 439.

The principles of metrical and rhythmic structure in the *dumy* seem to be four:

(1) The *dumy* are sung in stanzas of unequal length.

(2) Lines within a stanza have 2, 3, or 4 stresses.

(3) A line has either (6) 7–8 or 9–11(12) syllables.

(4) Lines within a stanza may be grouped by number of stresses and number of syllables, together with rhyme.

Here are some examples from the classic work by F. M. Kolessa:[17]

(1) Ге́й, у святу́ неділе́ньку	3(2) stresses, 4+4=8(7) syllables
То ра́но-поране́нько,	2 stresses, 3+4=7 syllables

/Hey, on holy Sunday,
Early, very early/

(2) Ге́й, то не чо́рні хма́ри наступа́ли,	4(3) stresses, 11(10) syllables, 5(4)+2+4
Не дробні́ дощі́ накра́пали,	3 stresses, 9 syllables, 3+2+4
Ге́й то не сиві тумани й устава́ли, —	4(3) stresses, 12(11) syllables 5(4)+3+4
Як три бра́ти з туре́цької,	2 stresses, 7 syllables, 4+3
Бусурме́нської, тяжкої нево́лі,	3 stresses, 9 syllables, 4+5
Із го́рода Озо́ва утіка́ли.	3 stresses, 11 syllables, 4+3+4

/Hey, black clouds have not come,
Nor has a light rain fallen,
Hey, gray mists have not risen,
But three brothers from the Turkish
Hard, infidel prison,
From the city of Azov have escaped./

In spite of this metrical variety, however, the number of epithets for "horse," which one might expect to increase in reflection of the metrical variety, remains about the same as in Russian and Bulgarian. There are three: *dobryj* ("good"), *voronyj* ("raven black"), and *kozac'kyj* ("Cossack"). In the *duma* about Holota, for example, *dobryj* appears twice:[18] То козакъ Голота, сердечный, добрымъ конемъ гуляе ("Cossack Holota, the wretched, is riding his good horse"; variant B, line 8), but otherwise the epithet in the text is *voronyj*. In fact, in lines without a verb *voronyj* seems to be the rule.

[17] F. M. Kolessa, *Melodiji ukrajins'kyx narodnyx dum* (Kiev, 1969), pp. 263–64.

[18] The Ukrainian texts are quoted from Kateryna Hruševs'ka, *Ukrajins'ki narodni dumy*, vol. 2 (Xarkiv and Kiev, 1931).

For example, in the following, the verb, meaning "wish for," is located two or three lines above:

variant A, line 12: "Czoho ty za mnoiu uhaniaiesz?
/Why do you run after me?/
Czy na moi zbroi iasnyi?
/Is it for my gleaming weapons?/
Czy *na moi koni woronyi?*"
/Is it for my black horses?/

and its counterpart
variant G, line 48: На віщо жъ ти ва́жишъ:
/What do you wish for?/
Чи на мою̀ ясне́нькую збро́ю,
/Is it for my gleaming weapon?/
Чи на мого́ коня́ вороного,
/Is it for my black horse?/

There is only one case where the horses appear with the governing verb in the first line of the series. This is in response to the questions asked above in variant A, which comes in line 17: "ne nabihaiu ia *na twoi koni woronyi* (I am not coming for your black horses)." Variant V offers two examples where the governing verb is in the following line:

variant V, line 29: Оть теперъ твого одного коня вороного
/Now your one black horse/
Поведу до шинкарки пропивати,
/I shall lead to the tavern to drink away,/
А другимъ твоим конемъ воронымъ
/and on your other black horse/
По Килиму-городу гуляти!
/[I shall] ride through the city of Kylym [Kylyia]./

This usage is extended to the diminutive in a line modifying the line before it:

line 8: «Ты козаченьку молодый,
/You, young Cossack!/
Под тобою кониченько вороный!
/A little black horse is under you./

It is to be noted that these phrases with *voronyj* occur in (1) comparatively short lines, frequently in a series, as in a catalogue, with the governing verb in either a preceding or a following line, and (2) in

lines that would correspond to the *second part* of the Russian, Bulgarian, or Serbo-Croatian lines.

What deduction of a comparative kind can be made from this information? Each of the four traditions has its own set of metrical and syntactic patterns into which the common word for "horse," *kon'*, has been inserted. Sometimes an epithet is needed to make the word fit properly. It is true that there are some special "tradition dependent" epithets such as *bogatyrskij, kozac'kyj, ćesarski* which belong to one group and not to the others and which presumably were formed later than any common or proto-Slavic period. On the other hand, *dobryj* is found in all areas, and one might speculate that if there were a common Slavic epic, its word for "horse" was *kon'-*, and that if an epithet for "horse" was used to accommodate the metrics, that epithet was very probably a form of *dobryj*.

There remain, then, the words for color. Apparently, the *voronyj* of Ukrainian was an older epithet than *kozac'kyj*; it might be that the latter was beginning to replace the former, since they have similar metrical characteristics. *Voronoj* could well have been a common Slavic epic epithet. Words for color in the Serbo-Croatian epic are largely, though not exclusively, Turkish or from Turkish forms of Persian and Arabic (but cf., e.g., *vranac* or *vrani konj* "black horse"; *bijeli konj* "white horse," etc.); these are a peculiarity of Serbo-Croatian, although the Bulgarian tradition's use of *Šarko* ("Piebald"), indicating the color of Krali Marko's horse, falls into this category.

Each tradition, therefore, has its own peculiar ways of expressing an essential idea, but at the same time each tradition includes ways of expressing it that are common to all the Slavic traditions. The formulaic language of South Slavic epic shares many basic formulas with East Slavic, although in each tradition the exact manifestations depend on differences in metrical and musical structure and may vary somewhat. On the level of formulaic language the four traditions are like dialects of the same language. In short, the traditional technique of oral epic verse-making is the same in all four Slavic language areas that we are considering.

***

In addition to formulaic language, some larger groups of lines, such as those I call "themes," are similar in the four languages, especially in Russian and South Slavic and less so in the Ukrainian *dumy*. For example, descriptions of saddling and caparisoning a horse in the

byliny have points of comparison with the same theme in the South Slavic tradition, as shown in passages from the collections of Gil'ferding and of Rybnikov. The first example is from Gil'ferding:[19]

Седлае, уздае добра коня:	/He saddles, bridles his good horse,
На коня положил он войлочки,	On the horse he placed blankets,
На войлочки клал он потеси,	On the blankets he put girths,
На потеси седелышко черкаское,	On the girths the Cherkassian saddle,
Подвязывал двенадцать потесей,	He bound on the twelve girths.
Подвязывал шелками муханьскими,	He bound them with silk
Не для ради красы басы угожества,	Not for the sake of beauty or pleasant adornment,
Для ради закрепы богатырскоей.	But for chivalric support.
Пряжки клал меди казанскоей,	He put on buckles of Kazan copper,
Стремянки железа булатнаго.	Stirrups of damask steel./

Here is a short form of the same theme:[20]

Седлали уздали добрых коней,	/They saddled, bridled their good horses,
На коней клали попу́тники,	On the horses they put blankets,
На попутники клали наметники,	On the blankets they put straps,
На наметники седелышка черкасскии,	On the straps the Cherkassian saddles,/

A somewhat longer form is found in Rybnikov's collection:[21]

Седлалъ добра коня богатырскаго,	/He saddled his good knightly horse,
Заседлывалъ коня, улаживалъ,	He saddled the horse, caparisoned it,
Подкладалъ онъ потничекъ шелковенькій,	He put on it a silken sweat blanket,
Покладалъ на потничекъ сѐделышко Черкасское,	On the sweat blanket he put the Cherkassian saddle,
Подтянулъ подпружики шелковыя,	He tightened the silken girths.
Полагалъ стремяночки железа булатняго.	He put on the stirrups of damask steel,
Пряжечки полагалъ чиста золота,	He placed buckles of pure gold,

[19] *Onežskie byliny,* 2: 407–408, lines 127–136.
[20] *Onežskie byliny,* 2: 416, lines 63–66.
[21] P. N. Rybnikov, *Pesni,* 2nd ed., by A. E. Gružinskij, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1909–1910), 1: 39–40, lines 155–66.

Не для красы, Ермакъ, для угожества,	Not for beauty, Ermak, for pleasant adornment,
А для-ради укрепы богатырскія:	But for chivalric support:
Подпруги шелковыя тянутся,—они нѐ рвутся,	The silken girths are pulled tight — they do not move,
Стремяночки железа булатняго гнутся,—они не ломятся,	The stirrups of damask steel, if they are bent — they do not break
Пряжечки красна золота они мокнутъ, —не ржавеютъ.	The buckles of red gold, if they are wet — they will not rust./

Such passages can easily be paralleled in the South Slavic songs, both Serbo-Croatian, where they occur especially in the Moslem tradition, and Bulgarian. In the song about the wedding of Smailagić Meho by Avdo Medjedović,[22] the description of the saddling of Meho's horse, which covers more than eighty lines (1884–1965), begins thus:

"Doratovi takum izvadiše	/They brought out the gear for the chestnut horse,
Tu najprije ćebe šegetinu.	First the blanket.
Preturiše ćebe pr'o dorata,	They put the blanket over the chestnut horse,
Pr'o ćebeta sedlo od merdžana,	And over the blanket a saddle of coral,
Naokolo od zlata pleteno. . . ." (lines 1884–1888)	Woven round about with gold. . . .
"Mešt' unkaša od zlata jabuka,	In place of a pommel was a golden apple,
Koja vredi kutije dukata. . . ." (lines 1889–1890)	Which was worth a box of ducats. . . .
"Preko sedla četiri kolana,	Over the saddle were fourth girths,
I petica na dora kanica,	And a fifth woven band,
Što hajvana brani od kolana,	Which protected the animal from the girths,
Kad je u skoku il' veliku trku;" (lines 1910–1913)	When he was jumping or in a swift gallop;/

On the other hand, while there is no dearth of horses in the Ukrainian *dumy,* there are no lengthy descriptions of them but only single-line formulas, as indicated above. This is so, I believe, largely

[22] Parry Collection, no. 6840.

because most of the *dumy* are simply not the kind of songs that the *byliny* and the South Slavic epics are. They do not allow for long descriptions of epic character, and so it is not easy to compare them with those epics. But when we say this we must also immediately point out that not all South Slavic songs characterized as "epics" are indeed epics: many, especially those in the Christian tradition, are actually ballads. This is true for both the decasyllabic songs in Serbo-Croatian and Bulgarian and for the long line *bugarštice*. If one is to compare the *dumy* with South Slavic oral traditional narrative, one must seek out the balladic forms or perhaps those that are mixed. Otherwise there is no valid comparison beyond the level of verse-making and of formulas for specific essential ideas.

For example, the *duma* "Pro Xves'ka Gandžu Andybera" (About Xves'ko Gandža Andyber) and the song "Marko Kraljević pije uz Ramazan vino" (Marko drinks wine during Ramazan) are both clearly narrative, but they are not heroic in the epic sense, because they tell of a single incident of protest or defiance. There is no depth of mythic pattern or background. The Marko in this song is not like the hero of "Marko Kraljević i Musa Kesedžija" (Marko Kraljević and Musa the Highwayman) or of "Marko Kraljević i Mina od Kostura" (Marko Kraljević and Mina of Kostur). Indeed, the kind of story that it tells is quite different.

The *duma* about Xves'ko Andyber depicts a poor Cossack entering the city of Kylyia and going to an inn. While he is warming himself at the stove, three gentlemen come in and order drinks, but offer nothing to the Cossack. One of them finally asks the barmaid to bring some green beer to the poor man. Instead she brings some "mead and fine liquor," which Andyber promptly consumes. He takes out a pure gold hammer to pawn for drink and spreads gold coins on the table. Then the gentlemen and the barmaid begin to pay more attention to him. Andyber goes to the window and calls out to the rivers of the steppe to aid him, whereupon a Cossack appears with fine clothes for him, and another with Moroccan boots, and a third with a Cossack cap. It is then that the gentlemen recognize him as Xves'ko Gandža Andyber, the Zaporozhian hetman. They order more drinks for him, which he pours on his clothes because they, not he, are being honored. Andyber then orders the Cossacks to take the gentlemen outside and flog them. This is a song of protest and defiance, a ballad in scope because it focuses on a single incident, and the figure of Andyber is heroic. So we have here not an epic in the western sense, but a fine heroic ballad of social protest.

In the Serbo-Croatian tradition this Ukrainian ballad bears comparison to the song about Marko drinking wine during Ramazan, as well as others of the same kind (e.g., "Turci u Marka na slavi," "Marko ukida svadbarinu," "Lov Markov s Turcima"). In the first, the sultan issues a decree that no one may drink wine during Ramazan, nor wear green coats, nor gird himself with a sword, nor dance the *kolo* with the women. But Marko does all these things, and even forces the *hodža*s and *hadži*s to drink wine with him. When the sultan is informed about this, he sends for Marko. When Marko comes, he sits on the divan at the sultan's immediate right, cocks his fur cap over his eyes, and places his famous mace at his side and his sword across his lap. The sultan scolds Marko for disobeying the decrees, and asks why he has cocked his fur cap over his eyes and placed his mace at his side and his sword across his lap. Marko replies that he drank wine because there was nothing in his religion to stop him from doing so; that he forced the *hodži*s and *hadži*s to join him because it was against his sense of propriety for them to look on while he drank without joining him; that he was wearing a green coat because it suited him; that he had girded himself with his sword because he had paid a good deal for it; and that he danced with the women because he was unmarried. He has cocked his fur cap over his eyes because his forehead is burning; he is talking with the sultan and has his mace and sword at hand in case of a fight. If there were one, it would be hard on the person closest to him. The sultan looks around, notes that he is closest to Marko, and moves away a bit, but Marko moves also. Once he is up against the wall, the sultan gives Marko a large sum of money to buy himself a drink![23] In this song, of course, defiance is less against a system, although that is implied, than against the sultan himself.

The *duma* "Pro samars'kyx brativ" (About the brothers of Samarka) is also clearly a ballad, but for a different reason. It is elegiac, focusing on the last moments of three dying brothers; there is no action, only each one's last words. By no definition is this an epic. By contrast, there is a very large international ballad genre of "last words," or "gallows speeches," the prisoner's "good night," with a number of subdivisions. The *duma* about "Xvedir bezridnyj" (Xvedir, the one without kin) begins in the same vein as such ballads, i.e., with the words of the dying Xvedir, to which is added the fulfillment of Xvedir's

[23] Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, *Srpske narodne pjesme,* 4 vols. (Belgrade, 1958), 2, no. 70.

request to his page Jarema that leads to Xvedir's proper burial. This is not an epic, but strictly a ballad, and a very fine one, I might say. Indeed, the quality of the *dumy* as ballads is very high.

But not all the *dumy* are balladic. The *duma* "Pro Kišku Samijla" (About Kiška Samijlo), for example, is not a ballad but all epic. It is the story of an escape, beginning with the Cossacks as captives and ending with their arrival on home territory. It differs from escape stories in South Slavic epic most notably because its prison scene takes place on a galley, not on dry land. Also, although escape stories can be found, especially in the hajduk traditions, South Slavic tradition tends to deal more with rescue and release for ransom.

While actual rescue songs are almost non-existent in Ukrainian, there are several *dumy* other than that of Samijlo Kiška that deal with prisoners or captives who *talk* about being released for ransom, or who escape. In the *dumy* there is mention of ransom, as in the *duma* "Pro plač nevil'nyka" (About the lament of a captive), but no ransoming. Escapes occur in the *dumy* about Ivan Bohuslavec' and Marusja Bohuslavka, but they do not have the developed narrative we associate with epic. The subject of escape or rescue is treated in the *dumy,* to be sure, as in the other three Slavic traditions, but in quite a different manner. The *dumy* seem to stand alone in their elegiac starkness, as for instance, the *duma* about the brothers of Samarka and the *duma* about the brothers from Azov.

Another possible exception to the classification of the *dumy* as ballads is the justly famous *duma* about Ivan Konovčenko. In the fullness of its narrative this *duma* is epic and so I prefer to classify it, but the subject of a mother's curse and its tragic consequences is closer to the ballads, with their propensity for domestic tragedy.

I suspect that on the whole the *dumy* and their counterparts in the other Slavic traditions are later phenomena than the *byliny* and the South Slavic epics. The emphasis on "Cossack" alone is sufficient to indicate this. The hajduk songs in South Slavic are generally younger than the return songs or wedding songs, which are based on myth. The hajduk songs are closer to and overlap with historical songs.

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In Slavic scholarship it is customary to divide traditional sung narrative into ancient, mythological, or historical. Since the history of the people of each tradition is peculiar to them, in spite of similarity of experiences, comparative study of the historical songs would constitute comparative history. But some songs in all four traditions

name historical personages and places associated with them, although the action is not historical and may, indeed, be mythical. Let me illustrate with some famous examples. The Serbo-Croatian, Bulgarian, and Russian traditions all have epics about a hero's long absence from home and his return to find his wife about to marry again: in Russian this is told of Dobrynja Nikititch, in Serbo-Croatian, of Janković Stojan and many others, and in Bulgarian, of Krali Marko and others. But this theme is not found in the Ukrainian *dumy*. Another subject common to the first three Slavic areas is that of a "wedding," that is, bride-capture in a variety of forms, including rescue, combined occasionally with escape. This subject, too, is either lacking or handled quite differently in the Ukrainian *dumy*. The comparison rests, then, with the other three Slavic traditional epics. In these cases we can truly speak about comparative Slavic epic in terms of subject matter.

The Russian *bylina* of Dobrynja and Aljoša is the classic Russian return song, but it is not the only *bylina* treating this subject. An important element is lacking at the beginning of this Russian song — that is, the wedding. In short, Dobrynja is not called away on his wedding night — a significant fact because it excludes the possibility of there being a son who might play a role in the story. On the other hand, in South Slavic the mention of the wedding is very common, although in the classical "Ropstvo Jankovića Stojana" (The captivity of Janković Stojan), the reference is oblique:[24]

"U Ilije mlada osta ljuba,	/Ilija left behind a young bride,
mlada ljuba od petnaest dana,	a young bride of fifteen days,
U Stojana mladja osta ljuba,	Stojan left behind a younger bride,
mladja ljuba od nedelje dana."	a younger bride of a week./

Although the significance of the recent wedding seems lost in the Serbo-Croatian song, since there is no son, nevertheless a vestige remains in the quoted lines. In the song about Marko and Mina there is no hint of departure on the hero's wedding night, although, interestingly enough, Marko receives two invitations simultaneously with a summons from the sultan to fight against the Arabs. One invitation is to be *venčani kum* (sponsor) at the wedding of the king of Buda, and the other is to be godfather to Sibinjanin Janko's two sons. The idea of a wedding seems to haunt the beginning of this return song, although none actually occurs. The real difference, then, in the openings of the

[24] Karadžić, *Srpske narodne pjesme,* 3, no. 25, lines 5–8.

return song in the Russian and South Slavic traditions is that in the South Slavic the hero is recently married (in many cases, he leaves on his wedding night), whereas in the Russian this element is missing.

Another significant difference between the *bylina* about Dobrynja and Aljoša and the South Slavic return songs is in the recognition scene between the returned hero and his wife. Dobrynja comes to the wedding feast disguised as a singer and recognition occurs through a ring in a cup or chalice which is presented by the minstrel to the bride. The motif of recognition by a ring, so common elsewhere (including the English ballads "Hind Horn" and "Lord Bateman," and the Middle English romance "King Horn") is not found in the Serbo-Croatian or Bulgarian return songs with which I am acquainted. On the other hand, although the returned hero is never (as far as I recall) disguised as a minstrel, recognition is nevertheless brought about by song. For example, the hero, after telling a deceptive story about his own identity, says that his friend (whom he is pretending to be — himself, of course) had left behind a *tambura* and asked him to sing a bit in his memory. In "Ropstvo Jankovića Stojana," Stojan sings a transparently symbolic song which clearly reveals his identity. Elsewhere the hero frankly sings, "I do not wonder that my mother does not recognize me, because she has become blind from weeping; nor at my sister, since she was very little when I went away; but I do wonder at my servant for not remembering his young master. . . ." Songs, if not rings, are a common denominator in the two Slavic traditions under consideration, Russian and South Slavic, although the form that the motif takes varies.

One could continue to enumerate the famous stories known in both the Russian and South Slavic traditions, as, indeed, Putilov has done; his fine book shows that there are regional differences, such as those I have just mentioned, between the two traditions, as well as many patterns, sub-patterns, and elements common to them both. Here, too, as on the level of the formulaic language, we come to realize that we are dealing with "dialects," i.e., local narrative variations within a common stock of narrative possibilities, the sum total of which we might call "the language of narrative."

From the analysis of texts in the Slavic regions we have learned that not only is variation occurring continuously, but also that it is not strictly speaking "variation" at all (which tends to imply a fixed original of some sort), but constant re-creation within regional traditional parameters not merely of text, but also of narrative content.

Consequently it seems to be impossible, or nearly so, to say "this form of the story is common Slavic." All that we can say, after surveying all available versions in a given language or group of languages, is "these are the elements found in such-and-such a percentage of the material surveyed." Beyond that we can only speculate about the past, perhaps indicating alternatives and tentative boundaries; nor can we predict the future with any exactness. Nevertheless, we have seen that occasionally, at least, some influences that may have affected one area within a region and not any other can be noted and traced.

Since the same comparatively few "international" stories, or story patterns, are found outside the Slavic realm as well, we must eventually extend our geographic net westward into the Celtic, Germanic, and Romance areas, eastward into Asia, and, of course, to Greece and the other Balkan countries. For the moment, however, let us rest with Russia, the Ukraine and the Slavic Balkans. The larger task can be undertaken more surely when we understand the principles and methodologies involved in the study of the three important areas we have explored here.

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Seventeenth-Century Views on the Causes of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising: An Examination of the "Discourse on the Present Cossack or Peasant War"*

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For generations, historians have studied the causes and course of the mid-seventeenth-century revolt in the Ukraine. Handicapped by the limited number of sources, especially from the rebel camp, they have argued about the nature and goals of what has been variously called a "revolution," "jacquerie," "war of national liberation," or an "uprising."[1] Different interpretations of the conflict notwithstanding, they have elucidated the social, economic, religious, and cultural tensions that precipitated the revolt and have examined its transformations.[2] Although many scholars have commented on the political,

*The text, "Dyskurs o teraźniejszej wojnie kozackiej albo chłopskiej," and an English résumé were published in Frank E. Sysyn, "A Contemporary's Account of the Causes of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 5, no. 2 (June 1981): 245–57. Only for difficult problems in definition and interpretation are the relevant lines quoted here.

[1] There is no comprehensive work on interpretations of the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising. Evaluation and interpretation of the revolt were the fundamental questions of nineteenth-century Ukrainian historiography and frequent points of dispute among Ukrainian, Russian, and Polish historians. For discussions of the literature, see Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, "Naukova literatura Khmel'nychchyny," in *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy,* 10 vols. (reprinted, New York, 1954–58), 8, pt. 2: 211–24; Borys Krupnyts'kyi, *Istorioznavchi problemy istorii Ukrainy* (Munich, 1959), pp. 1–44; Bohdan Baranowski and Zofia Libiszowska, "Problemy narodowowyzwoleńczej walki ludu ukraińskiego w XVII w. w historiografii polskiej," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 61, no. 2 (1954): 197–217; Dmytro Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography* (New York, 1957) (Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., 5–6), passim; and Olgierd Górka, "Bohdan Chmielnicki — jego historycy, postać i dzieło," in *Sesja naukowa w trzechsetną rocznicę zjednoczenia Ukrainy z Rosją 1654–1954: Materiały* (Warsaw, 1954), pp. 65–102. Treatment of the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising in discussions of seventeenth-century revolts has usually been cursory and often superficial. See, for example, George Clark, *The Seventeenth Century,* 2nd ed. (London, Oxford, and New York, 1970), p. 189. More informed is the description in Henry Kamen, *The Iron Century: Social Change in Europe, 1550–1660* (New York, 1971), pp. 324–26, 369–70.

[2] In addition to the literature cited in fn. 1, see the imposing output of Soviet scholars listed in *Metodicheskie ukazaniia i bibliografiia po izucheniiu spetskursa*

social, and cultural attitudes of individuals and of various social strata, few have made these a focus of study;[3] moreover, their comments have usually been based on examples selected from diverse sources rather than on a close examination of a single source.[4] This approach limits

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"Osvoboditel'naia voina ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 gg. i vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei," pt. 1 (Dnipropetrovs'k, 1980).

[3] Some noteworthy studies are Zbigniew Wójcik, "Feudalna Rzeczypospolita wobec umowy w Perejasławiu," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 61, no. 3 (1954): 76–109; J. R. Szaflik, "Nastroje wsród społeczeństwa Lubelszczyzny w okresie wojny narodowo-wyzwoleńczej na Ukrainie (1648–1654)," *Annales Universitatis Maria Curie-Skłodowska,* sect. F, vol. 2 [1956] (Lublin, 1960), pp. 61–80; F. P. Shevchenko, "Istorychne mynule v otsintsi B. Khmel'nyts'koho," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal,* 1970, no. 12, pp. 126–32; Ivan Kryp"iakevych, "Sotsial'no-politychni pohliady Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal,* 1957, no. 1, pp. 94–105; Zbigniew Kwaśny, "Kilka uwag w sprawie szlachty lubelskiej w okresie wojny narodowowyzwoleńczej na Ukrainie w latach 1648–1654," *Acta Universitatis Vratislaviensis,* no. 108, Historia 16 (1969), pp. 31–45; Yaroslav Dashkevych, "Armenians in the Ukraine at the Time of Hetman Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj (1648–1657)," in *Eucharisterion = Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3/4 (1979–80), pt. 1: 166–88; Bernard D. Weinryb, "The Hebrew Chronicles on Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Cossack-Polish War," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1, no. 2 (June 1977): 153–77; and S. Ia. Borovoi, "Natsional'no-osvoboditel'naia voina ukrainskogo naroda protiv pol'skogo vladychestva i evreiskoe naselenie Ukrainy," *Istoricheskie zapiski AN SSR* 9 (1940): 87–124. There is, of course, much relevant material in the many works by Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, Ivan Kryp"iakevych, Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, Myron Korduba, F. P. Shevchenko, I. D. Boiko (on the peasantry), and P. V. Mykhailyna (on burghers). Yet almost all these works deal with the actions of individuals and groups, rather than with their attitudes or values. Obviously, study of attitudes and values is more feasible for the elite groups, who left written statements, than for lower orders, who usually did not.

[4] Most such works examine the historical writings and memoirs of contemporaries such as Samuel Grądzki, Samuel Twardowski, Wespazjan Kochowski, Stanisław Oświęcim, Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, Iakym Ierlych, Sylvian Muzhylivs'kyi, and the author of the Lviv Chronicle. See Jan Czubek, *Wespazjan z Kochowa Kochowski: Studium biograficzne* (Cracow, 1900); Wiktor Czermak, "Kilka słów o pamiętnikach polskich XVII-go wieku," *Ateneum* 4 (1896)): 117–35 (reprinted in *Studia historyczne* [Cracow, 1901], pp. 249–76); A. Czechowski, *Samuels von Skrzypna Twardowski, "Wojna domowa"* (Poznań, 1894); Czesław Hernas, *Barok* (Warsaw, 1973), pp. 284–94 (a discussion of Radziwiłł and Ierlych) and the introduction to Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, *Pamiętnik o dziejach w Polsce,* trans. and prepared by Adam Przyboś and Roman Żelewski, 3 vols. (Warsaw, 1980), 1: 5–86. For discussions of "foreign" works written at the time of the revolt (mostly French, German, and Italian but also including Polish) see D. S. Nalyvaiko, "Zakhidnoevropeis'ki istoryko-literaturni dzherela pro vyzvol'nu viinu ukrains'koho narodu 1648–1654 rr.," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal,* 1969, no. 8, pp. 137–44; no. 9, pp. 137–43; no. 10, pp. 134–45; no. 11, pp. 131–36; no. 12, pp. 128–32. The considerable literature on the "Cossack chronicles" cannot be included under this rubric since these works represent the thought of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. There is no study of pamphlets and political literature on the revolt comparable to Zofia Libiszowska, "Antyszwedzka literatura propagandowa z czasów Potopu," in *Polska w okresie drugiej wojny*

an understanding of the vocabulary, categories, values and collective consciousness of a distant age, for all too frequently meanings are merely ascribed and illustrations are then provided. Only an intensive study of individual contemporary texts can yield a fuller understanding of the political cultures and intellectual climate of 1648. This paper conducts such an examination of the "Discourse on the Present Cossack or Peasant War."

The "Discourse" is an invaluable source on the political climate at the time of the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising. Even though it is a propagandistic work, it treats a wide spectrum of social, religious, economic, and national issues. Indeed, the causes of the revolt mentioned in the "Discourse" are identical to those given in most modern historical works: the excessive obligations on the peasantry; the mistreatment of the Cossacks by the officials of the Commonwealth; Orthodox hostility to the spread of Catholicism in the Ruthenian lands and their dissatisfaction with the government's treatment of the Orthodox church; the Ruthenians' antagonism toward Polish dominance in Rus'. But while the anonymous author of the "Discourse" (hereafter the Discourser) touches upon many of the issues studied by modern scholars, he evaluates them from a totally different perspective. Herein lies a key to understanding seventeenth-century attitudes toward contemporaneous events in the Ukraine.

The "Discourse" has particular significance because of the time of its composition and the depth of its discussion. This political tract was written between late June and mid-November 1648. In contrast to later detailed accounts of the revolt, many of which were written in the 1650s, it reflects the attitudes and loyalties motivating the adversaries in the Ukraine in the summer of 1648.[5] Yet unlike other immediate accounts, which are mostly private letters recounting events, the "Discourse" contains a comprehensive discussion of the underlying causes of the revolt and proposes measures to forestall its recurrence.[6]

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północnej, vol. 2 (Warsaw, 1957), pp. 529–604, for the late 1650s. Poetic works have received the most attention. See Ivan Franko, "Khmel'nychchyna 1648–1649 rokiv v suchasnykh virshakh," *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 23 (1898): 1–114; and Juliusz Nowak-Dłużewski, *Okolicznościowa poezja polityczna w Polsce: Dwaj młodsi Wazowie* (Warsaw, 1972). The unpublished study of my Harvard colleague, George Grabowicz, "The Khmel'nyts'kyi Revolution of 1648 in the Contemporary Polish Literature," also treats prose works.

[5] On the dating of the "Discourse," see my "Contemporary's Account," p. 251, fn. 9.

[6] The major nineteenth- and early twentieth-century printed collections of letters are cited in M. Hrushevs'kyi, "Dzherela do istorii Khmel'nychchyny," in *Istoriia*

The document emerged from the political culture of the nobility that dominated the seventeenth-century Commonwealth. At the core of that culture lay the nobles' perception of themselves as the only real citizens of the Commonwealth and their belief that the essential divide in the population of the Commonwealth was that between noble and commoner. The institutions of the state and those of the nobility (*szlachta*) had become so intertwined that the distinction between the Commonwealth and the noble order had become blurred. Although subject to a monarch, the nobles considered themselves to be ordained by God as the free "political nation" of the republic. Hence, they jealously guarded their privileges against encroachment by the monarch and limited the freedom of other social orders. Concurrently, they affirmed the concept of the equality of all nobles, although their upper stratum, the magnates, unquestionably dominated political and economic life in the Commonwealth.[7]

The assembling of disparate states, lands, and peoples into the Commonwealth had been accomplished largely by the amalgamation of their elites. The corporate order of the *szlachta* that emerged in the Kingdom of Poland became the model for the elites of Royal Prussia, Livonia, and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. To explain the existence of diverse lands as one Commonwealth, political thinkers cited references in classical sources to the ancient Sarmatians' rule over a huge expanse of eastern Europe. "Sarmatism" was a constantly evolving set of views about the past of this territory, its peoples, and their social and political structures. One variant held that the nobles alone were descendants of the Sarmatians, which explained why nobles formed a group totally apart from other segments of the population and why a

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Ukrainy-Rusy, 8, pt. 2: 199–211. Also see *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho 1648–1657,* comp. I. Kryp"iakevych and I. Butych (Kiev, 1961); *Dokumenty ob osvoboditel'noi voine ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 gg.*, ed. A. Z. Baraboi et al. (Kiev, 1965); and *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei: Dokumenty i materialy, 1620–1654,* comp. P. P. Gudzenko et al., 3 vols. (Moscow, 1953–1954). For a discussion of letters from the period, see Hanna Malewska, *Listy staropolskie z epoki Wazów* (Warsaw, 1959).

[7] The most important recent works on the nobility are Janusz Tazbir, *Kultura szlachecka w Polsce. Rozkwit-upadek-relikty* (Warsaw, 1978); Jarema Maciszewski, *Szlachta polska i jej państwo* (Warsaw, 1969); Henry Wisner, *Najjaśniejsza Rzeczpospolita: Szkice z dziejów Polski szlacheckiej XVI–XVII wieku* (Warsaw, 1978); and Andrzej Zajączkowski, *Główne elementy kultury szlacheckiej w Polsce: Ideologia a struktury społeczne* (Wrocław, 1961). For additional literature, see Frank Sysyn, "The Problem of Nobilities in the Ukrainian Past: The Polish Period, 1569–1648," in Ivan L. Rudnytsky, ed., *Rethinking Ukrainian History* (Edmonton, 1981), pp. 80–81, fn. 11, and p. 97, fn. 68.

German-speaking noble in Prussia, a Polish-speaking noble in Great Poland, and a Ukrainian-speaking noble in Volhynia were all part of one "noble nation" (*naród szlachecki*).

During the seventeenth century, the nobility of the Commonwealth was becoming homogeneous, due to the spread of the Polish language and the Roman Catholic faith. With this came the identification of all nobles with Polish historical traditions, and of themselves as "Poles." Concurrently, the nobles' estrangement from non-nobles, including Polish-speaking burghers and peasants, increased. With the successes of the Counter-Reformation, most nobles were becoming militantly Catholic. But this process was far from complete by 1648, since non-Catholic nobles remained influential and noble liberty still encompassed freedom of conscience.[8]

The views on religion, social groups, national communities, and political structures contained in the "Discourse" will be examined here. Their examination, however, requires some departure from the text's order of presentation as outlined in my introduction to its publication (*Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 5, no. 2 [June 1981]: 247–251).

The tract was written to inspire men to action by giving a picture of the "demons" who are menacing their world — that is, the rebels. These demons are the Orthodox, the Ruthenians, and the peasants and Cossacks — groups who did indeed provide recruits for the rebels. In his condemnations, the Discourser frequently shifts focus from one demon to another — from Ruthenian to Orthodox, from Orthodox to Cossack and peasant, and from Cossack and peasant to Ruthenian.[9] To understand his purpose in interweaving the three elements of

[8] Many aspects of the eastern expansion of the noble order are treated in my "Problem of Nobilities in the Ukrainian Past," pp. 29–102. The evolution of Sarmatism as a unifying ideology is treated by Tadeusz Ulewicz in his *Sarmacja: Studium z problematyki słowiańskiej XV i XVI wieku* (Cracow, 1950), and in his "Il problema del sarmatismo nella cultura e letteratura polacca," *Ricerche Slavistiche* 8 (1960): 126–98. A good bibliography on Sarmatism and cultural affairs in the seventeenth century is given by Hernas, *Barok,* pp. 506–512. Hernas's work contains many insights into the thinking and culture of the seventeenth-century nobility. To his bibliography on Sarmatism, add the special issue of the Warsaw journal, *Teksty,* 1974, no. 4.

[9] Note, for example, the abrupt shifts from a discussion of Ruthenian history to an attack on Orthodoxy, to a description of Ruthenian jealousy towards Lachs, to a discussion of excess burdens and taxes on the peasantry ("A Contemporary's Account," lines 15–68). The last three sentences of the "Dyskurs" afford another example, as clergymen, Cossacks, and Rus' are discussed in rapid fire (lines 181–91).

religion, social order, and national community, one must first determine his views on each. This requires careful attention to the terms which describe each element,[10] and to the conventions that governed the Discourser's thinking and expression. Understanding these questions is difficult because little reseach has been done on the verbal conventions and political cultures at the time of Khmel'nyts'kyi's revolt.[11] By studying the "Discourse" as an expression of the nobiliar political culture of the Commonwealth, and by comparing its depiction to events as we understand them, we should gain a better understanding of not only this and similar texts, but also of that nobiliar culture and of the revolt itself.

The issue of religion dominates the "Discourse." The Discourser maintains that religious antagonisms — above all, the machinations of the Orthodox — are the underlying cause of the revolt. His interpretation reflects the importance of religion in early modern European

[10] Systematic study of terms and concepts of political cultures has often been done by specialists on Western Europe. See, e.g., J. G. A. Pocock's discussion of the study of terms and concepts in early modern Western Europe in "The Machiavellian Moment Revisited: A Study in History and Ideology," *Journal of Modern History* 53, no. 1 (March 1981): 49–72. Polish historians have only just begun similar studies. For the early eighteenth century, Andrzej Sowa's "Mentalność elity rządzącej w Rzeczpospolitej w okresie panowania Augusta II" (Ph.D. diss., Jagełłonian University, 1977) examines magnates' views and attitudes on the basis of correspondence, and cites Polish literature on methodology. A group carrying on such research in Warsaw is mentioned in E. Opaliński, "Serenissima Respublica Nostra (na marginesie książki H. Wisnera)," *Przegląd Historyczny* 71, no. 3 (1980): 561–69.

[11] Although there is little in the literature on the Khmel'nyts'kyi revolt per se, a number of Polish works describe political and social concepts of the period. Of the older literature, see Władysław Smoleński, "Szlachta w świetle własnych opinii," in *Pisma historyczne,* 4 vols. (Cracow, 1901–1925): 1–29. Also see Jarema Maciszewski, "Mechanizmy kształtowania się opinii publicznej w Polsce doby kontrreformacji," in *Wiek XVII: Kontrreformacja. Barok. Prace z historii kultury,* ed. Janusz Pelc (Wrocław, Warsaw, and Cracow, 1970), pp. 55–70, for a discussion of public opinion that includes media and values. Władysław Czapliński has an important essay on political thought in the same volume: "Myśl polityczna w dobie kontrreformacji (1573–1655)," pp. 39–54. Other important essays by Czapliński are his "Główne nurty myśli politycznej w Polsce w latach 1587–1655," in the collection of his articles, *O Polsce siedemnastowiecznej: Problemy i sprawy* (Warsaw, 1966), pp. 63–100; "Propaganda w służbie wielkich planów politycznych," in the same volume, pp. 164–200; and "Ideologia polityczna. 'Satyr' Krzysztofa Opalińskiego," *Przegląd Historyczny* 47 (1956): 103–121. Also see the conference paper by Stanisław Herbst, "Umysłowość i ideologia polska XVII w.," with the ensuing discussion, in Kazimierz Lepszy, ed., *Historia Polski od połowy XV do połowy XVIII wieku* (Warsaw, 1960), pp. 121–54 (VIII Powszechny Zjazd Historyków Polskich w Krakowie 14–17 Września 1958, Referaty i dyskusja, 3).

thought and political strife. Contemporary accounts of early modern European revolts often cite religion as a factor. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, pious Catholics, Calvinists, and Lutherans could countenance toleration of "error" only as a temporary expedient, and arguments for the extirpation of heresy were widespread. Religious factions frequently took up arms against sovereigns and against each other, so religious divisions were viewed as dangerous to a polity's existence. Even when religion was not the initial cause of a revolt, the grievances of a religious minority could provide justification and support for a rebel cause, while sovereigns rallied support to defend their own faith. Modern scholars, perceiving the importance of religion in early modern revolts, have shown how frequently religious institutions served as focal points both for rebels and for defenders of the status quo.[12]

The Khmel'nyts'kyi revolt had many of the characteristics of the religious war in western Europe. Taking up Orthodox grievances as a standard, the rebels made their rectification a fundamental demand. The rebels' anger was directed against Roman Catholics, Uniates, and Jews. For their part, Catholic zealots were among the rebels' most uncompromising opponents, and the powerful Catholic bishops in the senate effectively hamstrung the Commonwealth's negotiations with the rebels. But in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth the religious situation differed from that in western and central Europe, in a way that affected the role of religion in the Khmel'nyts'kyi revolt, as well as the presentation of religious issues in contemporary accounts.

During the sixteenth century the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was an exception in Europe's general religious strife. There a large Orthodox minority had long lived in a Catholic state, and the Confederation of Warsaw of 1573 committed the nobles and the monarch

[12] The literature on seventeenth-century revolts is very large, particularly because study of the revolts sparked the debate on the "general crisis" of the seventeenth century." A historiographic survey of literature on the revolts and the crisis can be found in Theodore Raab, *The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe* (New York, 1975), pp. 3–28. For comparative views of revolts, see Roger Merriman, *Six Contemporaneous Revolutions* (Oxford, 1938); Robert Forster and Jack Green, eds., *Preconditions of Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore, 1970); the review of Forster and Green's work by A. Lloyd Moote, "The Preconditions of Revolution in Early Modern Europe: Did They Really Exist?" *Canadian Journal of History* 7, no. 3 (December, 1972): 207–234; and J. H. Elliott, "Revolution and Continuity in Early Modern Europe," *Past and Present,* no. 42 (February, 1969), pp. 35–56. Literature on the Dutch and English revolts and on the French Fronde should be consulted for analysis of religious factors in revolts.

to tolerate all Christian denominations. Earlier, Poland had become a haven for Jews expelled from western and central Europe. The religious rights of peasants were never discussed explicitly and the rights of burghers depended on municipal autonomy and internal power relationships, but the religious rights of the nobles were firmly entrenched. The Commonwealth was spared the religious wars of the sixteenth and the early seventeenth century, and its inhabitants experienced a modicum of mutual tolerance surpassing mere legal toleration.[13]

During the first half of the seventeenth century, however, the religious situation in the Commonwealth was changing. King Sigismund III (1587–1632) actively supported Counter-Reformation Catholicism, and more and more nobles converted to Catholicism from Protestantism and Orthodoxy. The government refused to recognize that a large segment of the Orthodox population did not adhere to the Union with Rome negotiated in 1595–1596, and consequently began to persecute these Eastern Christians. Orthodox clergymen and laymen were obliged, then, to challenge the authority of the Commonwealth. At the same time, Catholic clerics and zealots began to demand restrictions on other churches. Acts such as the closing of the Antitrinitarian school at Raków (1638) bespoke the end of the age of tolerance.[14]

Although tolerance and toleration were on the decline, in the first half of the century they were still vital traditions. Władysław IV

[13] On traditions of tolerance and the religious problem in the Commonwealth, see Janusz Tazbir, *Państwo bez stosów: Szkice z dziejów tolerancji w Polsce XVII wieku* (Warsaw, 1958) (published in English translation as *A State Without States: Polish Religious Toleration in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* [New York, 1973]); Mirosław Korolko, *Klejnot swobodnego sumienia: Polemika wokół Konfederacji Warszawskiej w latach 1573–1658* (Warsaw, 1974); Ambroise Jobert, *De Luther à Mohila: La Pologne dans la crise de la Chrétienté 1517–1648* (Paris, 1974) (Collection historique de l'Institut d'études slaves, 21); and Wiktor Weintraub, "Tolerance and Intolerance in Old Poland," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 13, no. 1 (1971): 21–44.

[14] On the changes in the reign of Sigismund III, see, in addition to the works cited in fn. 13, Henryk Wisner's "Walka o realizację konfederacji warszawskiej za panowania Zygmunta III w latach 1587-1632," *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce* 19 (1974): 129–49. On the problems of the Orthodox church, see Kazimierz Chodynicki, *Kościół Prawosławny a Rzeczpospolita Polska 1370–1632* (Warsaw, 1934); P. N. Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba pravoslavnogo zapadno-russkogo dvorianstva s tserkovnoi uniei (do 1608)* (St. Petersburg, 1901), and *Seimovaia bor'ba zapadno-russkogo dvorianstva s tserkovnoi uniei (s 1609),* 6 pts. (St. Petersburg, 1902–1912); and Vasilii Bednov [Vasyl' Bidnov], *Pravoslavnaia tserkov' v Pol'she i Litve po "Volumina Legum"* (Katerynoslav, 1908).

(1632–48) avoided religious controversies and negotiated renewed official recognition of the Orthodox church. His policy allowed the Orthodox church led by Metropolitan Peter Mohyla (1632–1647) to pursue the active program of publication and educational reform that made Kiev the major intellectual center of the Orthodox world. Accustomed to religious pluralism, the Commonwealth's inhabitants succumbed slowly to the influences of the Counter-Reformation emanating from the west. Most important, religious liberty continued to be viewed as an intrinsic part of nobiliar liberty.[15]

The "Discourse" deals with three religious divisions: between Christians and non-Christians, between Catholic and non-Catholic Christians, and between the Greek and the Latin rites. The first of these divisions is relatively straightforward both in vocabulary and in concept. But the second and third divisions and their interrelation are complex.

Khmel'nyts'kyi's alliance with the Muslim Tatars evoked opprobrium in a society that in theory prided itself as an *antemurale Christianitatis.*[16] The Discourser condemns the rebels both for violating Christian unity and for allying with "pagans." But his condemnation of the breach in Christian solidarity pales in comparison to the ardence of his attack on the Christian "schismatics." He decries enmity between Christian peoples and Christian alliances with pagans not so as to propose an understanding between Christians of different creeds, but to show the evil of the rebels and the historic perfidy of the Ruthenians. Since he believes that the Orthodox "schism" lies at the root of the rebellion, he cannot hope to see Catholics and schismatics united in a common Christian cause.[17]

[15] On the policies of Władysław IV toward Orthodoxy, see Zacharias ab Haarlem, *Unio Ruthenorum a morte Sigismundi III usque ad coronationem Ladislai IV 1632–1633* (Tartu, 1936); S. T. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila i ego spodvizhniki (Opyt tserkovno-istoricheskogo issledovaniia),* 2 vols. (Kiev, 1883–98); and S. T. Golubev, "Zapadno-russkaia tserkov' pri mitropolite Petre Mogile (1633–1648)," *Kievskaia starina* 3 (1898): 397–420; 4: (1898): 20–50.

[16] For a discussion of the concept of *antemurale Christianitatis* and the nobility, see Tazbir, *Kultura szlachecka,* pp. 74–84; his "Przedmurze jako miejsce Polski w Europie" in Janusz Tazbir, *Rzeczpospolita i świat: Studia z dziejów kultury XVII wieku* (Warsaw, 1971), pp. 63–78; and the recent revisionist article by Wiktor Weintraub, "Renaissance Poland and *Antemurale Christianitatis,*" in *Eucharisterion = Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3/4 (1979–80), pt. 2: 920–31, which shows that Renaissance Poland was little interested in being cast as an *antemurale Christianitatis.*

[17] In addition to mentioning Tatars and Turks, at the outset the Discourser attacks the Ruthenians for recruiting pagans against the Poles ("the Ruthenians in

The divisions among Christians constitute the dominant religious themes in the "Discourse," especially the condemnation of the schism of the Orthodox and the call for the defense of the Catholic faith. On one hand stands the "true Catholic Roman faith," the "true faith," the "Catholic religion," the "Lachs' faith";[18] on the other, the "schism," the "Greek religion," or the "Ruthenian faith."[19] God is punishing the Commonwealth for its misguided concessions to the schismatics, which infringe on the rights of the Catholic church (lines 105–106 of the document). The schism is the underlying cause of the revolt, and its spearhead is the schismatic clergy ("broods of vipers, enemies of the Fatherland, destroyers of the Republic, leaders of bandits, haters of the Polish people").[20]

Description of the division between Christian denominations is complicated by the existence of two rites, Latin and Greek. The cardinal point of the Union of Brest was that a church could be Catholic although it adhered to the rites of the Greek church. In using terms for faith (*wiara, fides*), religion (*religia, religio*), and rite (*obrzędy, ritus*) the Discourser sometimes distinguishes between them carefully.[21] Thus the Christianization of the Ruthenians is given the

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former times, recruiting various pagan nations, Tatars, Moldavians, and those who reside on the Danube, in great number visited Poland, laying waste and destroying with fire and sword, not respecting Christian blood . . . "), lines 7–10. We do not know what Polish chronicler the Discourser used as his source, but his inclusion of Moldavians among the pagan nations is surprising. Professor Omeljan Pritsak has suggested that it was intended as an insult to the memory of the Orthodox metropolitan Peter Mohyla (Movila), who was of Moldavian descent. The Discourser also cites Wiśniowiecki's criticism of the rebels for having sold out to pagans (l. 145). Christianity is presented as a factor shared by Ruthenians and Poles that should mitigate hatred; see lines 17 and 18.

18 There is one mention of the "true, Catholic, Roman faith" (*wiara prawdziwa katolicka, rzymska,* line 26), one of the "Catholic religion" (*religio catholica,* line 184), one of the "true faith" (*genuina fides,* line 88), and one of the "Lach faith" (*wiara lacka,* line 48). "Catholics" is also used once, in the phrase *po katolikach-władykach* (line 106).

19 "Schism" (*schisma*) is most frequently used for Orthodoxy ("schisma albo odszczepieństwo Rusi," line 84; also in lines 87, 91, 92, 104), whereas "Greek religion" (*grecka religia*) is used twice (lines 22 and 51–52) and "Ruthenian faith" (*ruska wiara*) once (line 51). For religious designations of followers, "schismatics," as either *schizmatycy* (lines 85, 106, 112) or *odszczepieńcy* (line 102), is used four times. There is one instance of "desertores genuinae fidei" (line 88), a Latin equivalent of *odszczepieńcy.*

20 Bishops are included with priests and monks in this category (lines 85–86).

21 "Wiara" (lines 48, 50), "fides" (lines 88, 184), "religia" (lines 22, 51), "religio" (lines 19, 184), "ritus" (line 20), "obrzędy" (line 27). In one instance he uses both religion and rite (in the phrase "cum religione et ritu") as having been accepted from the Greeks (lines 19–20).

authorized Uniate interpretation, as the acceptance of the "true Catholic Roman faith, though with the ceremonies and rites of the Greek church, which was then in concord and unity with the Roman church and its highest pastor, the pope" (lines 26–29). At one point the Uniate benefices are referred to simply as "Catholic" (line 106); but elsewhere the distinction between rite and faith blurs, particularly at points where "the Greek religion" may refer to the Greek-rite church (whether in or out of union with Rome) or to the Orthodox church or faith.[22] In one instance "Greek religion" undoubtedly means Orthodoxy, as was common usage in seventeenth-century texts.[23]

The blurring of the distinctions between rite and religion or faith is in keeping with the contemporary perception of rites and practices as synonymous with a Christian faith. The idea that the Uniates could be truly Catholic while maintaining the externals of the "Greek religion" ran counter to centuries of experience. The lack of attention to the Uniates in the "Discourse" makes precise definition of the Discourser's concepts of faith and rite impossible, but this question will be taken up later in discussing the meaning of the phrases "Lachs' faith" and "Ruthenians' faith."

Other seventeenth-century writings depict the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising as God's punishment of excessive religious toleration, condemn the rebels for allying with the Tatars, and charge the Orthodox with disloyalty.[24] Still, toleration seems to have imposed some restraints.

[22] The description of the Christianization of Rus' is an example of the ambiguity in his use of "Greek religion." The Uniate interpretation would seem to assure that the Discourser would use the phrase to designate the branch of universal Catholic Christianity in the rite of the Greek church. Yet, just before the statement on the conversion, the author suggests that the character defects of the Ruthenians stem from having accepted the rite, religion, and, through intermarriage, blood of the Greeks. This statement about the Greek religion and rite was hardly appropriate for describing an equal branch of Catholicism (lines 19–20). Later, in describing the Orthodox nobility, the author says that they are "of the Greek religion" (lines 51–52).

[23] Lines 51–52. *Religiia grecka* was the usual designation for Orthodoxy and the Orthodox church in official legislation. Also see the petitions of the Orthodox nobility, "Supplikatia do przeoświeconego i jaśnie wielmożnego przezacnej Korony Polskiej i W. X. Litewskiego obojego stanu duchownego i świeckiego Senatu, w roku 1623 . . . od . . . ludzi zawołania szlacheckiego, religii starożytnej greckiej, posłuszeństwa wschodniego," in *Z dziejów Ukrainy: Księga pamiątkowa* . . . , ed. Wacław Lipiński (Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi) (Kiev [Cracow], 1912), pp. 99–111.

[24] See the works of Samuel Twardowski, *Woyna domowa z Kozaki i Tatary, Moskwą potym Szwedami i z Węgry* . . . (Kalisz, 1681), as well as the following by Jan Białobocki: *Brat Tatar abo liga wilcza ze psem, na gospodarza* . . . (Cracow, 1652); *Odmiana postanowienia sfery niestateczney kozackiey, z wzruszeniem po-*

No other work approaches the "Discourse" in its virulent condemnation of all Orthodox and call for the extirpation of schism. Indeed the preeminence of the religious issue suggests that the Discourser may have been a Catholic clergyman. Certainly, the intellectual antecedents of the "Discourse" lie in the works of the great Jesuit, Piotr Skarga, in the polemical literature of the first half of the seventeenth century, and in the circles of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith.[25]

Even the Discourser faced some constraints. He had to avoid any appearance of an attack on the nobles' right to religious liberty. Also, in assailing Orthodoxy, he faced problems different from those of a polemicist against Protestants. A society that esteemed ancient rights could readily regard the Protestant sects as a rootless modern innovation, but even the most fervent Catholics had to admit the venerable lineage of Orthodoxy. The Discourser resolved these problems by depicting the Orthodox as incorrigibly treasonous and hence implicitly forfeit of privileges. He emphasized the non-noble, low-born elements of the Orthodox constituency, and insinuated wrongdoing and treason of Orthodox nobles without directly addressing the matter of nobles' rights. Also, by supporting the Uniate interpretation of the Christianization of Rus', he called the antiquity and privileges of the Orthodox church into question.

Another challenge before the Discourser was marshaling evidence that Orthodoxy was the impetus behind the revolt. Aside from pointing to the Ruthenians' attacks on the Kingdom of Poland throughout history, he emphasized the enmity of the Orthodox clergy towards the

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koiu od miesiąca stycznia 1650, aż do września 1651 . . . (Cracow, 1653); *Klar męstwa na obiaśnienie pochodni w dalszą drogę ku nieugasłey sławie* . . . (n.p., September 1649); *Pochodnia woienney sławy* . . . (Cracow, 1649). See also Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, *Memoriale Rerum Gestarum in Polonia 1632–1656*, 5 vols. (Wrocław, Warsaw, and Cracow, 1968–75) (Polska Akademia Nauk, Oddział w Krakowie, Materiały Komisji Nauk Historycznych, 15, 18, 22, 25, 26).

[25] The most recent work on Skarga is Janusz Tazbir, *Piotr Skarga, szermierz kontrreformacji* (Warsaw, 1978). On Skarga's attitudes toward the Union of Brest and his attacks on Orthodoxy, see Józef Tretiak, *Piotr Skarga w dziejach i literaturze Unii Brzeskiej* (Cracow, 1912), especially pp. 53–82. On the polemics, see the bibliographic work of L. Ie. Makhnovets', *Davnia ukrains'ka literatura (XI–XVIII st. st.)* (Kiev, 1960), pp. 447–60 (*Ukrains'ki pys'mennyky: Biobibliohrafichnyi slovnyk u p"iaty tomakh*, 1). Also see Aleksander Brückner, "Spory o unię w dawnej literaturze," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 10 (1896): 578–644; and Tadeusz Grabowski, *Z dziejów literatury unicko-prawosławnej w Polsce, 1630–1700* (Poznań, 1922). On the Congregation, see E. Šmurlo, *Le Saint-Siège et l'Orient orthodoxe russe, 1609–1654*, 2 pts. (Prague, 1928) (Publication des Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, ser. 1, no.4).

Commonwealth and the Catholic faith. The latter he attributed to the inferiority of the clergy's culture and intellect, and to their envy at the spread of Catholicism. He charged the clergy with obstructing the political processes of the Commonwealth by bribing participants in the Diets and dietines. Finally, he accused the clergy and their "bought" champions of leading the revolt and of manipulating the Cossacks into the attack. But in his discussion the Discourser cites few incidents that compromise the Orthodox leadership, lay or clerical.[26]

How did the readers of the "Discourse" react to its charges against the Orthodox? Certainly the suspicions and theories of conspiracy that abounded in 1648 should have assured a receptive audience.[27] Some readers may have agreed that God was punishing the Commonwealth for its concessions to schism. All must have been aware that Orthodox clerics had been involved in revolts in the past. Like the Discourser, they must have heard reports of treason in the taking of cities. But at the core of the Discourser's charges was an attack on the Orthodox hierarchy that could have been accepted only by those predisposed to view all Orthodox as traitors. The religious compromise of 1632, which recognized the Orthodox hierarchy, had produced a church leadership loyal to the Commonwealth and hostile to rebel causes. It might have been plausible to charge Metropolitan Iov Borets'kyi with kindling the fires of revolt in the 1620s; it was implausible to make such an accusation in the 1640s against metropolitans Peter Mohyla or Sylvester Kosiv. The Discourser's insistence that Orthodoxy was the underlying cause of the revolt and that only the extirpation of schism would ensure peace may have been acceptable to some Counter-Reformation Catholics. But the Orthodox

[26] In discussing the ingratitude of the Orthodox for concessions already granted them and the misguided policy of seeking peace through more concessions, he mentions that "w liście swoim jeden euisdem officinae figulus et omnium secretorum et arcanorum, jako się przechwala, satio thrasonice conscius, quo successu?" (lines 108–110). I have been unable to find this letter, but consider Adam Kysil a likely candidate for the "figulus."

[27] Anti-Orthodox sentiment was voiced at the Convocation Diet in July. See, e.g., the reaction to Adam Kysil's speech on July 23, "Dyaryusz konwokacyi warszawskiej podczas bezkrólewia od dnia 16 lipca do 1 sierpnia 1648 odprawiającej się" in [Jakub Michałowski] *Księga pamiętnicza* (Cracow, 1864), pp. 122–23 (Zabytki z dziejów, oświaty i sztuk pięknych wydawane staraniem C. K. Towarzystwa Naukowego Krakowskiego, 2). Fear of the Orthodox was so great that rumors spread that Kysil would be elected king by a coalition of Orthodox and Protestants: *Litterae Nuntiorum Apostolicorum Historiam Ucrainae Illustrantes (1550–1850)*, ed. A. G. Welykyj, 13 vols. (Rome, 1959–69), 6: 267.

church hierarchy's resistance against allowing the church to be subsumed under the banner of the Cossack rebels must have weakened his argument.

Scholars have long agreed that religion was very important to chroniclers on both sides of the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising. Late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century explanations of the revolt by Ukrainian Cossack historians gave prominence to the defense of Orthodoxy as a cause. For example, the first sentence of the *Eyewitness Chronicle* reads, "The beginning and reason for the war of Khmel'nyts'kyi is exclusively the persecution of Orthodoxy and the oppression of the Cossacks by the Lachs."[28] But the *Eyewitness Chronicle* then lists the grievances of the Cossacks without any further mention of the religious issue. The almost mechanical way in which religion is mentioned in the Cossack chronicles and early manifestos has influenced some historians to see religion as an *ex post facto* justification of the revolt, rather than a real cause or issue in 1648. Khmel'nyts'kyi's lack of concern for religious issues before his entry into Kiev at Christmas 1648 has been cited as proof of religion's minor role in the revolt's early stages.[29]

The "Discourse," on the contrary, offers evidence that the religious factor was of importance from the very outset, particularly in arousing mass support for or against the rebel cause. The Discourser provides insight into the reasons for Orthodox discontent. His attacks on the Orthodox exemplify the Counter-Reformation attitudes that sparked the hostility of many Orthodox to the existing order in the Commonwealth. These attitudes also embittered the struggle over the Eastern church between the energetic Orthodox defenders and their diehard Catholic opponents. The Discourser is hardly an unbiased witness of Orthodox activities in the Ukrainian lands in the summer of 1648, but he does effectively depict the fervent resentment of the village and urban lower clergy against the triumphant Latins. Perhaps scholars have too long focused on the hierarchy and leadership of the church, so abundantly documented, to the detriment of the few extant reports of monks with sword in hand or the personal accounts by zealous Orthodox rebels.[30]

[28] *Litopys samovydtsia*, ed. Ia. I. Dzyra (Kiev, 1971), p. 45.

[29] See Hrushevs'kyi's analysis of the religious causes of the revolt and his account of the influence of the Kiev circle on Khmel'nyts'kyi: *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, 8, pt. 2: 88–117, 121–29.

[30] See A. F. Korshunov, *Afanasii Filippovich: Zhizn' i tvorchestvo* (Minsk, 1965), and my review in *Kritika* 8, no. 3 (spring 1972): 118–29.

While the "Discourse" is only an outsider's description of Orthodox discontent, it is direct testimony that some defenders of the Commonwealth viewed the revolt as primarily a religious war. The text is evidence of the growing Catholic religious fanaticism that made interconfessional relations in the Ruthenian lands very difficult. Between 1632 and 1648, such thinking paralyzed attempts at a lasting accommodation of the disputes in the Eastern church. After 1648, it doomed all efforts to come to terms with the resurgence of Orthodoxy.

In contrast to the emphasis on religious issues, the Discourser pays little direct attention to social and economic strife. Because no controversial point of view is presented, attitudes are not spelled out explicitly. However, the Discourser does reveal his attitudes toward social and economic factors indirectly, through discussion of other issues.

In early modern Europe, acceptance of the division of society into hereditary groups varying greatly in privileges, power, and wealth was virtually universal. The defenders of the existing social order had well-articulated explanations for their position. These explanations were sometimes directed at rebels against authority, and sometimes justified revolts against monarchs who tampered with an elite's privileges. Forces for change — economic, social, and political — were suspect in an age that viewed novelty as illegitimate and social divisions as ordained by God. At times, however, the structure of society and the distribution of privileges became so far removed from the actual allocation of power and wealth that redefinition of relations among social orders was unavoidable. At other times, the economic and political system broke down, giving the lower social orders a chance, at least temporarily, to throw off the bonds that oppressed them. But always the privileged orders, especially the nobilities, had the advantage of defending established and well-defined social patterns.[31]

The Khmel'nyts'kyi revolt stands out among the revolts of early modern Europe in its radical consequences for the social order and its

[31] For a discussion of early modern societies maintaining that revolution was hardly possible in them, see Moote, "Preconditions of Revolution in Early Modern Europe." Also see Elliott, "Revolution and Continuity in Early Modern Europe." For discussion of the revolutionary elements in the seventeenth-century revolts, see Rosario Villari, "Revolte e conscienza rivoluzionaria nel secolo XVII," *Studi storici* 12 (1971): 235–64.

violent, and relatively successful, rising of the lower classes against their superiors. On one level, the Cossacks, a new social order on the ascendant, challenged the noble-dominated political and social system that denied them privileges despite their de facto status as a military and economic sub-elite. On another level, the imposition of greater obligations on peasants who had been relatively little encumbered evoked a violent reaction against landlords and their clients. On yet another level, dissatisfaction among various orders — including segments of the nobility — with the arbitrary and frequently violent conduct of a small circle of magnates prompted many nobles and burghers to join the revolt. However, the radical nature of the revolt was expressed largely in action, not in manifestos or theories.

In general, justifications of the revolt were not programs for social change, but calls for the restitution of rights, albeit often bogus ones. The Cossack leadership condemned abuse of "ancient" Cossack privileges and charged magnates with transgressions against Cossack rights. Usually the Cossack leaders expressed willingness to abandon their peasant supporters if these grievances were redressed. The peasants left few statements of their goals, but remarks set down in documents of the ruling order indicate a desire to enter the Cossack ranks or to escape serf obligations, rather than to change the social order. Whereas the peasants' silence is hardly surprising, given problems of literacy and source survival, one wonders at the verbal reticence of the many nobles who joined the rebels, even on the issue of magnate misrule. They offered no real challenge to the dominant noble ideology of the anti-rebel forces.[32]

[32] On Cossack demands, see the letters of Khmel'nyts'kyi and the instructions to Cossack delegates in *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho,* passim. On the Hetmanate's social policies, see Kryp"iakevych, "Sotsial'no-politychni pohliady Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho"; V. S. Stepankov, "Sotsial'naia politika getmanskoi administratsii v gody Osvoboditel'noi voiny ukrainskogo naroda (1648–1654), bor'ba protiv nee krest"ianstva i kozatskoi golyt'by," *Istoriia SSSR,* 1979, no. 3, pp. 71–84; and V. O. Holobuts'kyi, "Sotsial'no-ekonomichna polityka het'mans'koi administratsii (1648–1657): 325 richchia vozz"iednannia Ukrainy z Rosiieiu," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal,* 1979, no. 1, pp. 25–35. On the peasantry, see V. I. Legkii, *Krest"ianstvo Ukrainy v nachal'nyi period osvoboditel'noi voiny 1648–1654* (Leningrad, 1959). For a discussion of nobles who joined the revolt, see Wacław Lipiński (Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi), "Stanisław Michał Krzyczewski: Z dziejów walki szlachty ukraińskiej w szeregach powstańczych pod wodzą Bohdana Chmielnickiego," in *Z dziejów Ukrainy,* pp. 157–328 (recently republished together with a Ukrainian translation as *Uchast' shliakhty u velykomu ukrains'komu povstanni pid provodom Het'mana Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho,* ed. Lev R. Bilas [Philadelphia, 1980]); "Dwie chwile z dziejów porewolucyjnej Ukrainy" in *Z dziejów Ukrainy,* pp. 515–617; and *Ukraina na perelomi, 1657–59:*

Although social radicalism was little evident in the rebels' pronouncements, the anti-rebel forces depicted the revolt as a bloody jacquerie against society and civilization. They condemned the Cossacks as the driving force of the revolt and portrayed the uprising as a rebellion of subjects against their lawful masters. This perspective suffused almost all writings from the anti-rebel camp, although proponents of accommodation did mention some of the rebels' grievances.[33]

The "Discourse" conforms closely to the dominant ideology of the Commonwealth in its description of social groups and their position in the revolt. It divides society into nobles (*szlachta, ordo equester*) and commoners (*pospolitość* or, negatively, *chłopstwo*).[34] The tract is addressed to the first group, so as to rally it to defend the Commonwealth. It condemns the second group as the source from which the rebels were drawn. Hence the Discourser entitles his work "On the Present Cossack or Peasant War," emphasizes the base origins of the rebels, and labels the rebellion as a manifestation of baseness. He describes the "barbarous" acts of the rebels in detail, particularly their attacks on nobles. It is true that in explaining the causes of the revolt he offers implicit criticisms of existing social and economic conditions, but he never proposes a change in the socioeconomic system. His

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Zamitky do istorii ukrains'koho derzhavnoho budivnytstva v XVII stolitti (Vienna, 1920). Social and political thought in the period is examined in the recent Ph.D. thesis by Stephen Velychenko, "The Influence of Historical, Political, and Social Ideas on the Politics of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Cossack Officers between 1648 and 1657" (London School of Economics, University of London, 1980).

33 See Baranowski and Libiszowska, "Problemy narodowowyzwoleńczej walki"; Franko, "Khmel'nychchyna 1648–1649 rokiv v suchasnych virshakh"; and Wójcik, "Feudalna Rzeczypospolita wobec umowy w Perejasławiu." Letters form a particularly useful source on attitudes. See the large collection for 1648 in *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 1–361, and the works cited in fn. 2.

34 For mentions of the nobles and nobility, see lines 50–52 (where he indicates that gradations within the nobility are important), line 66 (a discussion of peasants and their lords, *panowie*), line 116 (the Cossacks' inability to struggle against their lords), and lines 124, 139, 145, 158, 162, 164, 174 and 178. While the terms used for nobles are few, those for commoners are numerous. Only once is the neutral term *pospolitość* used (line 69). Otherwise, the Discourser favors *chłopstwo* to describe Cossacks, peasants, and rebels. Although derived from *chłop,* the word for peasant, here *chłopstwo* is derogatory for men of base birth — reflective of the ideology which did not differentiate between Cossack and peasant. There is little discussion of the burghers, so there is little material on how they fit into the social divide. For mentions of commoners and various men of base birth and their characteristics, see lines 3–4, 36–38, 46–47, 115–16 (the Cossacks as *chłopstwo*), 120 (blood that is *ignobili, plebeio, rustico*), 124, 153–54, 159–60 (rebels and *chłopstwo* linked together). Frequently the nobility and the baseborn are placed in opposition.

depiction of the war as an uprising of commoners against the nobility is intended to provide a clearcut situation and rally all nobles in a united front against their class enemies. In a number of instances, however, this representation of the relation of social orders in the revolt is contradicted by his own evidence.

Throughout the "Discourse" the peasants receive relatively little attention. After admitting that excessive burdens were placed on the peasantry, the Discourser depicts the peasants' cruelty against the lords and estate stewards as retribution. He thereby implicitly criticizes the treatment of the peasantry, but places primary blame not on the lords, but on their stewards, lessees, and tax farmers, many of whom were lesser nobles. Such criticism was certainly more palatable than criticism of the landlords themelves. But far from calling for a redress of the peasants' grievances, the Discourser ignores them through most of the discussion.[35]

The second major segment of commoners in the Ukraine, the burghers, receives still less attention. It is said merely that the assumption of municipal offices by Lachs has aroused jealousy, and that priests organized the taking of certain cities. It may be presumed that the author has in mind the priests' role in leading fifth columns of Orthodox Ruthenian burghers within city walls; this would explain his proposal that in the Ruthenian lands nearer Poland only Lachs be allowed to live in cities. The author is little disposed to discuss the burghers, but his recognition of their importance in the revolt is inherent in this drastic proposal. Catholic and Orthodox burghers are mentioned in passing, but another chiefly urban element of the population, the Jews, is not mentioned at all. Although the author charges the rebels with acts of cruelty and barbarity, he does not mention their slaughter of the Jews.[36]

[35] In the ideology of the nobles, the Cossacks were also peasants, and the derogatory *chłopstwo* could describe all commoners. For discussion of Cossacks as *chłopstwo,* see line 115. For discussion of peasants in the strict sense, see lines 65–68.

[36] The "treason" of Ruthenian burghers was a common refrain in 1648. For the participation of Ruthenian burghers in the revolt, see O. S. Kompan, *Uchast' mis'koho naselennia u vyzvol'nii viini ukrains'koho narodu 1648–1654 rr.* (Kiev, 1954). The Discourser's omission of the Jews is significant because, to obtain protection, Jews were flocking to the camp of his hero, Wiśniowiecki. In this omission his text is like many accounts of the revolt: each group in the fragmented society of the Ukrainian lands wrote about its own fate and ignored that of others. The Discourser discussed the barbarities that were likely to move his readers —the execution of landowners and the desecration of Catholic churches. His omission of the Jews probably also reflected his discomfort with the relations between land-

In discussing the commoners, the Discourser focuses on the Cossacks. Yet, considering his loathing of the Cossack-led revolt, the treatment is remarkably detached. He assumes that they will in the future, as they have in the past, rise up in revolt against the Commonwealth and hence must be destroyed. But the Discourser's venom is directed not at the Cossacks themselves, but at those who are manipulating the Host — the Orthodox clergy and lay supporters. He even admits that some Cossack grievances against the administration of the Host and Commonwealth officials are justified. But the assertion that mistreatment of the Host provoked the revolt is dismissed, on the grounds that redress could have been sought in other ways. In addition to being marionettes of the Orthodox clergy and delegates to the Diet, the Cossacks are portrayed as base commoners who had to turn to the Tatars because they could not stand up to the lords on their own. The Discourser sees no place for such rabble in the Commonwealth. He proposes that the very name of the Zaporozhian Cossacks be obliterated and that they be replaced on the Ukrainian frontier by nobles from Masovia and Podlachia.[37] At one point the Discourser has a more

owners and Jews in the Ukrainian lands: a zealous Catholic in an anti-Semitic age could hardly justify this symbiotic partnership. On no point were the defenders of the Commonwealth so vulnerable, in ideological terms, as to the rebels' charge that the enemies of Christ had been raised up over a Christian people. Self-interest might lead Wiśniowiecki and his peers to protect Jews, but anti-rebel propagandists and historians were reluctant to defend the Jews' position in the old order. The Discourser may have decided just to avoid the problem. There is, however, one instance where he might have had the Jews in mind — his admission that excessive exactions had been made from the peasants by stewards and lessees, a group which included Jews, particularly in the popular imagination. Such criticism not only absolved the major landowners of responsibility for the excesses, but also implied criticism of their Jewish agents. On expressions of anti-Semitism, see Kazimierz Bartoszewicz, *Antysemityzm w literaturze polskiej XV–XVII w.* (Cracow, 1914).

[37] The Discourser provides a resolution for one of the most difficult problems in the nobles' conception of society — the existence of the Cossacks. He affirms that they in no way differed from the peasantry and the rabble in general (line 115). This widespread social tenet of the nobility conflicted with the function of the Cossack in the Commonwealth and with the numerous privileges that the Cossacks had wrung from the king and Diet. In 1632 the Cossacks had even insisted that as members of the body-politic, they should be allowed to participate in electing the king. The Diet had replied that they were indeed part of the body of the Commonwealth, like fingernails and toenails that had to be pared from time to time (Zbigniew Wójcik, *Dzikie Pola w ogniu: O Kozaczyźnie w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej* [Warsaw, 1960], pp. 130–31). Refusal to accept them as "worthy of being incorporated into the Fatherland" (quoting Wiśniowiecki; line 146) implied a determination not to tolerate their de facto existence as a social order any longer. The Discourser therefore proposed a final solution to the question — the annihilation of all the Cossacks.

"positive" appraisal of the Cossacks' potential, warning that a new "Cossack Commonwealth" may be created. But in this instance he intimates that other forces are behind the Cossacks.[38]

The Discourser voices the dominant ideology of the Commonwealth in describing the noble order. The Commonwealth, the Fatherland, and the Crown of Poland (in the text *Korona Polska* implies the Kingdom of Poland as well as the Polish Crown, the symbol of sovereignty) are the patrimony of the *szlachta,* or the order of knights. Challenges to them must be suppressed, for only harm can come from compromises with the base orders. The noble is above all a warrior, more valorous than the Cossack and capable of replacing him as defender of the Ukraine's borders. The Discourser supports his argument with quotations from Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, leader of the armed resistance against the Cossack revolt and the opponent of all compromise.[39] Thus, he, like many nobles of the age, found an archetype of noble virtue in the brave and intransigent prince.[40]

The Discourser does not question the powerful political or economic position of the nobles, although he says that the nobles' excessive exactions have provoked the peasants. His criticism of estate stewards and lessees is implicitly a criticism of the system of large domains owned by absent magnates and a recognition of the abuse of the Cossacks by the great nobles. Yet nowhere does he criticize the fabulously wealthy magnates. Instead, the great magnate Wiśnio-

[38] The mention of the creation of a "New Cossack Republic" or a "Ruthenian Principality" is followed by the phrase "którego snadź ktoś afektuje." This aside is probably an attack on Adam Kysil, leader of the Orthodox nobility and negotiator with the Cossacks. Kysil's treason was commonly alleged in 1648: see, for instance, Lypyns'kyi, "Stanisław Krzyczewski," pp. 171–82. Kysil's public statements had certainly provided ammunition for his enemies. On May 31 he warned that "Nieprzyjaciel obwoływa novum Vasallum Krymowi z Ojczyzny naszej, i z własnego na wszystek świat libertatis domicilio, format sobie domicilium vel Dominum . . . Kijów Stolicę bydź swoją deklarował," Kysil to Primate Maciej Łubieński, in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza,* p. 27. At the election Diet, Kysil' spoke of the rebels' lack of respect for the *majestas Reipublicae,* and maintained that they, too, were a *Rzeczpospolita,* see the *votum* of 10 October 1648, in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza,* p. 238. Such statements lent themselves well to opponents who sought to prove that a secessionist plot was afoot.

[39] On Wiśniowiecki's policies, see Władysław Tomkiewicz, *Jeremi Wiśniowiecki (1612–1651)* (Warsaw, 1933) (Rozprawy Historyczne Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego, 12), pp. 181–298.

[40] For examples of paeons to Wiśniowiecki, see the works of Jan Białobocki cited in fn. 24.

wiecki is held up as a hero whom other nobles should emulate. The concept of *szlachta* equality and liberty as the common inheritance of all nobles — from pauper to magnate — dominates the "Discourse," as it does much of the Commonwealth's political writings. It muted any criticism of the magnates who were impinging on other nobles' rights and who had brought the Dnieper basin to the state of near anarchy.[41]

Initially the discussion of social strata appears to be relatively clearcut. The Discourser's disdain for commoners, however, has a more complex aspect: he sees base elements as incapable of inspiring and planning the revolt. His attitude toward the Orthodox clergy and lay nobility is the key to his real view of the social constituency of the rebel camp.

The clergy were recognized as a separate corporate order in the Commonwealth, but the distinction between noble and commoner penetrated into it. Roman Catholic clergymen had extensive privileges and, with the support of Rome, were a major force in the external and internal affairs of the Commonwealth. Yet the clergy's influence depended on the Roman church's acceptance of the noble-commoner divide. Major clerical offices were reserved for the nobility. Noble bishops and abbots often saw themselves principally as members of the noble order.[42]

The position of Orthodox clergymen was analogous, albeit weaker. The illegal existence of the church between 1596 and 1632 had undermined a juridical position already less advantageous than that of the Catholic clergy. As in the Catholic church, major posts were reserved for the nobility. Indeed, the rights of nobles were more sweeping in the Orthodox church than in the Catholic church. Resistance to the Union of Brest was built on the insistence that the hierarchy and the clergy could not make decisions without the laity. After 1596 the Orthodox clergy frequently protested that they would not negotiate with the government without the participation of the lay nobility.[43]

41 On relations between magnates and other nobles, see Maciszewski, *Szlachta polska i jej państwo,* pp. 156–69. On the position of magnates, see Władysław Czapliński and Adam Kersten, eds., *Magnateria polska jako warstwa społeczna* (Toruń, 1974).

42 On the position of the church and the clergy in the Commonwealth, see Janusz Tazbir, *Historia Kościoła katolickiego w Polsce 1460–1795* (Warsaw, 1966), and *Kościół w Polsce,* ed. Jerzy Kłoczowski, 2 vols. (Cracow, 1966–69).

43 On the legal position of the Orthodox church and clergy, see Bednov, *Pravoslavnaia tserkov' v Pol'she i Litve.* The position of the laity in the church is discussed by Viacheslav Zaikin (Zaikyn), *Uchastie svetskogo elementa v tserkovnom upravlenii: Vybornoe nachalo i sobornost' v Kievskoi mitropolii v XVI i XVII v.* (War-

In portraying the Orthodox clergymen as major villains of the revolt, the Discourser asserts their superiority to the Cossacks and peasants in organization and intellect, but he does not willingly admit their superiority in social position or descent. Rather he mocks the lower clergy and monks as descendants of "field and plough peasants." Elsewhere he condemns the Orthodox bishops, and he undoubtedly has the higher clergy in mind in the accusation about bribery of delegates to the Diet. In so doing, he attacks a group of noble descent, but he avoids direct mention of this inconvenient fact.

The Discourser has more difficulty fitting the Orthodox lay nobles into his explanation of the revolt. These "deserters of the True Faith" are accused of having been bribed by the clergy to carry on obstructionist tactics at the Diet and dietines. The nobles who for more than fifty years had used their privileges to protest the abrogation of Orthodox privileges are portrayed as manipulators of the lower orders. The Discourser casts aspersions on their motivations, but his own understanding of their importance in Orthodox affairs assures that in describing the revolt he alludes to the lay Orthodox nobles, albeit in a roundabout manner.

The depiction of the revolt as a conflict between social orders suffers by the Discourser's dual attack on Orthodox nobles, both lay and clerical. A reluctance to admit openly that "brother nobles" are among the despised Orthodox and rebels underlies the entire text. Indeed, the "Discourse" is the product of tension between the author's contradictory goals. He views the Commonwealth as the perfect political embodiment of a free nobility, rejects any possibility that nobles could be dissatisfied with its institutions, and depicts the conflict as a revolt of commoners against the nobility. Yet he is convinced that the masses are not the real, conscious actors of history and that the Orthodox nobles are substantially responsible for the revolt. The result is a series of circumlocutions and verbal gymnastics.

Such gymnastics appear in the discussion of the growth of Roman Catholicism in the Rus' lands. The Discourser attributes this development to the ignorance of the Orthodox clergy, and maintains that the Orthodox church retains only peasant believers. He says that there are no longer any princes or great lords of the Ruthenian faith. But he has departed so far from the actual situation that he is compelled to emend

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saw, 1930); and Orest Levitskii (Levyts'kyi), "Cherty vnutrennogo stroia Zapadno-Russkoi tserkvi," *Kievskaia starina* 8 (1884): 627–654. Also see my discussion in "Problem of Nobilities in the Ukrainian Past," pp. 54–61.

with the addition that while it is true that there are important nobles of the "Greek religion" in various counties, he really has in mind high dignitaries and senators. The whole passage consequently becomes very murky. Even the emendation about high dignitaries and senators adds to the confusion, because there were in fact two senators of the Orthodox faith in 1648, as well as a number of princes. But fundamentally, the whole passage reveals that although Orthodoxy was on the decline, it was not the faith of peasants alone. One may, of course, doubt that readers of the time were disposed to critical analysis of the Discourser's statements, but his added explanations show an assumption that the reader would not accept exaggerations unquestioningly.[44]

Even more contorted are the Discourser's attacks on the Orthodox nobles. He is determined not to legitimize the Orthodox cause by admitting that nobles had fought for their freedom of conscience at Diets and dietines. He hates the nobles whom he sees as behind the revolt, but is reluctant to admit a noble constituency among the rebels. He carefully avoids the word "noble" in discussing the Orthodox nobles. Those who defended the Orthodox church at the Diets are referred to as "deserters of the true faith." Their activity is not a defense of their faith, but an effort to win the adulation of the masses and to attend Diets at someone else's cost. He charges "these loquacious and factious men" with attempting to gain by arms what they cannot gain by reason. He portrays them as bribed agents of the Orthodox clergy and conspirators against the Commonwealth. The Discourser seeks to express his perception of the importance of Orthodox nobles in the revolt without facing all the implications of nobiliar support for Orthodoxy and for the revolt.[45]

Religious and social conflicts are widely acknowledged as causes of

[44] For the passage, see lines 47–52. Adam Kysil and Bohdan Stetkevych were senators. On families that remained Orthodox, see the election charter of Sylvestr Kosiv of 25 July 1647 in *Z dziejów Ukrainy,* pp. 136–38. Among princely families, the Chetvertyns'kyi, Ogyns'kyi, and Puzyna families were still actively involved in Orthodox affairs and provided episcopal candidates from their ranks.

[45] The phrase "desertores genuinae fidei" could be interpreted to mean Catholics who accepted bribes to serve the Orthodox church. However both the remainder of the text (phrases such as "viri isti loquestes factiosi, qui vocem suam et operam in quaestum locarunt, wespół z swemi duchownemi," lines 96–97 and the historical context make it clear that the Orthodox nobles are meant. The phrase might be understood within the Uniate interpretation that the Orthodox were bound by the Union of Brest or simply as a description of schism. On the activities of the Orthodox nobles in defense of their faith, see Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba . . . do 1608,* and *Seimovaia bor'ba . . . s 1609.*

early modern revolts; national tension is not. Nineteenth-century historians frequently depicted revolts such as the Dutch and the Catalan as uprisings of united, nationally-conscious communities. In reaction, twentieth-century historians have stressed how different the early modern societies of corporate orders were from modern nations, how weakly national consciousness was developed among the wider strata of the population, and how low the cultural-ethnic community and its historical territory stood in the hierarchy of loyalties of most early modern men. Recently, however, attention has been paid to the phenomenon of national consciousness in early modern Europe, as well as to the defense of traditional regional liberties by elites and the arousal of popular xenophobia during early modern revolts.[46]

The subject of national consciousness and national community is essential to the study of the seventeenth-century Commonwealth, a state which comprised many peoples and cultures. Yet that subject is complex, because of the difficulty of decoding seventeenth-century terms and perceptions. Scholars have shown that it is a mistake to read modern nationalities into the terms "Polak" or "Lach," "Rusnak" or "Rusyn." It has been pointed out that in the Commonwealth "nation," or *naród,* commonly referred to the inhabitants of a region, and then often to its *szlachta* alone. Students of the nobility have emphasized the emergence of the concept of a *szlachta* nation based on Sarmatian ideology. Finally, it has been shown that "Polak" and "Lach" were sometimes used to designate the nobility, as opposed to the peasantry, in ethnically Polish as well as non-Polish territories. Terminology is especially ambiguous for some parts of the Ukraine in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, because there class, religious, and linguistic factors converged so that a Polish-speaking, Roman Catholic nobility came to rule over a Ukrainian-speaking, Uniate or Orthodox peasantry.[47]

[46] The essay by J. W. Smit, "The Netherlands Revolution," in Robert Forster and Jack P. Greene, eds., *Preconditions of Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore, 1970), pp. 19–54, criticizes earlier national interpretations of the revolt and points out their limitations. For a discussion of national consciousness in the period, see Orest Ranum, ed., *National Consciousness, History, and Political Culture in Early-Modern Europe* (Baltimore, 1975). Also see Konstantin Symmons-Symonolewicz, "National Consciousness in Medieval Europe: Some Theoretical Problems," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 8, no. 1 (Spring 1981): 151–66. For a discussion of the need to study the national factor in early modern revolts, see Elliott, "Revolution and Continuity in Early Modern Europe," pp. 47–51.

[47] The most important studies are Stanisław Kot, "Świadomość narodowa w

The question of national tension is particularly emotion-laden in studies on the Khmel'nyts'kyi revolt. Ukrainian historians — the Cossack chroniclers of the eighteenth century, the populists of the nineteenth century, the members of the "state" historical school of the early twentieth century, and present-day Soviet Ukrainian historians — have all tended to view it as a revolt of the Ukrainian people against Polish masters. Soviet historians have usually depicted it as a "national-liberation war" which expressed the desire of Ukrainians to throw off Polish rule and unite with their Russian "brothers." While some Polish scholars have seen the war as a Polish-Ukrainian/Ruthenian conflict, most have emphasized social, economic, and, to a lesser degree, religious causes. Most nineteenth-century Polish historians supported a restoration of a "historic Poland" and a "Polish nation" encompassing Ukrainian lands, a program that did not readily admit past Polish-Ukrainian conflict. Twentieth-century scepticism about the role of national consciousness and national tensions in early modern revolts has reinforced the earlier position of Polish historiography.

The issue of the national element in the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising is far from resolution. Any answer must be based on a careful description of the "national" or "proto-national" communities of the seventeenth

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Polsce XV–XVII," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 52, no. 1 (1938): 15–33; Janusz Tazbir, "Świadomość narodowa," in *Rzeczpospolita i świat: Studia z dziejów kultury XVII wieku* (Wrocław, 1971), pp. 23–43; the chapter "Świadomość narodowa szlachty" in Tazbir, *Kultura szlachecka w Polsce,* pp. 85–103; and Jan Jakubowski, *Studia nad stosunkami narodowościowymi w Litwie przed Unią Lubelską* (Warsaw, 1912) (Prace Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego, Wydział II, Nauk Antropologicznych, Społecznych, Historii i Filozofii, 7). Discussions of the development of Polish national consciousness in the Middle Ages should also be consulted: Roman Grodecki, "Powstanie polskiej świadomości narodowej na przełomie XIII i XIV wieku," *Przegląd Wpółczesny,* no. 52 (1935), pp. 3–35; Roman Heck, "Problemy świadomości historycznej średniowiecznego społeczeństwa polskiego," in Roman Heck, ed., *Dawna świadomość historyczna w Polsce, Czechach i Słowacji* (Wrocław, etc., 1978); Bronisław Geremek, "Metody badań nad świadomością społeczeństwa polskiego w średniowieczu," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 85, no. 2 (1978): 311–14. On Ruthenian-Ukrainian national consciousness, see the works of Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi. Also see K. H. Huslystyi, *Do pytannia pro utvorennia ukrains'koi natsii* (Kiev, 1957). Regrettably the major work *Ukraintsi,* edited by Huslystyi and published in a provisional form, has been blocked from final publication in Kiev: H. Huslystyi, ed., *Ukraintsi: Istoriko–etnohrafichna monohrafiia. V dvokh tomax* (Kiev, 1960). The question of Ruthenian national consciousness from 1569 to 1648 is the subject of a recent doctoral dissertation by Teresa Chynczewska-Henne done at the Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw, "Świadomość narodowa Kozaczyzny i szlachty ukraińskiej w XVII wieku."

century, on an analysis of views and attitudes toward "national" categories among various elements of the population, and on a more exact description of the goals of the revolt and the reaction it engendered. Special attention must be given to the relationship of religion and nationality in seventeenth-century Ukraine, since the Eastern church was also the Ruthenian church.[48]

In what way does the Discourser present the rebellion as a conflict between peoples or national communities? He speaks about the hatred of the Ruthenian "nation" (*naród ruski*) against the Lachs or Poles, and about the Ruthenians' machinations against the Crown of Poland despite their linguistic and blood ties with the Poles. He asserts that the present conflict is but one more uprising, takes comfort in the earlier victories of the Poles, and decries the flaws in the Ruthenians' character and their cultural backwardness. In describing their envy of the Lachs who had settled in their lands, he says that the Ruthenians wanted to drive the Lachs out. The revolt may give birth to a Ruthenian principality, he fears, but if the Cossacks are destroyed, the Rus' will never again raise a hand against the Kingdom of Poland. In sum, the Discourser undoubtedly depicts the conflict as a "national" confrontation of Ruthenians and Poles. But to understand his view of this "national" element, we must first understand his perception of who the two peoples were.

In noting the events of the six centuries that elapsed between the reign of Volodimer the Great and the outbreak of the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising, the "Discourse" reflects the changing nature of the Ruthenians. At the beginning the Rus', Ruthenians, or "Ruthenian nation" are presented as a people of the Slavic tongue[49] who under Prince Volodimer had accepted Christianity from the Greeks and subsequently were involved in numerous campaigns against their neighbors, the Poles. These Ruthenians had their own polity, with Kiev as the capital, lived as a compact population having its own language, and, after the conversion, professed a common "Ruthenian faith." In sum,

[48] I have discussed some of the aspects of this problem in "Ukrainian-Polish Relations in the Seventeenth Century: The Role of National Consciousness and National Conflict in the Khmelnytsky Movement," in Peter Potichnyj, ed., *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present* (Toronto, 1980), pp. 58–82.

[49] He does not say specifically that the Ruthenians are Slavs, but this is implicit in his statement that the Ruthenians and Poles had one language and the same ancestors (line 17). His arguments that two peoples of common language and descent should not be enemies can be studied as an early statement of Slavophilism. For a discussion dealing with both Sarmatism and Slavophilism, see Ulewicz, *Sarmacja*.

the Ruthenians are depicted as the distinct political, cultural, and religious community that was Kievan Rus'.

The situation of the seventeenth-century Ruthenians was far different from that of their tenth-century ancestors. The Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands did not have an independent state nor did they possess a homogeneous population, culture, or faith. Not only were conversions to Protestantism and Roman Catholicism numerous, but the Ruthenian church had split in two, with one faction uniting with Rome. Hence we must take care to understand who the Discourser has in mind when he mentions the seventeenth-century Rus' or Ruthenians.

The Discourser uses "Rus'" to designate both a territory and a people. There are several instances of "Rus'" being used as a territory: there is no learning in Rus', the Lach's faith is taking hold in Rus', and "deeper Rus'" is the home of all rebellions. Other territorial references are to the "Ruthenian territories," "the Ruthenian counties," and "their [the Ruthenians'] land," or to the specific regions "Ukraine" (i.e., the Kievan palatinate) or "Podillia." Other than using the qualifier "deeper," the Discourser does not say what territories, specifically, constitute Rus'. "Rus'" as a reference to a group of people or as the collective plural for Rusyn/Ruthenian occurs in mentions of the schism of the Rus', that the Rus' should be allowed to live only in the villages, that the Rus' were jealous of the Lachs' successes in their land, and that "all the Rus'" put their trust in the Cossacks.

The references to the Ruthenians yield certain, if incomplete, information on who the Ruthenians were considered to be in the seventeenth century. The intermeshing of dynastic, political, territorial, and historico-cultural criteria makes it difficult to determine who is meant by "Lithuanians," "Poles," or "Muscovites" in seventeenth-century texts. This problem is simpler for the "Ruthenians" because there was no Ruthenian dynasty or state. Many seventeenth-century texts use "Ruthenians" in a territorial sense to describe the inhabitants, or only the upper classes, of the palatinate of Ruthenia or of the palatines of Kiev, Volhynia, Bratslav, and Chernihiv, collectively. In the "Discourse," however, the term is used primarily as a description of a historico-cultural community, albeit one associated with the Rus' land. The question of Ruthenian historical continuity is clear, moreover: the seventeenth-century Ruthenians are heirs to the Rus' of Volodimer, prince of Kiev. In speaking of the Ruthenians as heirs to Kievan Rus', the Discourser does not mention the other pretenders to that inheri-

tance — the Muscovites. We cannot deduce whether he distinguished sharply between the Ruthenians in the Commonwealth and the Muscovites (as did many of his contemporaries) or whether he saw them as parts of one Rus' people descending from the Rus' of Volodimer (as did others of his contemporaries) or held both views, depending on context.[50] It would appear that he did not see Muscovy as an active rival for the lands of Rus'-Ukraine, for he feared a formation of a new Ruthenian principality rather than secession to Muscovy. Whether his concept of "Rus' nation" included the Belorussians, as so often occurred in contemporary texts, also cannot be ascertained. But although the Discourser says nothing about contemporary views of the relations among the East Slavs, he does provide information on the relationship between the religious affiliation and national designation of the Ruthenians.

Of all the sins of the Ruthenians, the Discourser saw profession of Orthodoxy as the most grievous. To be part of the "Rus'" people, one had to profess the "Rus'" faith. Other than two mentions of the "Greek religion" and a few references to schism, references to Orthodoxy use adjectival forms of "Rus'." To the Discourser, that faith belonged to a particular people and formed an intrinsic part of their identity.

[50] Views about the relations between Muscovy/Muscovites and the Rus'/Ruthenians of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth have yet to be explored systematically. Ivan Lappo, *Ideia edinstva russkogo naroda v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi* (Prague, 1929), is a useful but polemical work. Also see Omeljan Pritsak and John S. Reshetar, "The Ukraine and the Dialectics of Nation-Building," in D. W. Treadgold, ed., *The Development of the USSR: An Exchange of Views* (Seattle, 1964), pp. 248–49, 255–59. For an instance of the clear distinction of Rus' from Muscovy, see Kassian Sakowicz (Kasiian Sakovych), *Kalendarz stary, w którym jawny y oczywisty błąd okazuie się około święcenia Paschi,* 2nd ed. (Warsaw, 1641), p. 20. Sakovych states: "Że więcey Narodów trzymaią Stary Kalendarz niźli Nowy iako to Graeci, Wołosza, Ruś, Moskwa, y niektórzy hereticy w Niemieckich miastach" (That more peoples retain the old calendar than the new, such as the Greeks, Moldavians, Ruthenians, Muscovites and some heretics in the German cities). For a clear historical distinction, see the Hustyn chronicle in *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei,* vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1843), pp. 367–68. For views on the common blood and religion of the two peoples, see Adam Kysil's letter of 31 May 1648 to Primate Maciej Łubieński in *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei: Dokumenty i materialy v trekh tomakh,* 3 vols. (Moscow, 1954), 2: 26. Very rich material pertinent to this problem can be found in "Palinodiia, sochinenie Zakharii Kopystenskogo 1621 goda," in *Pamiatniki polemicheskoi literatury v Zapadnoi Rusi,* vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1876), columns 312–1199 (Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka, 4) and Jan Dubowicz, *Hierarchia abo o zwierzchności w Cerkwi Bożey . . .* (Lviv, 1644). It seems certain that "Rusyn" and "Rus'" (as a collective plural for Ruthenians) were used only in the Ukrainian-Belorussian lands and then only for the Ruthenians of the Commonwealth.

The Discourser was well aware that Orthodoxy is an international creed: for instance, he discusses the relation of the Greeks to the conversion of Rus'. But in practice, he, like his contemporaries, had contacts with the particular church, not the universal one. Orthodoxy lent itself to being viewed as a "national" faith. The decentralization in the administration of the church and the use of a number of liturgical languages allowed particular churches to function as "national" institutions. In certain cases, the particular churches survived as national and cultural institutions after the demise of the dynasties and states under which they had been formed. By the seventeenth century, the metropolitan see of Kiev — with its loose ties with Constantinople, role as bearer of the traditions of Kievan Rus', and use of the Slavonic language in the liturgy — functioned as just such a national church for the Ruthenians.

The Discourser's particular emphasis on Orthodoxy as a characteristic of the Ruthenians is evident in his discussion of the Uniates, or, more properly, in the lack of any discussion of them. The Uniates shared the cultural, historical, and linguistic traditions of the Orthodox Ruthenians; indeed, in the author's interpretation, the Ruthenians had been Uniates at the time of their conversion. But whereas the Orthodox faith is mentioned frequently in the "Discourse," the Uniate church is almost ignored. Unlike contemporaries who viewed the Uniate church as the true Rus' church or who discussed the two Rus' churches of the Ruthenians, the Discourser merely offers the Uniate-Catholic interpretation of the conversion of Rus' and laments that Catholic sees had been handed over to the Orthodox.[51]

The Discourser's silence about the Uniates may have had a practical and an ideological reason. In practical terms, the Uniate church was a small institution. At the center of rebel territory it was nearly absent, while in the western Ukrainian lands its following was small.[52] The

[51] I have discussed various definitions of the Rus' community in "Ukrainian-Polish Relations in the Seventeenth Century," pp. 72–73. For discussions of both Orthodox and Uniates as Rus', see the speeches of Adam Kysil before the Orthodox synod of 1629, published in P. V. Zhukovich, *Materialy dlia istorii Kievskogo i Lvovskogo soborov 1629 goda* (St. Petersburg, 1911), p. 17 (Zapiski Imperatorskoi Akademii nauk, ser. 8, no. 15), and before the Diet of 1641, published in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila,* 2, pt. 2: 153–54. The first speech is translated in part and discussed in my article, "Adam Kysil and the Synods of 1629," *Eucharisterion = Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3/4 (1979–80) pt. 2: 839–41.

[52] On the relative lack of success of the Union in the Ukrainian lands in the first half of the seventeenth century, see Władysław Tomkiewicz, "Dzieje unji kościel-

ideological reason may have been the author's desire to promote "real" Catholicism rather than Uniatism. While adhering to the Uniate interpretation of the conversion of Rus', he depicted the Greeks and their church — also "Catholic" in the tenth century, by his interpretation — in a negative manner. His criticism of the education and social origin of the Ruthenian clergymen could have been applicable to the Uniates as well as to the Orthodox. The author never gives his views on the Union of Brest, but his proposals to destroy the Ruthenian clergy and churches in the area of the revolt and to repopulate the Ukraine with nobles from Masovia and Podlachia hardly seems to be a plan for propagating the Union. Rather, the proposals appear to assure the ultimate triumph of the "Lachs'" faith — Roman Catholicism of the Latin rite. The author may well have preferred to avoid the entire issue of the existence of a group of Uniate Catholic Ruthenians. It was much simpler to depict Ruthenians and their Orthodoxy as the enemy.

The Discourser says a good deal that defines "Poles," "Lachs," and "Poland." At the beginning of the text the Lachs or Poles are the people living in a country, called Poland, which bordered on Rus'. The author describes the present revolt as one of the long series of attacks by the Ruthenians on his people, the Lachs or Poles. In contrast to the Ruthenians, whose polity had disappeared and whose elite was disappearing, by the seventeenth century the medieval Poles or Lachs had been transformed by the expansion of their state and by the assimilation of the elites of other peoples. The concept of Poland and Poles changes, then, in the description of the contemporary period. In contrast to the account of the early period, when the Ruthenians are described as having invaded *Polska* (Poland), the discussion of the seventeenth-century political entities most frequently uses the anational terms *patria, ojczyzna* and *Respublica, Rzeczpospolita.* In the discussion of the rebels' and Ruthenians' political treason the Polish Crown (*Korona Polska*) is mentioned, here meaning the abstract concept of sovereignty rather than the territorial Crown (Kingdom) of Poland.[53] Nonetheless, the concept was associated with the

nej w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim (1596–1795)," in *Pamiętnik VI Zjazdu Historyków Polskich w Wilnie 17–20 wrzesnia 1935,* vol. 1 (Lviv, 1935), pp. 325–26.

[53] Similar to but later than the Hungarian concept of the Crown of St. Stephen, the Corona Poloniae or Korona Polska came to represent the abstraction of the Polish state. After 1569 the "Korona" or Crown was used to designate the Kingdom of Poland in contrast to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Before 1569 there had been frequent disputes on the nature of the Polish-Lithuanian union,

past of the Poles or Lachs, although in the seventeenth century the Ruthenians were equally the subjects of that Crown. The Discourser makes clear that a Poland (in contrast to a territorial Rus') exists within the Kingdom of Poland when he proposes that Ruthenians should not live in cities "nearer Poland." While the Discourser's comments about Poland are few, they do indicate the transformation of the relatively homogeneous Poland of medieval times into the multinational Commonwealth.

At the beginning of the "Discourse" *Polacy* and *Lachowie* are used interchangeably to refer to the Poles. *Polak,* the indigenous name for Pole, has at various times referred to the Polish people, inhabitants of Polish states, and Polish political elites. *Lach,* a borrowing of the Ruthenian name for Pole, has often reflected the cultural and national dichotomy of the eastern lands of the Commonwealth. After presenting the terms as synonyms, the Discourser favors *Lach.*[54] The choice was probably intended to emphasize the national and religious aspects of the Polish-Ruthenian confrontation. But there is no clear distinction between the two terms in the text.

The Lachs are identified with Roman Catholicism, and the Ruthenian clergy is said to be jealous that the Lachs' faith (*wiara lacka*) has taken root in Rus' and is flourishing. Obviously, the author realized that this Lachs' faith was being practiced in Spain, Italy, and the Philippines in almost identical form. But on the border between Eastern and Western Christianity, Latin-rite Roman Catholicism became the Polish faith.

The designation of Roman Catholicism as the Lachs' faith points to how the Ruthenians could become Lachs — by religious conversion. At one point the Discourser implies that converts to Latin-rite Roman Catholicism no longer belong to the Rus' community. He idolizes

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particularly because the original agreement had called for the annexation of the Lithuanian lands to the Polish Crown. After 1569, *Korona Polska* could designate either or both the Kingdom and the concept of the state. This second definition emphasized the primary role of Poland and its traditions in the "Commonwealth of the Two Nations." The two meanings of *Korona Polska* are often difficult to separate, but it appears that the second is the one intended in the "Discourse." On the concept of *Korona Polska,* see Juliusz Bardach, Bogusław Leśnodorski, and Michał Pietrzak, *Historia państwa i prawa polskiego* (Warsaw, 1979), pp. 88–91. On the crown as a symbol of sovereignty, see Jan Dąbrowski, *Corona Regni Poloniae w XIV wieku* (Wrocław, 1956). On Lithuanian attitudes towards the Crown, see Wisner, *Najjaśniejsza Rzeczpospolita,* pp. 13–42, and the critique by Opaliński, "Serenissima Respublica Nostra."

54 On the etymology of "Lach," see Franciszek Sławski, *Słownik etymologiczny języka polskiego,* vol. 4, pt. 1 (Cracow, 1970), pp. 17–18.

Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki (Iarema Vyshnevets'kyi), who had converted from Orthodoxy to Roman Catholicism in 1631. The magnate's conversion had shocked the Orthodox community, and Metropolitan Isai Kopyns'kyi had sent the prince an impassioned call to return to the faith of his ancestors.[55] Contemporary Ukrainian chronicles described the conversion as the transformation of a prince of Ruthenian ancestry into a Lach.[56] Although ancestry was important to the Discourser in determining community, he did not define Poles or Ruthenians solely by descent. One could assimilate by assuming the other community's major characteristic — its faith.[57]

The Discourser's conceptions of Poles and Ruthenians also contain a social dimension. Roman Catholics and Poles/Lachs are generally identified with the nobles and the Commonwealth. Poland and the Commonwealth are represented by the political nation of the nobility. An example is the statement that the Cossacks, since they are "chłopstwo," cannot stand up to the Poles (*Polakom*). Here, as in other seventeenth-century texts, all nobles in the Commonwealth are identified as Poles in the political sense.[58] Another example is the warning that concessions to the rebels, who are motivated by inveterate hatred against the Lachs, would only provoke them to ally with the Tatars and to revolt again, and that under such circumstances no noble would want to reside in the Ukraine. Here Lachs clearly means the nobility. Poland, the land of the Lachs that he mentions, is the inheritance of the nobility.

But there are also times when "Lach" and "Polak" do not refer to

[55] The letter is published in Lipiński, *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, pp. 121–23.

[56] See O. A. Bevzo, ed., *L'vivs'kyi litopys i Ostroz's'kyi litopysets': Dzhereloznavche doslidzhennia* (Kiev, 1970), p. 122.

[57] Twice the Discourser deals with communities of descent. He explains Ruthenian characteristics on the basis of the admixture of Greek blood. He also maintains that the Lachs and Ruthenians have the same ancestors and that this should diminish hostility between them. He also comments that the two peoples speak the same tongue. Although these remarks are not specific enough to label his views as pan-Slavic, they do connote an awareness of Slavic unity. For discussions of problems of descent and the Sarmatian myth, see Ulewicz, *Sarmacja*. Also see Władysław Serczyk, "Jedność słowiańska w argumentacji rosyjskiej publicystyki politycznej XVI–XVII w. (Próba systematyzacji)," in *Słowianie w dziejach Europy: Studia historyczne ku uczczeniu 75 rocznicy urodzin i 50-lecia pracy naukowej profesora Henryka Łowmiańskiego* (Poznań, 1974), pp. 215–25 (Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu, Wydział Filozoficzno-Historyczny, Seria Historia, 58).

[58] For an example of this usage by a prominent Ruthenian, see Adam Kysil's *votum* published in Johannus Lünig, *Orationes Procerum Europae . . .* (Leipzig, 1713), pt. 2, pp. 35–37.

nobles. The Lachs who assumed burgher offices in the cities of the Ruthenian lands or who were to populate cities nearer to Poland were certainly not nobles. The Lachs and Poles described at the beginning of the tract seem to be a people comprising various social strata. The author was cognizant that his description included non-noble Lachs and Poles, but he choose to ignore them.

The Discourser sets out to associate the Ruthenians with all that is barbarous and base. Although he sees the Ruthenians as essentially non-nobles, he does discuss the noble component of the Ruthenian "nation." A number of such instances have been pointed out above in the analysis of the Discourser's attitudes towards Orthodox nobles. The most interesting case, however, occurs in his discussion of the history of Ruthenian-Polish relations. His lengthy account of the Ruthenians' hatred toward the Lachs/Poles seems to refer to the entire community, especially its higher orders. But in asserting that the Ruthenians would rather live under the bondage of Turks or some other tyrants than in the free Commonwealth, he adds parenthetically that he is talking about the "chłopstwo" who has neither good blood nor education. Despite the qualification, it is difficult to see the Ruthenians who directed wars, took loyalty oaths, and intermarried with the kings of Poland as "chłopstwo." Also not easily recognizable as such are the Ruthenians who are later said to be jealous of the Lachs for having appropriated the senatorial posts and noble offices. The Discourser has two contradictory purposes which he attempts to reconcile. He portrays *all* Ruthenians, including their nobility, as enemies of Poles and the Commonwealth. At the same time, he strives to identify the entire Ruthenian community as "chłopstwo."

The comments on Ruthenians and Poles reflect the fundamental cultural, social, and economic changes in the Ukrainian lands in the early seventeenth century. In 1613 Jan Szczęsny Herburt had warned that to expect the Ruthenians to change their faith was like trying to have a Poland without Poles or a people that spoke Polish but were no longer ruled by Polish laws and customs, like relocating Gdansk near the Carpathians and Sambir near the Baltic.[59] But contrary to Herburt's view, the Ruthenians were changing. Members of their elite had not only become members of the nobility of the Commonwealth loyal to their noble republic, but also were abandoning their ancestral faith

[59] "Zdanie o narodzie Ruskim, spisane podczas konfederacyi Moskiewskiej (1613) od pana Szczęsnego Herburta, Dombromilskiego, Wiśnińskiego, Mościckiego starosty," in *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, pp. 92–96.

and language. As they adopted the Polish language and Roman Catholic faith, the more affluent nobles were intermarrying with families from the Polish heartland. Resistance to this process, particularly regarding religion, came from the minority of nobles who rose to defend "Rus'." This group would disappear by the end of the century, but at the time the "Discourse" was written it was still active.

The Discourser retained the concept of the Ruthenians and Poles as two socially complex communities living side by side at the same time that he chose to emphasize the new interrelation created by the migration of Polish nobles to the Ruthenian lands and the assimilation of the Ruthenian elite. In the Commonwealth only nobles were part of the political nation; hence Ruthenians and Orthodox were disappearing from the body-politic. The Commonwealth was becoming a state of one "noble nation" (*naród szlachecki*) that was Polish and Catholic, and the divide between Pole and Ruthenian was becoming that between noble and commoner.

The "Discourse" gives evidence of national antagonism, as well as of the changing relation between the Ruthenian and Polish communities. It shows that in the mid-seventeenth century *naród* could be defined in ways remarkably similar to a modern historical-cultural nation, rather than only in terms of order (e.g., noble nation) or political and territorial divisions (e.g., Prussian nation, Volhynian nation). But does national tension emerge as a major cause of the revolt? Other than the charge that the rebels may be planning to form a Ruthenian principality, the "Discourse" says little about the goals of the Ruthenian rebels. It would appear that the pernicious influence of Orthodoxy and the jealousy of the Ruthenians were sufficient reasons for periodic rebellions. In fact, the Discourser had even less evidence of the hostility of the Ruthenians against the Poles than of the hostility of the Orthodox against the Catholics as a direct cause of the revolt. Few Ruthenian institutions existed in the early stage of the revolt and Ruthenian political goals were amorphous. Many influential Ruthenians were loyal to the Commonwealth in 1648 and the Ruthenian nobility did not lead the revolt as an organized group. The Ruthenians' rebelliousness against the Lachs may well have sprung primarily from religious and social grievances, rather than national ones.

The "national" factor in the "Discourse" consists of a description of Ruthenian-Polish hostility rather than of a planned revolt with definite goals by a Ruthenian leadership against Polish rule. Perhaps the most revealing aspect of the text is the degree of antagonism that the

Discourser felt against the Ruthenians. This text indicates that the issue of national enmity as a cause and factor in the revolt must be reexamined. Its role may not have been major, but it certainly existed. Polish scholars have recently directed attention to the function of xenophobia toward other states and societies among the nobles of the Commonwealth.[60] Some of this attention should be paid to the xenophobia that existed between communities in the Commonwealth, including that between Polish Catholic and Ruthenian Orthodox nobles.[61] It may have been muted and on the decline, but nonetheless it must be examined if we are to understand the relations among the communities in the Commonwealth at the time.

The Discourser did foresee the way that the national factor came to play a major role in the revolt. His warning that the rebels might break away from the Commonwealth and form a "new Cossack Commonwealth or Ruthenian Principality" proved almost prophetic. His dual designation for the polity that might emerge encompassed the two related but never fully integrated concepts that were to contend in the rebel lands in the decade that followed.

The Discourser's statement is, of course, no proof that Khmel'nyts'kyi was trying to set up such a state from the onset of the revolt. It does show, however, that from the very beginning there were suspicions that such an entity might emerge. The conceptualization of such a possibility by the rebels and their opponents was the first necessary stage in the political revolution that was to occur in the Ukraine.

The Discourser wove the religious, social, and national factors of the great revolt into a composite. In so doing, he expressed the major tenets of the nobility's ideology at the moment the Commonwealth faced a most serious internal challenge. Political and social thought in the Commonwealth was generally less creative and flexible in the mid-seventeenth century than in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The "Discourse" exemplifies the rigidity in thought and politics that was precluding evolution or reform. In the century after 1648 the nobles, convinced that their institutions were perfect, responded to challenges and crises by defending their political inheri-

60 See the collection of essays, *Swojskość i cudzoziemszczyzna w dziejach kultury polskiej,* ed. Zofia Stefanowska (Warsaw, 1973).

61 Władysław Czapliński points out the need for such studies in his essay "Wiek siedemnasty w Polsce: Próba charakterystyki," published in his *O Polsce siedemnastowiecznej,* p. 61.

tance. The resilience of the political culture of the Commonwealth in the face of adversity reflected the nobles' dedication to it. Yet, without reform the Commonwealth could not compete with its changing neighbors. The state's weaknesses were already apparent before 1648. The "Discourse" exemplifies the attitudes that brought about the disaster of 1648 and then blocked attempts to come to terms with the problems that brought on the revolt.

At the root of the trouble were a noble ideology and an idealized conception of the Commonwealth that were malfunctioning in the Ukrainian lands. The Discourser recognized that exploitation and abuse had driven the peasants and Cossacks to revolt, but dedication to noble liberty, as he understood it, precluded any criticism of those nobles at fault. He acknowledged the might of the Cossacks, but his concept of the proper social order of the Commonwealth ruled out "incorporating them into the Fatherland." He condemned Ruthenian commoners for preferring Turkish servitude to living freely and tranquilly in the Commonwealth, but he was unwilling to grant commoners the rights that would make a free and tranquil life possible. The dissatisfied Cossacks, burghers, and peasants in the Ukrainian frontier lands were hardly passive subjects, but the Discourser was unwilling to make any concessions to win their loyalty to the Commonwealth. His "Fatherland" was for nobles only and he proposed a fight to the death to preserve it that way.

The text we have discussed here provides insights into why the Commonwealth failed to cope with the revolt. The reluctance of the government's ruling faction, led by Ossoliński and Kysil, to abandon long-term political plans and devote all efforts to putting down the revolt gave the rebels the opportunity to gather strength and engendered mistrust in many circles. In the "Discourse" this mistrust takes the form of condemning candidates to the throne who negotiated with the rebels and insinuating that the rebels had support from the governing circle. The Discourser, like many disaffected with the government's policies, idealized Wiśniowiecki, an opponent of the ruling faction who had vowed to fight to the end for no changes in the old order. The text itself was probably written by someone in Wiśniowiecki's circle to discredit Ossoliński and Kysil. Catholic bigotry pushed many nobles into supporting Wiśniowiecki's intractable position. Thus the "Discourse" represents the thinking of the faction that lacked the means to enact its policy, but could and did block attempts at a negotiated settlement. This impasse of factions in 1648 showed

how easily the Commonwealth's administration could be paralyzed by nobiliar liberty.

The attitudes expressed in the "Discourse" marked the end of the tolerant, multireligious, and multinational Commonwealth in which the Orthodox and Ruthenian traditions could take full part. The Discourser saw his fatherland and republic exclusively as Catholic and Polish. The triumph of these new attitudes brought the Commonwealth to disaster in the Ukraine, and their enduring potency made the Commonwealth a very different society at the end of the seventeenth century than it had been in the sixteenth. The assimilation of the Ruthenian elite and the weakness of Ruthenian political traditions made the ideological shift possible, but the transition was far from smooth. The "Discourse" reflects a moment when pressure was building against those who persistently resisted the process. As late as the 1640s some Ruthenian Orthodox nobles insisted that the Sarmatian Ruthenian nobles had freely joined the Commonwealth and were equals of the Sarmatian Poles.[62] This variant of Sarmatian theory had served to unite diverse lands and peoples into a pluralistic Commonwealth. The Discourser does not mention Sarmatism, but intrinsic to his discussion of the nobility and the fatherland is the new, narrow Sarmatism of the militantly Polish-Catholic nobility that was to triumph in the second half of the century.

The Discourser depicted the Khmel'nyts'kyi revolt as a battle of Poles, Catholics, and nobles against Ruthenians, Orthodox, and commoners, particularly Cossacks and peasants. He gave characterizations of the constituency of each camp, yet neither camp approached his ideal concept of it. The Discourser, like any effective political polemicist, chose not to delve into the complexities of the situation. In reading his text, or any other contemporary account of the revolt, care must be taken to distinguish how the prism of political culture and verbal convention shaped the portrayal of the revolt. The "Discourse" is but one entrée into the world of the adversaries who confronted each other in 1648. The examination of other political works, historical writings, and correspondence will also enrich our understanding of their concepts, conventions, values, and programs.

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[62] This view was expressed by Adam Kysil in a speech delivered at the Diet of 1641. Part of this speech is published in S. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila,* 2, pt. 2: 153–54. Views on the free union are contained in the pamphlet, "Supplikata . . . ," republished in *Z dziejów Ukrainy,* pp. 99–111 (especially p. 101).

A Century of Moscow-Ukraine Economic Relations: An Interpretation*

I. S. KOROPECKYJ

Introduction

The Ukraine was integrated politically and economically into the Russian Empire in the middle of the eighteenth century. From that time up to the Revolution of 1917, the Moscow government treated the Ukraine as just another region of the empire. Since the Revolution, the Ukraine has been organized into a constituent union republic of the USSR, and the Kiev government has nominally possessed extensive political and economic prerogatives. In reality, however, all decision-making powers have been concentrated in the hands of the union government in Moscow. Consequently, the economic interests of the Ukraine were subordinated first to those of the entire Russian Empire and subsequently to those of the USSR, as perceived by the authorities in Moscow. An important question that arises is whether tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union have differed in their treatment of the Ukraine. In addressing this question, the present discussion covers approximately the last one hundred years, with the Revolution of 1917 being the divide between the tsarist and Soviet eras.

In the manifold economic relationships that exist between any two regions of the same country, the transfer of national income, budgetary relations, trade, flow of resources, and institutional influences are probably the most important elements. The discussion of all such relations between the Ukraine and the rest of the Russian Empire/ USSR over one hundred years is beyond the scope of one article. The

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objective of this study is limited to an analysis of only one aspect of these relations, usually in the center of public attention: transfers of national income by the central government through the state budget.[1] Evidence of such transfers is presented in the following section. No attempt is made to assess the short- and long-run effects of these transfers on the economy of either the Russian Empire/USSR or the Ukraine;[2] however, possible reasons for the outflow of national income from the Ukraine are discussed in the subsequent three sections. Based on the evidence presented, a hypothesis about the nature of economic relations existing between the Russian Empire/USSR and the Ukraine is advanced in the last section.

This article uses the framework developed by the author in an earlier work which analyzed the overall regional policy in the USSR during the postwar period (Koropeckyj, 1970). By contrast, however, it narrows the discussion to the relations between the Ukraine and the rest of the Russian Empire/USSR from the middle of the nineteenth century to the most recent years. Furthermore, it makes use of estimates prepared by other researchers as well as earlier ones by the author, since the main purpose here is not so much the presentation of new estimates of relevant variables as an interpretation of the available evidence.

For the purposes of this study, the Ukraine is treated as an economic region. Geographically, it includes only those Ukrainian ethnic lands that belonged to the Russian Empire before the Revolution and those that were incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR after the Revolution. The empire before the Revolution is referred to as "tsarist Russia" or "the tsarist empire." The term "Russia/USSR" denotes the political entities before and after the Revolution. By "ethnic Russians" is meant the Russian nationality; their territory is called "ethnic Russia" or "the Russian SFSR." It should be noted that this republic contains

[1] Interregional transfer of national income can also take place through the price structure. In other words, the prices of goods and services in which a given region specializes and which it exports can be set low directly or indirectly by the government relative to the prices of imports from other regions. However, an analysis of this aspect cannot be undertaken here because of insufficient data. Even a detailed study on national income in the Ukraine in the early 1960s, with access to unpublished information, has not attempted to estimate the magnitude of such transfers, for the same reason (Akademiia nauk, 1963, Chapter IX).

[2] In the latter case, for example, along Johan Galtung's or Samir Amin's theories of structural or dependence imperialism.

several nationalities other than ethnic Russians. The terms "republic" and "region" or "interrepublic" and "interregional" are used interchangeably for the post-1917 period.

Evidence of National Income Transfers

A summary of the budgetary relationships between the Ukraine and Russia/USSR, prepared by various researchers, is presented in Table 1 (pp. 490–91). Brief comments are given for each of these estimates, except for the few taken from secondary sources. A detailed evaluation of the estimates cannot be given here, since they were taken from such substantial studies as a two-volume life work in one case, from a monograph in two other cases, and from extensive articles in the remaining cases. A critical analysis of the underlying data base and the methodology used for each estimate would require a separate study. Therefore, no one set of estimates is considered to be "correct"; rather, confidence is placed on the consistency of the trends among them.

For the prerevolutionary period, the percentages of excess of state budget receipts over state budget payments in relation to receipts in the Ukraine are used as indicators of the budgetary relationships. Among the estimates of this period, those by Iasnopol'skii are very detailed and thorough. They not only show tax receipts from each province (*guberniia*), but also incorporate the incidence of indirect taxation. On the other hand, in his estimate of budget expenditures, Iasnopol'skii restricted himself to showing direct disbursements: i.e., he did not distribute certain budget payments among provinces according to benefits (e.g., defense or other central government activities). It is not possible to comment on the estimates by Porsh and Mal'tsiv because of the unavailability of their works; the data in the table were taken from a secondary source. But according to this source, both authors generally followed Iasnopol'skii's methodology (Richyts'kyi, 1928, p. 80). Finally, the data by Petrovs'kyi, uncertain as to the period covered, are included primarily because their author was none other than Lenin.[3]

[3] Hryhorii Petrovs'kyi, an early Communist leader in the Ukraine, cited the data in 1913, during a debate in the State Duma in St. Petersburg. Later, he stated that these data and the entire speech were prepared for him by Lenin. The text of the speech appears in Lenin (1936).

The percentages of excess budget receipts over budget expenditures to budget receipts in the Ukraine vary, although slightly, for the periods covered. Some of the variations may be the result of the different methodologies used by the individual researchers. But it is clear that the Ukraine consistently paid substantially more to the state budget than it received from it. On the average, the Ukraine's share of tsarist Russia's budget receipts was about 20 percent, and of payments, about 13 percent (Richyts'kyi, 1928, p. 78). In absolute terms, this surplus stayed at about 50 million rubles per annum at the end of the nineteenth century and at about 40 million at the beginning of this century (Volobuiev, 1929, I, pp. 70–71).[4] No national income estimates for the Ukraine prior to the Revolution are available for comparison. To obtain an idea of the magnitude of such a relationship, a rough approximation of the Ukrainian national income in 1900 was undertaken.[5] According to it, the surpluses of 50 million rubles before and of 40 million rubles after the turn of the century represent 3.2 and 2.5 percent, respectively, of the Ukraine's national income for that year.

The evidence on the excess of budget receipts over budget expenditures in the prerevolutionary Ukraine is supported by the data on its external trade. Since taxes decreased aggregate demand more than budget expenditures augmented it, the Ukrainian output not absorbed internally had to be exported. As a result, the Ukraine was expected to have positive balance of payments in its trade with the rest of the empire and with foreign countries.

The sketchy trade data for the Ukraine available for a few years at the beginning of this century show such a surplus. For example, exports exceeded imports, in trade with the rest of the Russian Empire and foreign countries, by 319 million rubles on the average in the years 1909–11 (Shrah, 1924, p. 114) and by 375 million rubles in 1913 (Ostapenko, 1924, pp. 206–207). The fact that the external trade

[4] For example, one ruble in 1898 was equivalent to about $4.50 in 1979.

[5] The Ukraine's national income in 1900 was estimated as follows. According to Prokopovich (1918, p. 25), in 1900 the average national income (excluding services and government sectors) per capita was 67.25 rubles for the European part of the Russian Empire. In view of the Donbas industries and a relatively productive agriculture, the national income per capita in the Ukraine can reasonably be assumed to have been about the same as the average for the entire empire. Multiplying this average times the 1897 census population of nine Ukrainian provinces, which was 23,470 thousand (Leasure and Lewis, 1966), yields an estimate of the Ukraine's national income as 1,578 million rubles.

surplus was higher than the budgetary transfers (40 to 50 million rubles) indicates capital movements, including payments of interest and dividends and loan repayments to outside investors in the Ukrainian economy. The Ukraine also earned a separate surplus in its trade with countries outside the Russian Empire, a component of the overall Ukrainian surplus. This surplus was estimated at 263 million rubles annually in 1909 to 1911 and at 114 million rubles in 1913, and it accounted for approximately two-thirds and almost nine-tenths of the positive balance of the entire empire's trade with foreign countries in the respective years (Shrah, 1924, p. 114; Ostapenko, 1924, p. 207; Gregory, 1979, p. 661). Since the Ukraine's surplus in trade with countries outside the tsarist empire exceeded its needs for the servicing of foreign debt (Ostapenko, 1924, p. 207), the owners of Ukrainian non-labor resources increased their assets outside the Ukraine. But other regions of the tsarist empire, especially the financial community in St. Petersburg and Moscow, also gained from this situation; their access to foreign exchange, earned by the Ukrainian economy, was facilitated by membership with the Ukraine in the same monetary and banking system. The earning of foreign exchange by its own economy was thus the Ukraine's additional contribution to the economy of the entire empire.

The estimates of national income transfers between the Ukraine and other regions of the USSR are more numerous than those available for the prerevolutionary period. Unfortunately, for a few, primary sources are still unavailable. The importance and reliability of these studies are enhanced by the fact that basically similar results were obtained by scholars both in the USSR and in the West using a variety of methodologies.

Estimates by Dobrogaev (cited by Volobuiev), Richyts'kyi (based on the work of the Ukrainian Gosplan), Melnyk (for both periods), and V. Kuts (in the volume by the Academy of Sciences, Kiev) were prepared in the traditional manner for estimates before 1917. (Table 1, pp. 490–91). These estimates represent the relative excess of reported budget receipts over payments in the Ukraine. The differences in results stem from the different periods covered, the availability of basic data to individual researchers, and adjustments made or not made for the Ukraine's share in union budget expenditures not directly attributable to a specific region, for instance, defense. The

estimates of budget surpluses with adjustments are relatively lower than those without. Dobrogaev and Kuts do not make adjustments, whereas Volobuiev, Richyts'kyi, and Melnyk do.

The other researchers of the post-1917 period represented in Table 1 traced national income transfers between the Ukraine and the rest of the USSR by methods other than budgetary analysis. The purpose of Iemel'ianov and Kushnirskii's study was to estimate the excess of national income produced over national income utilized in the Ukraine between 1959 and 1969. Since only the data on national income produced are complete, they had to estimate (using the least squares method) national income utilized for the few years for which such data were unavailable. Bandera's objective for the two years 1960 and 1966 was to estimate the balance of trade between the Ukraine, on the one hand, and the rest of the USSR and other countries, on the other. The resulting surplus represents the financial side of the excess of commodity exports over commodity imports in the Ukraine. Capital exports from the Ukraine were the primary concern for Wagener. Using various assumptions, he estimated savings and investment in the Ukraine and considered the excess of the former over the latter as capital outflow from the Ukraine to other regions of the USSR. Finally, Gillula's results show the excess of the Ukraine's production over its absorption on the basis of input-output analysis.

A consistent trend emerges: all estimates indicate that the outflow of national income from the Ukraine to other regions continued under the Soviet regime. This trend is evident in terms of the budgetary surpluses during the 1920s and the early 1930s, as well as in terms of the excesses of national income produced over national income utilized during the 1960s and 1970s, the periods for which data are available.

The evidence on the outflow of the Ukraine's national income after the Revolution presented in Table 1 is supported by data on geographical distribution of investment in the USSR. A strong correlation has been found between national income produced and consumption per capita for the Soviet republics during the postwar period with the coefficient of correlation equal to 0.968. The correlation between national income and accumulation, both also per capita, is lower — 0.600 (Gillula, 1979, p. 627). A republic's reduced share in total investment relative to population would indicate national income outflow. As the percentages in Table 2 (p. 492) show, the Ukraine's share in total USSR investment was consistently below its population

share, for example, 19.5 percent in 1970. The investment share fell as low as 14.6 percent in 1979. It approached the population share in the Ukraine only during the years immediately following both World Wars, exceptions probably explainable by the need to reconstruct a war-devastated economy. In contrast, as Table 2 shows, the investment shares of the RSFSR during the entire period since the Revolution and of Kazakhstan during the postwar period were higher than their population shares (53.8 and 5.4 percent, respectively, in 1970).

Now let us compare the tsarist and the Soviet regimes with respect to the level of national income withdrawals from the Ukraine. In relation to budget receipts, outflow in terms of budgetary surplus was higher before the Revolution (between 40 and 50 percent) than during the 1920s (between 11 and 23 percent) or during the 1960s (slightly over 30 percent). This difference can be explained in part by a higher share of national income flowing through the state budget in the USSR, over 60 percent in recent years. In comparison, the share in capitalist tsarist Russia estimated for 1900 was about 37 percent (Prokopovich, 1928, p. 24; Khromov, 1950, p. 527). The latter percentage has, in addition, a somewhat upward bias; Prokopovich's national income data refer only to the European part of the empire, whereas Khromov's budget data are for the entire empire. The share of national income transferred from the Ukraine after World War II ranged between 10 and 20 percent, and even if one accepts the lowest estimate of 10 percent, that is considerably higher than the rough approximation of about 3 percent during the tsarist period. The transfer of either about 3 percent or more than 10 percent of the Ukraine's national income to other regions of Russia/USSR year after year during one century is probably unique in the history of international and interregional relations (cf. Wiles, 1977, p. 311).

There is an important distinction between the interregional transfers of national income in Russia and the USSR and those in Western countries. Under parliamentary democracy in the West, the government has to have approval from the population or from elected representatives for such budget transfers. This has not been the case either in tsarist Russia or in the USSR. It is certain that if political democracy existed in multinational Russia/USSR, the capital exporting nationalities would object to such a budget policy,[6] since, almost as

[6] Such objections were heard before the Revolution (cf. Petrovs'kyi's speech cited in fn. 3 above) and in recent times (for examples, see Koropeckyj, 1977, pp. 20–24).

a rule, interregional transfers of national income proceed more smoothly in ethnically homogeneous countries, regardless of political ideology (e.g., Italy or Poland), than in multi-ethnic countries (e.g., Great Britain or Yugoslavia). Furthermore, in a market economy, the transfer of funds from richer to poorer regions by individuals or private institutions requires interest payments and eventually the return of the funds to the lender. These conditions existed in the tsarist empire, but not, of course, in the USSR.

The continuous and unrequited transfer of national income from the Ukraine to other regions of Russia/USSR has been taking place as a result of the unequal status of the Ukraine versus the Moscow government and can therefore be called a tribute (e.g., Boulding, 1972, p. xi). In the West this is usually considered to be contrary to accepted moral and ethical precepts. According to some Soviet authors, such a transfer under socialism is also contrary to Marxist philosophy.[7] If the transfer of funds — which are of a rent-like nature in the originating region[8] — results in increased output in the receiving region, then the exporting region is entitled to the repayment of these funds. (There is no mention of the payment of interest for the use of the funds, however). These authors argue that under socialism there should be no difference, economically or legally, between the individual and the population of a region: in both instances, income should be determined by production. This principle has, in fact, been accepted in relations among socialist countries,[9] but, obviously, not as yet among the constituent republics of the USSR.

Economic Considerations

Budget expenditures can be distributed among individual regions

[7] Cf. Danilov-Danil'ian and Zavel'skii (1975, p. 555), who base their argument on Marx's discusssion of the Gotha Program (Marx and Engels, 1969, pp. 18–22).
[8] Let us assume that the quantity and quality of capital per unit of labor are equal throughout the USSR and that production costs for certain products (primarily agricultural) in the Ukraine are below the average for the USSR. Because wages and prices (representing average values) are equal in all regions of the USSR, the excess of produced value over labor costs (including depreciation, some taxes, increase in reserves, etc.) represents the differential rent of the Ukraine.
[9] See the statement of this right of individual socialist states in *Composite Program for Further Deepening and Improving Collaboration and Development of Social-Economic Integration of Comecon* (Moscow, 1971). I thank Aron Katsenelinboigen for drawing my attention to this source.

basically for the following three purposes: the needs of the central government, including defense; population consumption, usually of the collective type; and investment in infrastructure and productive facilities. These expenditures, especially investment, can affect the interregional structure in two ways. First, investment in less developed regions and the consequent increase in productivity can reduce interregional inequality of output and income per capita. Second, investment in more productive regions — which are usually the more developed — can maximize the output for the entire country. Assuming given population mobility, the latter alternative would lead to an increased inequality of income per capita among regions. In Western countries experience has shown that in the course of economic development a tendency toward a widening of interregional inequality is at first evident. Only after a certain level of income per capita is reached nationally can a movement toward a reduction of this inequality be discerned (Williamson, 1965). In capitalistic economies this equalization process proceeds in response to market forces, although governmental intervention can, and often does, play an important role.

With respect to the relationship between budgetary transfers from the Ukraine and the equalization trend in Russia/USSR, the following qualifications should be kept in mind. The Ukraine's budgetary losses were not large enough so that if used for investment in other regions, pronounced changes in the empire's regional structure would have occurred. Moreover, it is very likely "that only a minute part of its [the Russian government's] budget expenditures went directly for purposes of developing the industrial sector" (Kahan, 1967, p. 466). The bulk of Ukrainian budgetary funds, as will be discussed below, must have been used for other purposes. The share of the Ukraine's national income transferred to other regions of the USSR, as we saw, was both absolutely and relatively larger after the Revolution than before. Still, these funds by themselves were most likely not a decisive factor in the changes in the interregional distribution of productive facilities, particularly since Soviet leaders spent only a part of their budget for this purpose, although a part larger than that spent by their pre-revolutionary predecessors. Thus no direct, and certainly no pronounced, relationship between the budgetary losses of the Ukraine and the equalization trend in Russia/USSR can be expected. Nevertheless, this trend deserves our attention because its fluctuations imply changes in the utilization of at least a part of Ukrainian budgetary funds.

Let us now consider whether there was a tendency toward lessening

interregional inequality first in tsarist Russia and then in the USSR. The movement toward less geographical concentration of industry can already be detected during the half-century preceding World War I (Spechler, 1980, pp. 410–411, Table 1). The trend resulted mainly from the relative decline of the Central Industrial Region around Moscow and of the St. Petersburg-Baltic Region in the country's total output. The principal beneficiaries of this development were the Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, the Transcaucasus and other border provinces of the empire. Thus, in spite of the budgetary losses, the Ukraine experienced above average growth of its industry. It can be assumed that, as a result, the level of the Ukraine's economic development approximated the average for the empire during the turn of the century.

For social and political reasons, the commitment of the Soviet leadership to interregional economic equalization, primarily industrial equalization, has been explicit and more important than that of the tsarist government (Koropeckyj, 1970, pp. 236–37).[10] Because of the centrally planned economy and the public ownership of the means of production, the Soviet government's ability to achieve this goal was also incomparably greater than the tsarist government's had been. Indeed, an equalization trend, as evidenced by the decrease in the population-weighted coefficient of variation for some variables, can be observed during the interwar years for the eleven union republics that then constituted the USSR.[11] The coefficient for urbanization — a variable assumed to be a good indicator of economic modernization — decreased from 0.148 to 0.112 between the censuses of 1926 and 1939. However, there is little change in the coefficient for gross industrial output in the years for which comparable data are available: it decreased from 0.269 to 0.259 between 1932 and 1937 (TsUNKhU, 1939, pp. 8, 9, 144).[12] Because of the rapid industrialization during the preceding Five-Year Plan, 1928–32, the relative decrease in this indicator for the same period would probably be comparable to that for urbanization.

The population weighted coefficients of variation for urbanization,

[10] Some Western scholars, however, claim that the equalization objective has never been of high priority for Soviet leaders (McAuley, 1979, p. 145).

[11] These were the present republics minus the three Baltic republics and Moldavia, although part of present-day Moldavia was then an autonomous republic within the Ukraine.

[12] Because population estimates for 1932 and 1937 are unavailable, the results of the 1926 and 1939 censuses were used as respective weights.

gross industrial output, and, during the last two decades, for net material product in per capita terms are shown in Table 3 (p. 492). These indicators span the period from the year just before World War I to 1979, and the underlying data refer to comparable political units, the present-day fifteen union republics. The coefficients are low by world standards. Their further decrease between 1913 and 1940 confirms the previous finding of a reduction in inequality during the interwar period. This decline continued through World War II and the immediate postwar decade. Since about 1960, a change in the direction of the trend can be observed, particularly in such a comprehensive indicator as net material product. Inequality widened especially between European republics as a whole, including the entire Russian Federation, on the one hand, and the combined Transcaucasian and Central Asian republics, on the other. The net material product per capita of the latter, the less developed republics, decreased in relation to the former, the more developed republics — from 81.3 to 60.0 percent between 1960 and 1979. Part of this decline must be attributed to rapid population growth in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. The same slight increase toward inequality has been found in a thorough study of the interrepublic distribution of personal and collective income of state employees and of members of collective farms between 1960 and 1970 (McAuley, 1979, pp. 111–13, 130, 140–41).[13] In general, the ranking of union republics with respect to level of economic development has remained largely unchanged during the Soviet period: the Ukraine's income per capita has been close to the USSR average, preceded by that of the Baltic, the Russian, and recently also the Belorussian republics, and followed by the Moldavian, the Transcaucasian, and finally the Central Asian republics.

One can assume, then, that during the interwar period and immediately after World War II, Ukrainian funds helped to an unspecified degree to develop industry in the less developed republics. In view of the fact that the equalization trend reversed itself during the 1960s and 1970s but the transfer of a portion of Ukrainian national income continued, the question arises whether the bulk of these funds was used for investment in regions which were relatively more developed but in which productivity was growing faster than in the Ukraine. Such

[13] This reversal in the equalization trend at higher levels of income seems to contradict the hypothesis put forth by some Western economists (Cohn, 1977, pp. 78–79) who attempted to apply the pattern established by Williamson for market economies to the Soviet economy.

allocation, consistent with the efficiency principle, would result in the maximization of output for the entire country within some intermediate time.

The efficiency of geographical distribution of investment will not be analyzed for the prerevolutionary period because the tsarist government was only marginally involved in investment in productive facilities; in any case, the necessary data are not available. However, one can investigate whether the productivity of capital, or of combined capital and labor, was growing at a faster rate in other republics than in the Ukraine during various periods of the Soviet regime.

Selected measures of growth in productivity in industry and agriculture are presented in Table 4 (p. 493). Except for the first two estimates of the productivity of capital, shown by the incremental capital-output ratio and the marginal productivity of capital, all other estimates are intended to show total factor productivity. These indicators have been derived either by dividing the rates of output growth by the growth rates of combined resources or by subtracting the latter from the former. Capital and labor coefficients have been obtained by the use of some version of the Cobb-Douglas production function. Comparisons were made between the Ukraine, the RSFSR, and Kazakhstan. The last two republics were included because of their relatively heavy investment activity, primarily in the Asiatic RSFSR and northern Kazakhstan (Table 2).[14] In cases where data for these two republics were unavailable, the comparison was between the Ukraine and the USSR as a whole.

According to the evidence in this table, the growth of capital productivity in industry during the interwar period was higher in the Ukraine than the average for the entire USSR. This situation also prevailed after World War II until the mid–1960s with respect to both the entire USSR and the RSFSR. Toward the end of that period, according to Cohn and my estimates, productivity growth of industry in the Ukraine began to lag behind that of industry in the entire Soviet Union and the Russian republic. This decrease in the Ukraine was relatively steep, because Bond's data indicate that the Ukraine was behind the RSFSR for the entire 1960–1975 period. On the other hand, productivity growth of agriculture in the Ukraine was greater

[14] Between 1971 and 1975, for example, 29 percent of total USSR investment was allocated to the Asiatic part of the RSFSR and to Central Asia, with 56 percent of this sum going to the former, 22 percent to Kazakhstan, and 22 percent to the remaining four Central Asian republics (Schroeder, 1978, pp. 133–34).

than that of agriculture in the RSFSR during the 1960s and early 1970s. In comparison with Kazakhstan, the Ukraine was ahead in the resource productivity growth of industry throughout most of the postwar period, except for the early 1970s. In view of the sharp fluctuations in productivity growth in Kazakhstan's agriculture, no meaningful comparison of this sector in the two countries can be made. It is true that in contrast to productivity growth, the static productivity of resources in various extractive industries, resulting from favorable mineralogical conditions, might often have been higher in the Asiatic regions of the RSFSR and in other eastern republics than in the Ukraine. But the harsh climate of these regions, with its high requirements for infrastructure investment and long distances to population centers in the west of the country, will continue to outweigh, in terms of cost per unit of output to consumers, their advantageous natural conditions during the foreseeable future.

Because resource productivity grows in different economic sectors and industrial branches at different rates, structural changes can influence the overall productivity of a national or regional economy. In the above comparisons, analysis of such changes cannot be included because of lack of data. But it is doubtful that the inclusion of such an analysis would invalidate the results in Table 4. The economies of the Ukraine and the RSFSR, and to a lesser extent of Kazakhstan, are large enough and sufficiently diversified so that, in the context of Soviet planning, structural changes usually do not take place in one of these republics without taking place in another.

On the basis of Table 4, one can certainly question the validity of the efficiency argument for the transfer of Ukrainian funds to other Soviet regions for investment throughout the period under discussion. The recent deterioration of the Ukraine with respect to productivity growth, especially in industry, relative to the RSFSR is probably due, in large part, precisely to the investment policy of the Moscow planners. Because Moscow consistently allocated relatively less investment to the Ukraine than to the RSFSR and Kazakhstan, the Ukrainian economy was less able to introduce advanced technology and had less opportunity to adjust its economic structure to new technological requirements.[15]

[15] For further discussion of this problem, see Gordijew and Koropeckyj (1981, pp. 288–91).

Nationality Considerations

In view of the fact that the two economic considerations of equalization and efficiency do not provide a convincing explanation for the outflow from the Ukraine's national income to other regions of Russia/USSR, let us consider the nationality hypothesis that has been advanced for the pre- as well as post-1917 period. It maintains that the Ukraine was discriminated against by the tsarist government in favor of Russia proper (Ostapenko, 1924; Volobuiev, 1928; Richyts'kyi, 1928; Kononenko, 1958). Since the Revolution, it is argued, the central authorities of the USSR in Moscow have been dominated by ethnic Russians who have discriminated economically against non-Russian republics in favor of the Russian republic (Holubnychy, 1968, pp. 55–57, 76–86, 90–93).

For the pre-1917 period, it has to be kept in mind that the tsarist empire's economy was a market economy. Economic decisions were made by private entrepreneurs in response to the profit motive. If a region offered good opportunities for making profits, businessmen, domestic or foreign, would exploit the situation and the region would experience economic growth. The government could facilitate or obstruct these decisions to a degree, for example, by granting or refusing to grant corporation charters, subsidies, production orders (Liashchenko, 1948, pp. 232–33). The most important government aid for a region's development was construction of necessary infrastructure, primarily railroads. On rare occasions the government invested directly in productive facilities.

According to the authors cited, various obstacles were put in the way of the Ukraine's industrial development. But it seems that opportunities for profit must have remained strong, primarily in the heavy industry of the Donbas and some food processing branches, because the Ukraine attracted a considerable share of the empire's total investment. For example, the Ukraine's share in the total foreign investment alone of the empire's industry (without Finland) has been estimated at 36 percent as of 1913 (Akademiia nauk, 1949, p. 12) and at 26 percent in 1917 (Akademiia nauk, 1967, p. 15).[16] As a result, the growth of Ukrainian industry during the half-century preceding the Revolution was remarkable. Between 1854 and 1908 the Ukraine's share in the total industrial output of the tsarist empire (without

[16] Other estimates of this share fall within the same range.

Finland) increased from 7.1 to 18.4 percent, and from 9.4 to 22.0 percent in the output of the empire's European part alone (without Poland-Lithuania and Finland). This increase was from 11.9 to 19.3 percent for the same period within the interwar borders of the USSR (Spechler, 1980, pp. 410–11, Table 1, citing Soviet sources). This record would suggest that market forces proved to be quite strong in comparison with any obstacles Moscow may have put in the way of the Ukraine's economic development.

Regardless of the development rate of the Ukraine's economy, the tsarist government, as we saw, taxed the Ukraine more than it spent there through the state budget. Since this difference can be relatively easily quantified, it has often been cited as proof of Moscow's discriminatory policy against the Ukraine. The question that needs to be asked is whether this policy benefited ethnic Russians. The answer, at least for the last third of the nineteenth century, is suggested by Iasnopol'skii's study (1897, pp. 439 ff.) on the regional distribution of budget receipts and expenditures. This study analyzes in detail which provinces were beneficiaries and which bore the burden of the tax policy. It concludes that the principal beneficiary was St. Petersburg province, where the state capital was located at that time. The bulk of budget expenditures there went for activities associated with the administration of the entire empire (e.g., the tsar's court, the ministries, the military, etc.), as well as for interest payments on the state's domestic and foreign loans, incurred in part for the construction of the railroad network throughout the country. Thus all of the provinces were the indirect beneficiaries of the state expenditures in St. Petersburg. Direct beneficiaries were the border provinces, primarily those situated in the northwest of the country, which were inhabited by Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and Poles. Non-Russians also inhabited other border provinces; for example, various Caucasian nationalities lived in the Transcaucasus and various Moslem nationalities lived in Central Asia. The direct losers were for the most part the interior provinces of the country, inhabited predominantly by ethnic Russians as well as by Ukrainians and numerous smaller nationalities.

That the ethnic Russians were not favored by the budgetary policy can also be seen from the following evidence. According to an account by then finance minister Sergei Witte (1903, p. 218), the tax burden was most severe in the fifteen Central Black Soil and Central Industrial provinces of the empire's European part: for example, in 1896 budget receipts exceeded expenditures there by 3.50 rubles per capita. These

provinces were also among the poorest (Spechler, 1980, p. 314). Only one of them was inhabited by Ukrainians and one by Belorussians, while the others represented the heart of ethnic Russia. In comparison, the excess of per capital budget expenditures over receipts amounted to 1 ruble in non-Russian Central Asia and 70 kopeks in the Transcaucasus for that year.

The tsarist government considered the Ukraine and other non-Russian ethnic lands inseparable parts of a politically and economically integrated state. Members of these nationalities could attain the highest government positions as long as they faithfully served the empire's interests (cf. Nove, 1969, pp. 83–84). Finally, the bulk of landowners, businessmen, and investors in the Ukraine were non-Ukrainians.[17] Since these feudal magnates and newly rich capitalists controlled a substantial portion of the Ukraine's economy, any economic policy, including the budgetary policy, directed against the Ukraine in particular would have been more harmful to them than to the impoverished Ukrainian peasants. No matter how autocratic it may have been, the tsarist regime could ill afford to base its policies simply on a bias against the Ukraine which, at the same time, would have been discriminatory against the empire's most influential citizens and foreigners.

An economic policy toward the Ukraine motivated simply by an anti-Ukrainian bias on the part of Soviet leaders seems even less plausible. An explicit economic bias either against or for any ethnic group would be contradictory to the entire ideological climate in the USSR. The division of the Soviet Union along ethnic borders into union republics sharply unequal in economic potential makes economic planning and management cumbersome and difficult. Still, in order not to antagonize individual nationalities, the Moscow leadership refrains from abolishing these borders and from introducing an economically more efficient regionalization. The government saw to it that national income, at least during the last two decades, grew at a faster rate in most non-Russian republics than in the RSFSR, which ranked tenth among the fifteen union republics. However, the Russian republic was fourth in the growth of income per capita, a fact explainable in part by the above average population growth in the Trans-

[17] According to the 1897 census, ethnic Ukrainians accounted for the following percentages in the four "highest" classes in the Ukraine: hereditary nobility (landowners), 27.7; personal and official nobility (state officials), 23.7; hereditary and personal honorary citizens (successful professionals and businessmen), 41.0; and merchants, 6.7 (Khomenko, 1931, p. 46).

caucasian and Central Asian republics (various issues of *Narkhoz*). With respect to population welfare, in 1965 the RSFSR was fourth in personal income, third in retail sales and services, fifth in budget expenditures on health, education, and culture, and sixth in urban housing space, all on a per capita basis (Schroeder, 1973, p. 188, Table 7.10). This relatively high standing of the RSFSR incorporates the preeminence in standard of living of such showcase cities as Moscow and Leningrad. As a result, the relative poverty in some ethnic Russian regions (Central Black Soil, Volga, North Caucasus) is obscured in the data for the RSFSR as a whole (e.g., Schroeder, 1973, pp. 170, 172; Mil'ner and Gilinskaia, 1975, pp. 58, 59). These regions supplied many migrants to the developing republics, who left primarily for economic reasons, for example, during the 1960s (Ball and Demko, 1978, pp. 101, 106).

The allocation of a relatively high share of investment to the RSFSR (Table 2, p. 492) should not be regarded as a favoring of ethnic Russians by the central planners. The European RSFSR, with a population accounting for 43.3 percent of the USSR's total in 1970, received a proportional share, 44.0 percent, of the total investment in the USSR during the period between 1960 and 1975. The remaining share of the RSFSR's investment, equal to about one quarter of its total or 15.9 percent of the USSR's investment, was spent on the development of this republic's Asiatic regions (West and East Siberia and Far East), which had about one-fifth of the Russian republic's or 10.6 percent of the USSR's population (various issues of *Narkhoz*). But improvement in the standard of living in the eastern regions was most likely not the main objective for this favorable investment policy. As will be argued below, the policy seems to have been motivated by defense and political considerations.

At present, almost every fifth person residing in the Ukraine is an ethnic Russian. Therefore, by taking an above average share of the income produced in the Ukraine for its own needs Moscow discriminates against 10 million ethnic Russians. On the other hand, "The drain of funds from the Ukraine does not go exclusively to the expansion of Soviet military power. It also goes to the build-up that has taken place in Central Asia. In that region it is not only Russian (and Ukrainian) immigrants who benefited from new medical and education services, but the native peasantry as well" (Wiles, 1977, p. 311). In other words, if the nationality problem were an important factor in national income transfers, it would hardly make sense for the

Moscow leadership to discriminate against some non-Russians and some Russians inhabiting a certain non-Russian national territory, in favor of other non-Russians and Russians living alongside each other in some other national territory.

Geopolitical Considerations

Since the evidence discussed thus far does not support the conclusion that economic and nationality considerations were decisive in the transfer of a part of the national income of the Ukraine to other regions of Russia/USSR, other considerations must have been more, or at least equally, important. In an earlier work (Koropeckyj, 1970) I argued that geopolitical considerations (the relationship of geography to politics, economics, defense, etc.) were of overriding importance for decisions on overall regional developments in the USSR during the postwar period. Similar views had already been expressed by a locational specialist, Andreas Predoehl, and an eminent authority on Soviet economy, Vladimir Timoshenko, with regard to the investment policy in the USSR during the 1930s.[18] Finally, the preceding discussion suggests that the same applies to the prerevolutionary period and especially to the situation of the Ukraine.

For an understanding of this policy, it is essential to grasp the extraordinary importance of geography, or more specifically of space, throughout the empire's history. During the nineteenth century the tsarist government was constantly engaged in the conquest of successively remoter territories, primarily in the east and southeast. In order to consolidate power in these new dependencies and to defend them, the government had to build outposts, military bases, and transportation links.

Subsequently, the immense territory had to be integrated into the national economy of the empire. The expenses involved in opening the new regions were beyond the capability of the private sector, so that they had to be borne jointly by the private and public sectors. Even so the available resources did not allow for all regions to be developed simultaneously. As Liashchenko (1948, p. 418) noted, the capitalistic metropolis "subordinated economically national [i.e., non-Russian] peripheries, leveled their economic peculiarities, sometimes turning

[18] For a discussion of their views, see Koropeckyj, 1971, pp. 72–73.

the national periphery into a backward agricultural appendage of the metropolis, sometimes, the other way around — into an economically inseparable part of the overall capitalistic system, facilitating its capitalistic development. The latter, for instance, took place with respect to the Ukraine, which during the 1870s–90s already appeared as one of the principal and leading regions of the Russian capitalistic system." Thus the regime determined the order of priority for developing individual regions according to their political, military, or economic importance.

Although the railroads, the most conspicuous of the government projects, constructed up to 92 percent at government cost (Liashchenko, 1948, p. 192), appear to have been intended to promote the empire's economic and political integration, in reality their function was primarily military. In the words of a recent researcher, "much of it [the railroad network] was constructed to serve the needs of troop movements in case of war mobilization or actual war rather than the economic needs of freight and passenger service" (Kahan, 1967, p. 466). Some tsarist high officials had an even more farreaching vision of the railroads' importance. Witte, an enthusiast of railroad development, is quoted as having said that the railroads were essential for the opening of the vast Siberian expanse, the future importance of which was not only economic, social, and military, but also as a barrier against the population pressure of "the yellow race" (von Laue, 1969, pp. 237–38).

If any region was important for the regime, it had to be developed, regardless of which nationality inhabited it. To keep the given region under control, the internal security methods of the tsarist regime, later even more comprehensive under the Soviet successor, were devised. Furthermore, trustworthy individuals, whether Russian or non-Russian, were placed in high political and economic positions to make sure that Moscow's interests would not be jeopardized.

This approach toward regional policy has been institutionalized under the Soviet regime. It is even argued that the entire Soviet system — characterized by comprehensive planning, command approach, and centralization of decision making — came into being precisely to develop the huge areas east of the Urals, a task which was beyond the capabilities of the market economy (Raupach, 1968, pp. 21–22, 26, 28, 94). This and other geopolitical goals could be achieved through the appropriate spatial distribution of investment, which in the USSR is centrally planned and flows primarily through the state budget.

The statistics available and conceptual difficulties do not allow for a clear distinction between the share of investment allocated spatially according to purely economic criteria, on the one hand, versus political and military criteria, on the other. But there can be no doubt that in view of the USSR's preoccupation with defense and the expansionist character of its policy, a substantially greater portion of investment has been distributed according to these considerations than was the case in the tsarist empire. Even investment projects which seem to have been located for economic reasons reveal, upon closer inspection, the decisive influence of defense and political criteria. Such huge undertakings as the Ural-Kuznetsk Combine during the 1930s (Koropeckyj, 1971, Appendix B) and the Baikal-Amur Mainline at the present time (Shabad, 1979, pp. 165, 175) are good cases in point.

Specific aspects of Soviet geopolitics have been discussed extensively in my earlier work (Koropeckyj, 1970, pp. 267 ff.). Most of them were already of concern to the rulers of the tsarist empire. In summary, by spatially distributing economic activity Moscow has tried to achieve the following: a shift in economic activity from the west toward the east, territorial dispersal of industry, a build-up of regions bordering on China, establishment of economic links between the east and west of the country, exploitation of natural resources in Asiatic regions, and development of industries important for world power politics (armaments, foreign aid, space exploration) located primarily in Moscow, Leningrad, and the Baltics. The development of the Ukrainian economy was not especially attractive for any of these reasons; thus it was not emphasized, but kept at a tolerable level. The Ukrainian economy has been relegated largely to being a resource base for the development of regions important to the achievement of the enumerated objectives. The geopolitical considerations have been constant for centuries, and this explains the consistency in Moscow's policy toward the Ukraine. This policy has remained basically unchanged, irrespective of the ideology of the ruling regime in the Kremlin; the logic of geopolitics has been equally convincing to a tsar as to a general secretary of the CPSU.

In the future, the importance of the Ukrainian economy to the USSR leaders may increase. Its development will then be emphasized again, as was the case in the second half of the nineteenth century and during the late 1920s and early 1930s under Stalin. This could result from, for example, an increase in trade between the USSR and the West which requires expansion of productive and service facilities on

the littoral of the Black and Azov seas (Shabad, 1977). But since such developments are heavily contingent on politics, they cannot be predicted with any degree of accuracy.

Conclusion

About 3 percent of the national income produced in the Ukraine was transferred to other regions of the tsarist empire during the half-century preceding the Revolution. This loss increased to between 10 and 20 percent after the Revolution. More generally, the regional policy that existed under capitalism before 1917 continued largely unchanged under the Soviet system. Under both regimes, it was guided by the geopolitical demands of the state as perceived and acted upon by the state leadership. This finding seems to confirm the prediction by Max Weber (1968, pp. 919–20), made before the emergence of the first socialist state, as well as the conclusion reached recently by Weisskopf (1974, p. 70) on theoretical grounds, that there should be no difference in defense economics between a capitalist and a socialist state. Furthermore, the smaller drain on the Ukraine's economy before 1917 relative to that after the Revolution suggests that a region can better defend its own economic interests versus those of the central authorities under a capitalist than under a socialist system of government. Obviously, these generalizations are valid only if one assumes that the Soviet system constitutes a type of socialism.

At various times during the last one hundred years, Moscow's leadership fostered the development of the Ukrainian economy, particularly its heavy industry. Some Ukrainian regions, mostly those with conditions favorable for heavy industry, benefited from this policy, and are now among the most advanced in the USSR. There are probably other economic benefits (non-economic advantages or disadvantages are outside the scope of this discussion) which the Ukraine has enjoyed as a result of being a part of Russia/USSR. Those which come readily to mind are economies of scale, opportunity for migration to Asiatic territories, and the relative certainty of the supply of some key products (oil, timber). Yet it seems safe to assume that, disregarding all other possible economic disadvantages, including the basic one of inability to make its own economic decisions, the Ukraine has been, on the whole, more harmed by the continuous outflow of national income than helped by possible bene-

fits. Had the Ukraine been able to retain its funds, the growth rate of its economy would undoubtedly have been faster and the population welfare higher.

Were the Ukraine just another region in an ethnically homogeneous country, the most one could say would be that its continuous loss of national income has been highly inequitable for the region's population. But the Ukraine is inhabited mainly by Ukrainians, a people different from ethnic Russians, the dominant nationality in Russia/USSR. Furthermore, a convincing argument can be made that Ukrainians did not join either tsarist Russia or the USSR voluntarily. There is an obvious need, then, to define the economic status of the Ukraine, as the country of a distinct ethnic community.

A rather general definition states that whenever there is "any relationship of effective domination or control, political or economic, direct or indirect, of one country over another" (Cohen, 1973, pp. 15–16), a case of imperialism exists. Of course, according to this definition the Ukraine has been Moscow's colony for more than three hundred years. Another, narrower definition helps to focus on the economic aspect of the Ukraine's situation. According to it, economic imperialism between countries exists when a transfer of national income takes place from the weaker to the stronger country under the threat of force (Boulding, 1972, pp. x–xi). Such an unequal relationship can also exist between two regions inhabited by two ethnically different nationalities within a country. National income transfers from the weaker to the stronger region — which are legal though not legitimate — precisely characterize the economic relations between the Ukraine as a colony and Moscow as a metropolis.

Since the Ukraine has been experiencing economic loss to other regions of Russia/USSR, the question is who, specifically, has gained from this situation. Until the 1950s the poorer regions of Russia/USSR may have advanced somewhat at the expense of the richer Ukraine. For the two most recent decades this has no longer been true because of the rising inequality among the republics. In terms of output maximization, the entire USSR, too, has not gained at the expense of the Ukraine, for productivity in the Ukraine generally rose faster than in the entire USSR. Finally, there is no conclusive evidence that the economic welfare of ethnic Russians improved at the expense of the Ukraine either before or after the Revolution. As for other aspects of social life, no single factor can explain the outflow of national income from the Ukraine. Undoubtedly, all these factors have had a certain

influence on the geographical distribution of national income in Russia/USSR. But in view of the importance of defense considerations both in the tsarist empire and in the USSR, the state's geopolitical interests seem to have dominated regional policy decisions.

Neither the tsarist nor the Soviet regime has been a parliamentary democracy in the Western sense. Their leaders have not been elected by popular vote, and the policies of these leaders have not represented a compromise between vested interests or the views of the population. Rather, in both regimes policies reflected the interests of the ruling class or ruling elite. In tsarist Russia, the ruling class consisted of a hereditary landed aristocracy and military establishment, leading Lenin and his followers to call the regime military-feudal. In the USSR, the power to control every phase of human life has been monopolized in the hands of the multi-ethnic leadership of the Communist party, a regime sometimes aptly described as a partocracy. In my view, the relationship between the Ukraine as an economic colony and the Moscow metropolis can be defined largely by the existence and interests of this ruling class or elite ("the new class," in Milovan Djilas's terms).

The government in Russia/USSR, as the exponent of the ruling class or the ruling Party, has extracted resources from the Ukraine and used them to provide strong defense capability for the country. Being relatively secure from external threat, this class or elite has retained power in its hands readily and has enjoyed considerable benefits from its position.

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Table 1. National Income Transfers Between the Ukraine and Russia/USSR for Selected Years (percent)

Researcher	*Period*	*Excess of Budgetary Receipts Over Expenditures to Receipts*	*Excess of Budgetary Receipts Over Expenditures or National Income Produced over National Income Utilized to National Income Produced*[a]
	Before Revolution		
Iasnopol'skii (1897)[b]	1868–90	39.7	n.a.*
Petrovs'kyi (1974, p. 12)	9 years (?)	49.7	n.a.
Porsh (1918)[c]	1898–1902	44.7	n.a.
	1903–07	45.0	n.a.
	1908–10	42.4	n.a.
Mal'tsiv (1917)[c]	1913	45.2	n.a.
	After Revolution		
Dobrogaev (1927)[d]	1923/24–1926/27	16.1–19.8	n.a.
Richyts'kyi (1928, p. 80)	1925/26–1927/28	11.2	n.a.
Melnyk (1965, p. 90)	1928/29–1932	23.2	n.a.
Akademiia Nauk (1963, pp. 151, 154)	1959–61	31.1	14.6

[a] National income produced, according to the Eastern definition, is the sum of the net products of material production branches. In comparison with the Western concept, it excludes the net product of services and government sectors. National income utilized refers to the value of consumption and accumulation. It differs from national income produced by the surplus in the Ukraine's trade with the rest of the USSR and foreign countries, in the case of Bandera and Melnyk, and by this surplus and internal losses, in the case of Iemel'ianov and Kushnirskii and Gillula.

[b] In addition to two volumes of text, Iasnopol'skii (1890, 1897), there was also published an appendix containing a large number of tables in absolute terms on which the analysis in the text is based. While both volumes are available in the West, the appendix is not. The percentage in this table is based on the same absolute data in Volobuiev (1928, I, pp. 70–71) and Kononenko (1958, p. 238).

[c] Cited in Richyts'kyi (1928, p. 80).

[d] The higher percentage in the table was prepared by Dobrogaev and is cited in Volobuiev (1928, II, pp. 59–60). The lower percentage reflects the adjustment of Dobrogaev's estimate by Volobuiev for central government expenditures.

* n.a. — not available.

Bandera (1973, p. 136, Table 5.1)	1960	n.a.	16.9
Wagener (1973, p. 99, Table 3.12)	1965	n.a.	9.9
Iemel'ianov and Kushnirskii (1974, p. 141, and various issues of *Narkhoz Ukraine*)	1959–69	n.a.	15.2
Bandera (1977, pp. 238–39, Table 9.1)	1966	n.a.	20.1
Melnyk (1977, p. 286, Table 10.6)	1959–70	33.6	19.9
Gillula (1979, p. 634)	1961–72	n.a.	11–14

Table 2. Shares of the Ukraine, RSFSR, and Kazakhstan in the USSR Total Investment (percent)

	Ukraine	RSFSR	Kazakhstan
1918–28[a]	19.0	65.9	4.2[b]
1929–41[c]	15.9	67.9	3.7
1946–50	19.3	61.2	3.9
1951–65	16.9	61.9	6.5
1966–79	15.7	60.5	6.3

[a] Without the fourth quarter of 1928.
[b] for 1920–28.
[c] Including the fourth quarter of 1928 and excluding the second half of 1941.

Sources: Various issues of *Narkhoz*.

Table 3. Population Weighted Coefficients of Variation for Urbanization, Net Material Product, and Gross Industrial Output in Per Capita Terms for Union Republics for Selected Years

	Urbanization	*Net Material Product*	*Gross Industrial Output*
1913	0.213	n.a.*	0.261
1940	0.137	n.a.	0.216
1960	0.146	0.111	0.215
1970	0.147	0.166	0.244
1979	0.153	0.208	0.266

Sources:
Urbanization: Various issues of *Narkhoz*.
Net Material Product: Absolute data for 1970 from *Narkhoz Latvia 71*, p. 51, and various issues of *Narkhoz*.
Gross Industrial Output: Absolute data for 1960 and 1970 from Gillula, 1978, p. 153, and various issues of *Narkhoz*.
*n.a. — not available.

Table 4. Growth of Total Factor Productivity in the Ukraine Relative to the USSR and Some Republics for Selected Periods (percent)

Researcher	*Period*	*Region*	*Industry*	*Agriculture*
Koropeckyj (1971, p. 35, Table 3.1)[a]	1928–37	Ukraine	83.3	n.a.*
		USSR	100.0	n.a.
Holubnychy (1968, p. 91, Table XII)[b]	1933–41	Ukraine	2.47	n.a.
		RSFSR	2.40	n.a.
		Kazakhstan	1.49	n.a.
	1954–62	Ukraine	0.92	n.a.
		RSFSR	0.78	n.a.
		Kazakhstan	0.70	n.a.
Koropeckyj (1970, p. 261, Table 9)	1958–65	Ukraine	3.33	n.a.
		RSFSR[c]	2.20	n.a.
		Kazakhstan	3.00	n.a.
Whitehouse (1973, p. 157, Table 6.1)	1961–70	Ukraine	2.4	n.a.
		RSFSR	2.4	n.a.
		Kazakhstan	1.4	n.a.
Cohn (1977, p. 74, Table 3.5)	1960–65	Ukraine	2.8	1.6
		USSR	1.3	–0.1
	1965–74	Ukraine	3.1	–0.6
		USSR	3.3	–1.0
Koropeckyj (1981, p. 109, Table 3.5)[d]	1960–65	Ukraine	3.5	1.1
		RSFSR	2.3	0.9
		Kazakhstan	–3.1	–3.0
	1965–70	Ukraine	4.6	0.2
		RSFSR	5.3	2.9
		Kazakhstan	4.5	13.0
	1970–75	Ukraine	2.8	–3.4
		RSFSR	4.4	–6.9
		Kazakhstan	5.0	–3.2
Bond (1979, p. 163, Table 6.1)[e]	1960–75	Ukraine	4.5	–0.9
		RSFSR	5.2	–1.9
		Kazakhstan	4.3	–1.5

[a] Incremental capital-output ratio.
[b] Marginal capital productivity.
[c] 1959–65.
[d] Calculated on the basis of data included in sources to this table.
[e] Calculated on the basis of index numbers.
* n.a. — not available.

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The Ukrainian University in Galicia: A Pervasive Issue

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Before 1918, the Ukrainians in Galicia, the majority population in the eastern half of the province, then part of the Habsburg Monarchy, attained a number of political and cultural rights. Among them was the establishment of schools with instruction in the Ukrainian language. After the World War and the collapse of the monarchy, Galician Ukrainians, like other nationalities of the former empire, tried to establish a politically independent national state. When this failed, they sought to preserve their national rights from encroachments by the central government in Warsaw and the local Polish administration.

The struggle for a Ukrainian university became a dramatic episode in the cultural and political life of Galician Ukrainians. It spanned both eras and transcended academic considerations. A university with Ukrainian as the language of instruction would have assured Ukrainians a natively educated intelligentsia and provided means for social mobility and economic advancement. But Polish control of education and the openly discriminatory policies of the post-1918 Polish government gave the issue a political cast which proved decisive.

National differences in Galicia were accentuated by a dedication to historical study and a penchant for the celebration of historical anniversaries. The duration of the battle for a Ukrainian university, which lasted over half a century, made it a popular legend as well as a political issue. The university already existing in Lviv became a bone of contention between the Ukrainians and the Poles. Some Poles argued that the Ukrainians had no right to the university at all, since it went back to the Polish Jesuit College founded in 1661 (abolished in 1763). The Ukrainians traced the history of the university to its

founding by the Austrian emperor Joseph II in 1784, twenty-one years after the Jesuit institution had been disbanded and at a time when Poland was no longer an independent state.[1]

Joseph II had established the university in Lviv to serve the needs of the population and the government. German and Latin were the primary languages of instruction, but a large portion of the first students were Ukrainian priests, whom Joseph II wanted to make "bureaucrats, teachers, land tillers, and even doctors in the village."[2] Ukrainian was their language of instruction in pastoral theology and other subjects. From 1787 to 1809, a Ruthenian institute also existed at the university.[3] Both the institute and the university were abolished during the reactionary period following Joseph's death. The university was reestablished in 1817 as the Francis I University, and it functioned under that name until 1918. During that time Ukrainians made some additional gains — in 1848 a chair in Ruthenian (Ukrainian) language and literature and in 1862 two chairs in law with Ukrainian as the language of instruction were established.

The reorganization of the monarchy in the 1860s benefitted the Poles, and by the 1870s the administration of the province of Galicia was in Polish hands. A law passed in 1871 provided for the use of the local language in education and administration, but it was often ignored or abused. Galician Ukrainians always proclaimed their legal right to use their own language.[4] Nonetheless, in 1879, Polish replaced German as the official language of the university in Lviv, with Ukrainian permissible in certain instances or with certain subjects.

[1] In some studies, the date of the founding of the university is given as 1661; see, for instance, Evhen K. Lazarenko, *300 rokiv L'vivs'koho universytetu* (Lviv, 1961) and *L'vivs'kyi Ordena Lenina derzhavnyi universytet im. I. Franka,* a brochure published in 1967. Lazarenko accused the Poles of founding the university for colonizing purposes. See also Bohdan Barvins'kyi, "Predtecha universytetu im. Frantsa I u L'vovi," *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* (Lviv), 125 (1918): 1–41.

[2] Ludwik Finkel and Stanisław Starzyński, *Historia Uniwersytetu Lwowskiego,* 2 pts. (Lviv, 1894), 1: 78 (Actually, Finkel wrote part 1, covering the years up to 1869, and Starzyński wrote part 2, covering 1869 to 1894.)

[3] To Ukrainians it was significant that there had been a Ukrainian institute at the university, but not a Polish one. The Ukrainian side is given by Vasyl Mudryi, an active participant, in *Ukrains'kyi universytet u L'vovi u rr. 1921–1925* (Nuremberg, 1948), and *Borot'ba za ohnyshche ukrains'koi kul'tury v zakhidnykh zemliakh Ukrainy* (Lviv, 1923). He also edited *L'viv: A Symposium on its 700 anniversary* (New York, 1962), which contains some material on the university issue.

[4] See Finkel and Starzyński, *Historia,* 2: 3, and Kost' Levyts'kyi, *Pro prava rus'koi movy* (Lviv, 1896). The law referred to is the rescript of the Ministry of Religions and Public Education of 11 July 1871.

The reforms of the 1860s, coupled with the Polish uprising of 1863, precipitated the establishment of student groups and national cultural organizations in Galicia. Both Polish and Ukrainian students engaged in open demonstrations of their nationality.[5]

A dramatic change was occurring in the second half of the nineteenth century among Galician Ukrainians. This was the growth of a secular intelligentsia. Although the married Uniate Catholic clergy, the mainstay of the Ukrainian national reawakening, remained very much in the forefront, political leadership began to be assumed by members of the liberal professions. Also, an increasing number of peasants were drawn into political activity. Radicalism, populism, and socialism were reenforced by contacts with Ukrainians from the Eastern Ukraine. The influence of Drahomanov, for instance, was crucial in the formation of a new Radical party. Rivalry among the parties led each one to curry favor with the electorate, which in turn spread political consciousness among the peasants. Attempts to broaden suffrage, which resulted in electoral reform in 1907, further strengthened the Ukrainians' national orientation.

These developments helped make education — frequently the sole means of upward mobility, largely because the province was industrializing very slowly — an important political issue in Galicia. Effective schooling in the native language became a major plank for the democratic parties. The decentralization of education, the establishment of provincial school boards, and the opposition of Galician Polish conservatives to expansion of schools combined to give the issue even greater political overtones. Local Polish administrations blocked the establishment of new schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction, while local school boards made certification of Ukrainian teachers difficult.[6] The university issue developed against this background, and

[5] In 1893 some students founded the Academic Corps of Leopol, which had as its aim "the unification of university youth under the banner of academic honor, without regard to any national, religious, or political tendencies." It never really functioned, and was formally disbanded in 1894. Other student societies reflected both student issues and national concerns: see Finkel and Starzyński, *Historia,* 2: 409.

The Ukrainian student movement in Galicia has not yet been fully studied. For an introduction to Ukrainian student organizations in Lviv, see Osyp Nazaruk and Olena Okhrymovych, "Khronika rukhu ukrains'koi akademichnoi molodizhy u L'vovi," in *Sich: Al'manakh v pam"iat' 40-vykh rokovyn osnovania tovarystva Sich u Vidni,* ed. Zenon Kuzelia and Mykola Chaikivs'kyi (Lviv, 1908), pp. 387–435. For a list of Ukrainian student organizations at the university, see Finkel and Starzyński, *Historia,* 2: 410.

[6] A detailed discussion of one aspect of the issue, women's education, is Bogu-

by the end of the century a Ukrainian university in Galicia became a major political goal. Ukrainian parliamentary representatives formally made the demand in the Austrian Reichstag on 29 December 1898.[7]

Pressure from the Ukrainians had resulted in the appointment in 1894 of Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, a leading Ukrainian historian from the Russian Empire, to the chair of East European history, with Ukrainian as the language of instruction, at the university of Lviv. The courses he was to teach included several in Ukrainian history. One reason for Hrushevs'kyi's appointment was the hope that he would strengthen Polish-Ukrainian cooperation on the common ground of anti-Russian feelings.[8] Discrimination against Ukrainians in the Russian Empire, however, made the Galician Ukrainians acutely aware of their national responsibility and obligation to establish a Ukrainian university.

Initially, Ukrainian students had demanded only that more subjects be taught in Ukrainian at the university in Lviv. They made use of all the traditional means of protest — petitions, rallies, commissions, and delegations to officials as high as the minister of education in Vienna. When these efforts failed to yield results, a rally of all Ukrainian students in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was called in Lviv on 13 July 1899. That assembly made a clear-cut demand:

> In view of the burdens which the Ukrainian people bear for the government; in view of the fact that article 19 of the Fundamental Law guarantees to each nation the opportunity of full cultural development in its own native language; in view of the fact that the bilingualism guaranteed by law but not introduced in practice at the university in Lviv is insufficient for the needs of the Ukrainian people; in view of the fact that the number of Ukrainian students is so large that the creation of a university for them is essential, the Ukrainian students of all higher schools in Austria demand from the government the creation of a Ukrainian university in Lviv.[9]

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sława Czajecka's "Przygotowanie kobiet do pracy zawodowej na tle ruchu feministycznego w Galicji" (Ph.D. diss., Jagellonian University, 1977).

[7] Bobrzyński, the vice-president of the Crownland School Council who in 1908 became the governor of Galicia, had complained that "the Ukrainians presented the establishment of a Ruthenian university as their highest political goal": Michał Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników,* ed. Adam Galos (Wrocław, 1957), p. 317. The historian Henryk Wereszycki (*Historia polityczna Polski, 1864–1918,* 2nd ed. [Paris, 1979], p. 176), also stressed that at the turn of the century a major Ukrainian party considered the university and popular suffrage as their foremost political goals in Galicia.

[8] Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników,* p. 302. Ivan Franko, who was under consideration at about the same time as Hrushevs'kyi, a moderate socialist, was denied appointment at the university in Lviv because of his political convictions.

[9] Mudryi, *Borot'ba,* pp. 42–43, citing *Ukrains'ko-rus'kyi universytet: Pam"iatkova knyha pershoho vicha ukrains'kykh studentiv v Avstrii* (Lviv, 1899). See also

The students' demand was supported by Galician Ukrainian organizations, including the press, many of which petitioned the government.[10]

Meanwhile, an influx of Polish students expelled from Russian universities, veterans of student protest movements, came to Lviv. Polish faculty at the university sought assurance from the government that "the Polishness of the university would be guaranteed."[11] Some Polish professors refused to validate transcripts that had been filed in Ukrainian, while others spoke openly against using Ukrainian at the university.

The Ukrainian students convened a second rally on 8 October 1901. Significantly, that gathering made less insistent demands. Called for now was a reorganization of chairs with Ukrainian as the language of instruction into a self-contained administrative unit, with doctoral examinations in Ukrainian. Even this reorganization, the students knew, would take some time to accomplish. For the time being, they would be satisfied with Ukrainian-speaking examiners and Ukrainian-language administrative forms. But these moderate demands, too, were ignored.

As the atmosphere at the university became more tense, the Ukrainian students edged toward confrontation. They called another rally for 19 November 1901. The secret agenda was to include the election of a delegation to be sent to the Ministry of Education and the Reichstag, as well as a call to boycott objectionable Polish professors at the university. The police, however, had planted an informer among the Ukrainian organizers of the rally and permission for the rally, usually a routine matter, was denied. Angered, the Ukrainian students held the rally nevertheless. When the rector and some faculty tried to talk them into disbanding, the crowd pushed them out of the room. The students

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Mykhailo Lozyns'kyi, "Z Avstryis'koi Ukrainy — Z borot'by za ukrains'kyi universytet u L'vovi," *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* 37 (January–March 1907): 527–36. The first all-student strike, in which students from all higher educational establishments (including gymnasia) participated, took place in 1899 in tsarist Russia. We do not know what impact the student movement there had on Ukrainians in Galicia. We do know, however, the influence that Polish students from Russia had upon the Austrian Poles. According to Finkel and Starzyński, in 1893 there were 1,279 students at the university: by nationality — 863 Poles, 414 Ukrainians, 2 others; by religion — 601 Latin-rite Catholics, 422 Greek-rite Catholics, and 244 Jews. The 43 students from outside Galicia were Poles expelled from imperial Russian universities.

[10] See, especially, "O rus'kii universytet u L'vovi," *Dilo*, 25 June (7 July) 1899.

[11] Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*, p. 314.

smashed furniture, and went out into the streets, singing patriotic songs as they marched through the city.[12]

Classes were suspended, and an investigation into the rally began. The university's senate issued a declaration in Polish deploring the events of November 19 and urging all students to defend the integrity of the university. The Ukrainian students took this as a call for a pogrom against them. Their reply came in the dramatic withdrawal of all Ukrainian students from the university. The secession lasted an academic year, and all Ukrainian students supported it, including the conservative Moscophiles.[13] The Ukrainian community immediately raised the money to enable the Galician Ukrainians to attend other universities in the empire, particularly that at Cracow, which was closest. The Ukrainian students viewed the western Galician university of Cracow as justly a Polish one, but attendance there merely strengthened their conviction that a Ukrainian university should exist in Lviv. When the students returned to Lviv in the fall of 1902, they renewed the struggle with even more dedication.

The decade preceding the outbreak of World War I was characterized by the growth of patriotism among both the Ukrainians and the Poles in Galicia. Patriotic political organizations of both nationalities proliferated. Many aimed at the amelioration of conditions in the villages and at the concomitant spread of national consciousness among the peasants. University and high school students became involved in social and political matters.[14] Assertion of national consciousness permeated all aspects of life in Galicia, and attempts to establish schools for women provided additional fuel for the nationality issue.[15]

[12] Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników,* p. 302; Mudryi, *Borot'ba,* pp. 44–46.

[13] Although a discussion of the political situation among the Ukrainian parties in Galicia is outside the scope of this article, a brief note reminding the reader of the so-called Moscophiles is in order. By the turn of the century the influence of the Moscophiles, adherents to a vague, politically romantic neo-conservatism which idealized the Russian tsar and the alleged unity of Eastern Slavdom, had declined. The Moscophiles resented the Ukrainian populist trend which emerged in Galicia, insisted on using a stilted variant of Church Slavonic rather than vernacular Ukrainian, and avoided contact with the political parties and social organizations formed in Galicia in the second half of the nineteenth century. Hence, support of the boycott by Moscophile students was considered a coup.

[14] See, for instance, the discussion of the Liga Narodowa, a patriotic national-democratic organization which tried to raise national consciousness among Polish peasants, in Wereszycki, *Historia polityczna,* p. 258.

[15] Polish students ended one rally before the new high school for girls run by Ukrainian Basilian nuns, chanting "Basilian nuns to the stake." Because religion

The more the Ukrainians demanded a Ukrainian university, the more the Poles rallied to the defense of what they considered to be the Polish university in Lviv. Anti-Ukrainian publications appeared more frequently, and criticism of the *Rusini,* as the Poles called Ukrainians, was loud, especially among local Poles.[16]

Since the Austrian government was taking no decisive action, the Ukrainians in Galicia began to plan a private Ukrainian university which could qualify for a government subsidy. The Shevchenko Scientific Society, the surrogate Ukrainian Academy of Arts in Galicia which had petitioned the government to establish a university, was in the forefront of these efforts. But a private university proved to be beyond the financial capabilities of Galician Ukrainians. Instead they organized summer courses at Lviv in 1904, in which students and faculty from the Russian Empire, where there were no Ukrainian language schools, took part.

The revolution of 1905 in the Russian Empire showed the Ukrainians the importance of direct action. At student rallies emotions ran high. Direct confrontations between Ukrainian and Polish students, at times mediated and at time abetted by the police, flared up more frequently. Following one in 1907, over a hundred Ukrainian students were arrested for rowdyism and destruction of property. When let go, they refused to depart as a protest over the arrest of five student leaders. Having staged another rally in jail, of which one leader was Myroslav Sichyns'kyi (who was later to assassinate Andrzej Potocki, the governor of Galicia), the students went on a hunger strike to make their cause and demand for a university known outside the monarchy.[17] The young Ukrainians manifested confidence, solidarity, and

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was involved, the incident came to be discussed in the Galician Diet; see *Sprawozdanie Sejmu Krajowego z roku 1902/3,* vol. 3 (34–49) (meeting of 24 October 1903), pp. 2287–88, and Czajecka, "Przygotowanie kobiet," pp. 488 and 578. Also see Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników,* p. 305.

[16] Traditionally the Ukrainians in Galicia referred to themselves as *Rusyny* and to their ancestral nation as *Rus'*. The Latinized and Germanized forms are *Rutheni* and *Ruthenen*; the Polonized, *Rusini.* The term was never used by Ukrainians as a name for Russians, although in rhetorical usage *Rus'* could include Russians. Conservatives — Moscophiles and Old Ruthenians — wanted to continue using the term *rusyn,* but by the turn of the century *Ukrainian,* which had come into widespread use in Eastern Ukraine earlier, had been popularized in Galicia by the democratic movement and won out. Although a few traditionalists used *rusyn,* especially on ceremonial occasions, most Ukrainians in Galicia resented the term, especially when used by non-Ukrainians. The Poles officially used the term *Rusini* as a synonym for *Ukraińcy* until 1939.

[17] The best account is by Osyp Nazaruk, in Nazaruk and Okhrymovych, "Khro-

enthusiasm, in contrast to the Galician Ukrainian intelligentsia, self-critical of its own apathy, dilettantism, and ineffectiveness.

The most dramatic episode in the struggle occurred in 1910. The Lviv City Council proposed that Polish be used exclusively at Lviv University, and Poles attacked bilingualism in a series of public rallies. In July, the Ukrainian students, failing yet again to obtain permission for a legal assembly, gathered at the university nevertheless. The Polish students blockaded the Ukrainians and alerted the police. In the ensuing scuffle, an armed Polish student fired into the crowd of Ukrainians and killed Adam Kotsko, a Ukrainian student. One hundred twenty-eight of the some three hundred Ukrainian participants were arrested. A hostile mob tried to lynch them, and broke windows in Ukrainian community buildings.

The ensuing investigation by Polish authorities focused on the activities of the Ukrainians and glossed over the murder of Kotsko. Emotions over Kotsko's death, however, ran high among his fellow Ukrainians, as exemplified in this passage, written after more than ten years (and a World War) had passed:

> This rally and the events connected with it shall eternally fill each Ukrainian with dread. . . . Ukrainian students redeemed with blood and the death of their own colleague the quest and goal of acquiring their own holy temple of learning and culture. One Ukrainian student fell dead from the bullet of a fellow Polish student within the walls of the temple of learning. He died not by the inquisition of the Middle Ages, not on the field of battle, but where friendship and peace ought to unite and elevate the spirit of all without regard to nationality, for the common ideal of perfecting oneself by learning.[18]

The census of 1910 and the war scares of 1911 and 1912 accentuated the animosities of the two nationalities. Again the Ukrainian parliamentary group raised the issue of a university at the Reichstag in Vienna. On 26 March 1912, when no results were forthcoming, they began a fillibuster. Eventually, the tactic won: the Vienna government promised to create a Ukrainian university in Lviv.

But the provincial administration was not Vienna. Poles in Lviv mobilized public opinion against the establishment of a Ukrainian university. Less than a month after the Vienna government's promise,

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nika rukhu," pp. 427–30. See also "Protses 101," in *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* 14 (May 1911): 362–77; the anonymous author argues that moderate activity brought no results, and that Polish actions had provoked the Ukrainian students.

[18] Mudryi, *Borot'ba,* p. 61; see also Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników,* p. 307.

a Ukrainian student rally was banned by the Polish city administration of Lviv. In July 1912 the Ukrainian parliamentary group resumed its fillibuster in Vienna, this time insisting on a documented pledge. An imperial transcript was issued in December of that year, promising that the university would be established by 1916. The Poles could not contest the decree, but the issue remained a heated one. In 1913 Ukrainian students organized another mass rally to keep the issue in the public eye.[19]

The outbreak of the First World War did not extinguish the Ukrainians' commitment to the university. After the invading Russian imperial army left Lviv in February 1916, the Shevchenko Scientific Society bombarded beleaguered Vienna with memoranda reminding the imperial government of the promise it had made in 1912.

When the armistice was signed in the West on 11 November 1918, the war was still going on in Galicia. On 1 November 1918, the Ukrainians proclaimed in Lviv the establishment of a national Ukrainian state on the territories of Eastern Galicia (i.e., the historical territories of the Halych principality). From that day until 14 March 1923, when the Allies mandated Galicia to Poland, Galician Ukrainians regarded Polish claims to Galicia as illegal and imperialist.

During the next four years the situation in Galicia became entwined with the Ukrainian national movement, the Ukrainian socialist and communist movements, Soviet Russian territorial ambitions, the aspirations of conservative Russians, Polish attempts to reestablish Poland to pre-partition boundaries, and great power considerations. But mobilizations and demobilizations, famine, pestilence, and economic and political crises did not diminish the issue of the university for the Ukrainians in Galicia.

In 1919 the Poles succeeded where the Ukrainians had failed. They established an independent state, beset as it was by internal dissension, political unrest, and terrorism. Immediately the university at Lviv was totally Polonized. A regulation of 14 August 1919, formalized by the government on September 22, allowed only loyal Polish citizens or

[19] *Istorychni postati Halychyny XIX–XX st.*, pt. 2: *Budivnychi novitnoi ukrains'koi derzhavnosty v Halychyni,* by Isydor Sokhots'kyi (Philadelphia, 1961), p. 141; see also Mudryi, *Ukrains'kyi universytet,* p. 13. The national issue continued to permeate deliberations of the Galician provincial school board. For instance in March 1914, the school board, trying to forestall demonstrations, permitted commemoration of the death of Taras Shevchenko. Immediately Poles demanded similar official celebrations of the anniversaries of the Polish writers and poets P. Skarga, J. I. Kraszewski, Z. Krasiński and Juliusz Słowacki.

citizens of the Allied states who had served in the Polish or Allied armies to enroll at Lviv University.[20]

As part of the peace settlement, however, the Allies had insisted that the Austrian successor states, including Poland, ensure the rights of national minorities. The Poles formally accepted the principle of minority legislation, but procrastinated with its implementation before abolishing it unilaterally. Many Poles, including government officials, believed that any concessions to the minorities would not only be a sign of weakness, but would indeed weaken the new state. Yet if Poland failed to grant the Ukrainians civil rights, the Allies might not confirm Polish claims to Galicia. Concurrently, the Poles were also troubled that Ukrainian students were seeking to form a university in Czechoslovakia,[21] thereby establishing a model for one in Poland and a focal point for discontented Ukrainian students there. The Polish authorities were also concerned about the Ukrainization policy in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which allowed for a growth of Ukrainian cultural life and favorably impressed some Ukrainians in Poland.

Many of the prospective Ukrainian students in Galicia were war veterans and pre-war activists. They needed a university degree to earn a living, and the Ukrainian community felt it owed its freedom fighters at least that much. Study outside the province was hampered by lack of money and Polish unwillingness to issue exit visas.

The issue of a Ukrainian university in Lviv now developed on two levels, as the Ukrainians acted both on their own and in cooperation with the government. The first level led to the establishment of the Ukrainian Clandestine University in Lviv. Attempts to work out an acceptable solution with the Polish government moved along on the second level, and peaked in the negotiations detailed in the documents appended here.

As early as August 1919, when the restriction of students at Lviv University to loyal Poles was announced, a group of Ukrainian scholars set out to provide Ukrainian youth with other means of higher education. But when the Shevchenko Scientific Society planned a

[20] Mudryi, *Borot'ba,* p. 77. See also *Vpered* (Lviv), 25 September 1919.

[21] The Czechs, veterans of a long struggle with the Germans on the integrity of Czech-language educational institutions, were sympathetic to Ukrainian aspirations. They helped both organizationally and financially in setting up institutions of higher learning for Ukrainian émigrés in Czechoslovakia.

series of university courses, the government forbade them.[22] In 1920 the Ukrainian Student Academic Society approached university officials to find some way Ukrainians could attend. The officials insisted that prospective students submit loyalty affidavits from local police officers, as well as attestation of service in some Polish civic organization — prerequisites which no nationally aware Ukrainian of the time would meet.

That same year the minister of education in the Witos government, Michał Rataj, known as a conciliator, brought up in conversations with three prominent Ukrainians — Vasyl Shchurat, Kyrylo Studyns'kyi, and Stefan Fedak, the first two scholars and the third a lawyer — the possibility of establishing a Ukrainian university in Stanislaviv.[23] The Ukrainians objected to the site because it lacked libraries, archives, and scientific equipment. A sufficient number of Poles also objected to the establishment of a Ukrainian university, once the government brought the issue before the education commission in the Diet, for the matter to be tabled.

Having lost their bid for independence — although not ready to admit so *de jure* — Galician Ukrainians insisted on return to the legal practices of the Austrian Monarchy, specifically, the recognition of the official use of Ukrainian. A delegation of former and potential Ukrainian students met with the rector of Lviv University in April 1921, and argued for the reestablishment of bilingualism at the university.

Immediate and full access to higher education for Ukrainians was a pressing need. Following the collapse of the Russian and Austrian empires, the Ukrainians were becoming painfully aware that their nation lacked specialists and technicians in all areas — from foreign-speaking diplomats to railroad engineers. The lack of qualified personnel was considered a major reason for the failure of Ukrainians to maintain an independent state.

In the fall of 1920, while waiting for a way to enter Poland's universities without compromising national dignity, Ukrainian stu-

[22] The reason for the ban was the allegedly inadequate academic credentials of some proposed teachers. The Ukrainians countered that the Polish teachers were less qualified than the Ukrainians. They also reminded the Poles that a year earlier the Ukrainian National Republic in Kiev had not banned similar courses organized by the Poles.

[23] Stanyslaviv had a larger proportion of Ukrainians than did Lviv, and it was the home base of the Ukrainian socialist and women's movements. The city became a haven for the beleaguered government of the Western Ukrainian Republic after it had been ejected from Lviv by the Poles: see Mudryi, *Borot'ba,* p. 84.

dents formed discussion groups within the Ukrainian Student Academic Society in Lviv. These groups were led by faculty from the former Austrian schools, a number of whom were qualified university instructors out of favor with Polish officials.[24] By 1921 the discussion groups were offering organized instruction and had developed an academic administration. Since the government had not permitted the Shevchenko Society to sponsor such courses, the Ukrainians hoped that the Society of Petro Mohyla, which had as an official function the organization of public courses in Ukrainian, would serve as its legal umbrella. But the Polish local administration refused to sanction these courses, as well.[25]

That July all Galician Ukrainian student organizations convened in Lviv. They declared not only a retaliatory boycott of all Polish higher schools, but also of any Ukrainians who attended them. Fearing a resumption of bloodshed in the struggle for a university, the faculty of the Lviv Ukrainian courses met and formalized the establishment of the Ukrainian Clandestine University, electing a rector and senate.

From 1921 to 1925 the Ukrainian Clandestine University in Lviv had over a thousand students attending courses ranging from philosophy to a pre-medical program. Its activity constitutes a remarkable chapter in the history of education. Credits earned at the university were recognized by established institutions of higher learning in Europe. Of necessity, the university functioned conspiratorially: its administrative files were kept in two portable trunks, perched at times on the shoulders of a custodian who eluded the police many a time. The dedication of the students and faculty was so great that they managed to persevere effectively through four years of harassment and open persecution. A number of Jewish students from Volhynia also attended, until they were picked up by the police and banished from Galicia. In 1922 a group of conservative Moscophile students, too, enrolled.[26]

[24] Mudryi, *Borot'ba,* p. 86; also Mudryi, *L'viv: A Symposium,* passim, and Lev Iasinchuk, "Education in L'viv," in ibid., pp. 280–303. On the overall Galician-Ukrainian educational situation see Lev Iasinchuk, *50 lit ridnoi shkoly, 1881–1931* (Lviv, 1931): this second edition is heavily censored; the first had been confiscated by the Polish government.

[25] Mudryi, *Borot'ba,* p. 90; rescript dated 11 April 1921.

[26] The fullest discussion is Mudryi, *Borot'ba.* He objects to the appellation "clandestine," but it was used by the school's faculty, students, and supporters, as well as critics. In the 1870s Polish women in the Russian Empire had established a "flying university"; it functioned for a few semesters but encompassed fewer

Support came from private donations of money and foodstuffs collected by the students. The $1,000 American sent by Hryhor Tsehlyns'kyi from the New York Workers' Society was a very substantial gift, since in *złoty* the sum equaled half the annual budget of the official Lviv University, now officially renamed the John Casimir University.[27]

The Polish government, beleaguered by political, economic, and social crises and plagued by the growth of paramilitary groups throughout the country, tried to link the Ukrainian Clandestine University to the growing wave of terrorism. When Stefan Fedak, a student who had been a lieutenant in the Ukrainian army (son of the prominent attorney), attempted to assassinate Piłsudski, the Poles arrested Vasyl Shchurat, the rector of the Clandestine University, and some faculty and students. Shchurat, a distinguished scholar and author, was in prison for three months.

The harassment strengthened the resolve of the Ukrainians to carry on. They used the university issue as a means of publicizing their nation's plight: a Ukrainian student convention held in Prague in June 1922, supported by the International Students' League, sent a protest to the Genoa Conference on the treatment of the Ukrainians by the Poles. In September of that year, the issue of a Ukrainian university was raised by Professor Ettore Lombardo-Pellegrini in the Italian Parliament.

The Poles were alarmed at these efforts by a minority to subvert the Polishness of their state. Public lectures in Ukrainian were proscribed, provoking the Ukrainians to demonstrations of protest. Elections announced for November 1922, which Galician Ukrainians boycotted as illegal, served as a pretext for the month-long detention of some 20,000 persons.

At the same time, however, the Warsaw government was exploring ways of placating the Ukrainians without actually giving in to the demand for a university and antagonizing its own people. An informal approach to Professor Petro Stebels'kyi about reactivating the Stanislaviv idea yielded no results. The promulgation of the law on provincial autonomy on 26 November 1922, which left education to the provincial governments, was regarded by Ukrainians as a political maneuver. But the Poles were in fact obliged to demonstrate to the

students than the Ukrainian one. The Poles were to organize a clandestine university during the Nazi occupation.

[27] Mudryi, *Ukrains'kyi universytet,* p. 17.

Allies their good will toward the minorities if the territorial *status quo* was to be sanctioned. Hence on 26 September 1922, they promulgated a law which called for the establishment of a Ukrainian university within two years.

Count Stanisław Łoś, an organizer of a small party of Ukrainian peasants willing to cooperate with the Poles which was bitterly resented by all other Galician Ukrainians, approached Rev. Tyt Voinarovs'kyi, a prominent Ukrainian cleric known for level-headedness, about the possibility of initiating negotiations for a Ukrainian university. Voinarovs'kyi met Łoś on what was considered neutral ground —conferences sponsored by the Vatican in Warsaw. The two men discussed both the need for the university and the difficulties its establishment would create, and Voinarovs'kyi communicated Łoś's intentions to the Ukrainian political leadership.[28] The senate of the Lviv Clandestine University insisted that Łoś be formally authorized by the Polish government to carry on negotiations, and that he do so through the Ukrainian Inter-Party Council.[29]

Voinarovs'kyi, however, tried to convince Shchurat and Marian Panchyshyn, a physician, to discuss the matter with the Poles directly, without going through the council. Shchurat and Panchyshyn refused, and both continued to work in the clandestine university. On 12 February 1923 its community base was strengthened by the establishment of the Curatoria of Ukrainian Higher Schools, which was to supervise the running of the Clandestine University and the polytechnic institute which had developed alongside it. The Curatoria put forward a formal proposal to Warsaw that the Ukrainian Clandestine University become a state university. This proposal was simultaneously raised by Ukrainian representatives to the Diet from Volhynia, Kholm, Pidliashshia, and Polissia (areas which had formerly been under the Russian empire and had not boycotted the election). The proposal received no response. Moreover, when the Curatoria petitioned the

[28] Łoś stressed the small number of qualified Ukrainian faculty — a view echoed in a memorandum of the rector of the Jagellonian and expressed by other Polish intellectuals. Mudryi, *Borot'ba,* pp. 118–22, quotes some of the correspondence between Łoś and Voinarovs'kyi. Of interest are Voinarovs'kyi's memoirs, published in *Istorychni postati Halychyny XIX–XX st.,* pt. 1: *Spohady z moho zhyttia,* by Tyt Voinarovs'kyi, ed. Daniel Bohachevsky (Philadelphia, 1961), especially pp. 70–73.

[29] See Mudryi, *Borot'ba,* p. 122. Apparently Łoś tried to continue the negotiations, with a representative of the Ukrainian Peasant Party, Rev. Nykolai Il'kiv, as an intermediary. Il'kiv, a member of the pro-Polish party, was regarded as a traitor by Galician Ukrainians and his inquiries went unanswered; ibid., p. 127.

government for approval of its by-laws, the Warsaw government, again in the throes of a major political crisis, failed to act, leaving the Curatoria in legal limbo.[30]

The official Allied sanction of Polish control of Galicia, including a guarantee of the rights of the nationalities living there, came on 14 March 1923. Given this recognition of de facto Polish control, even the staunchest Ukrainian patriots had to acknowledge the Polish presence. Ukrainian political parties began to take active part in the political life of the country, and more Ukrainians seemed willing to bargain on the issue of a Ukrainian university.

But national antagonism between the Poles and the Ukrainians continued as the political and economic situation worsened. Local Poles were vocal in their anti-Ukrainianism: limited government funds must not be spent, they argued, on those who had actively opposed Polish rule. Runaway inflation made this argument especially effective.

The new Polish republic struggled to establish a working democracy. Its unstable parliamentary alliances embodied conflicting views on the new republic's direction, international situation, and priorities. The government changed hands frequently and was often incapable of controlling the populace, which was being adroitly manipulated by parties out of power. Paramilitary organizations and workers' unrest undercut attempts to stabilize the situation. The assassination of President Gabriel Narutowicz on 16 December 1922, by a man connected with the national-democratic camp, was only one dramatic instance of the violence that plagued the country.

Under these circumstances, no stable policy vis-à-vis the Ukrainians could develop. Nor did the Ukrainians in Poland unite and speak with one voice. The issue of the Ukrainian university was used by both Polish and Ukrainian political parties for their own purposes, which made all actions regarding the issue suspect. Some Poles, particularly academics, took the commitment to establish a Ukrainian university seriously. Others postponed it through various ploys. Still another sizeable group, especially Poles living in Eastern Galicia, regarded even discussions of a Ukrainian school of higher education as tantamount to treason against newly resurrected Poland.

[30] See Mudryi, *Ukrains'kyi universytet,* pp. 22–25, and *Borot'ba,* p. 123. Mudryi's *Borot'ba* was published quickly in 1923, by the Central Bureau of Press and Propaganda of the Professional Organization of Ukrainian Students, because of the importance of the university issue.

The situation among Ukrainians was similar. Although in the 1920s most of the intelligentsia still agreed that higher education was vital to the national cause (in the next decade the rise of integral nationalism would challenge that conception), there was little agreement about how the goal could be achieved. The successes of the Clandestine University led some to advocate such self-organization, despite Polish opposition. Others, especially academics, realized that to function well a university needs stable financial support and government recognition.

A serious proposal for creating an official Ukrainian university came between 1924 and 1925 from a coalition government of centrist and right-of-center parties. It was formulated in the Ministry of Religions and Public Education by Stanisław Grabski, Tadeusz Waryński, and Stanisław Łoś.[31] The plan called for the creation of a commission comprising representatives of government, the faculty of Poland's oldest university, the Jagellonian in Cracow, and Ukrainian faculty (later it was decided to include faculty members of the John Casimir University). This commission would work toward establishing the nucleus of a Ukrainian university in Cracow. Once that nucleus was organized, it was to be moved to a city in ethnic Ukrainian territory. The government saw the situation in Lviv as too volatile to permit a Ukrainian university to be created there, as most Ukrainians insisted. As is evident in the materials appended here, the Poles felt that if this compromise proposal were spurned by the Ukrainians, the onus of intransigence would be on the minority nationality rather than on the government.

The government approached the rector of the Jagellonian, Jan Łoś (no relation to Stanisław Łoś), about heading such a commission.[32]

[31] Stanisław Grabski held various positions in the early years of the Polish Republic and was a leader of the national-democratic camp. Seeing Germany as a major threat to Poland, Grabski advocated compromise with national minorities in the eastern part of the country, as well as with the Soviet Union (he expounded these views in a book published in 1922). But, in fact, his willingness to compromise was circumscribed by his commitment to a strong Poland, and in Galicia his name became linked with the Polonization of schools. On 27 November 1923, in the last month of Wincenty Witos's government, he became the minister of education. On December 19 his brother, Władysław Grabski, became prime minister. Miklaszewski served as minister of education for a time, but Stanisław Grabski continued to play a vital role in the Ukrainian university issue. For an overall discussion of the political situation of Ukrainians in Poland, see Mirosława Papierzyńska-Turek, *Sprawa ukraińska w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej, 1922–1926* (Cracow, 1979).

[32] The Jagellonian University had naturally produced many politically prominent

Łoś was sympathic to the idea, and after polling his faculty obtained some active support, particularly from Fryderyk Zoll.[33] In mid-July 1924, representatives of the ministry met with Ignacy Lyskowski, the rector of Warsaw University, and Jan Łoś and Fryderyk Zoll, and agreement was reached on the main points of the Jagellonian's role in the planning of a Ukrainian university.[34]

On the Ukrainian side, the major actors were Roman Smal-Stocki (Smal-Stots'kyi) and Kyrylo Studyns'kyi. Dr. Smal-Stocki, born in 1893, had studied in Vienna, Leipzig, and Munich, and at this time was connected with the Ukrainian university in Prague. During World War I he had served in diplomatic and secretarial capacities, without seeing action in the field. His political views were moderate, and education abroad set him apart from the average Ukrainian intellectual of the time. A dapper young man of the world, Smal-Stocki was at times exasperated by Galician provincialism. As he shuttled between Warsaw, Berlin, Cracow, Prague, and Lviv, he occasionally acted as a spokesman for Ukrainians, although he did not have organized community support. Kyrylo Studyns'kyi, born in 1868, was a literary scholar and president of the Shevchenko Scientific Society. He had taught at the Jagellonian before the World War and had been interned by the Poles afterwards. Strengthening intellectual life in Galicia was his abiding interest.

Studyns'kyi and Smal-Stocki became intermediaries in the plan to found a Ukrainian university in Cracow. Ukrainians who had held professorial rank under the Austrians met in Prague at the end of August 1924; on the whole, they supported the establishment of the commission. They urged Studyns'kyi to continue working on the plan with the government, and Smal-Stocki to serve as an intermediary. Although maintaining that the permanent location of the Ukrainian university must be Lviv, they agreed to accept another site as a temporary measure. They insisted on the immediate creation of facul-

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Poles. In 1922 one of its rectors, Julian Nowak, headed a cabinet under Piłsudski, in which Gabriel Narutowicz served as foreign minister.

33 Fryderyk Zoll, formerly vice-president of the Galician School Board and then a vice-rector of the Jagellonian, was a moderate interested in the minorities and ready to cooperate with them. He had been an early proponent of education in the native language, as well as of education for women. Before the World War, Zoll had helped introduce more Ukrainian language schools in Eastern Galicia: see *Słowo Polskie,* 9 November 1924, and Czajecka, "Przygotowanie kobiet," passim. See also the interview with Zoll in the Cracow newspaper *Czas,* 12 September 1924, and the appended document 4, pp. 527–530.

34 See document 3, pp. 524–527.

ties of philosophy and law, however, and on the university's full operation by 1 January 1925.[35]

The Ukrainian academics neither publicized their decision nor involved the Clandestine University in the negotiations. Nor was the matter cleared with any political party before Studyns'kyi and Smal-Stocki met with the Polish premier, Władysław Grabski, and Stanisław Łoś on 3 September 1924. A few days later, they met with Minister Tadeusz Waryński, Jan Łoś, Fryderyk Zoll, and Stanisław Łoś. They agreed to establish formally a commission as outlined in the original proposal, which would advise the government on the creation of chairs, appointment of faculty, and the like.[36] The Polish government was now committed to the imminent creation of the commission, and Studyns'kyi and Smal-Stocki had committed the Ukrainian faculty, or at least themselves, to work jointly with the Poles.

Except for support from the Ukrainian faculty, and apparently some approbation from the Educational Commission of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, Smal-Stocki and Studyns'kyi had no organized community backing. They hoped that the establishment of the nucleus for a Ukrainian university would justify their tactics. When the plans for the joint commission were announced on September 7, the Ukrainian public was taken totally by surprise.

The announcement displeased some Ukrainians, who maintained that only a common front against the Poles would help Ukrainians.[37] The Galician Ukrainian political parties, used to parliamentary tactics developed in Austrian times, resented that the faculty had not informed the Inter-Party Council of the Polish initiative. On 27 September 1924, *Dilo,* the major Ukrainian newspaper in Galicia, carried a statement by the Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation, over the signature of its ranking member, Senator M. Cherkavs'kyi, that it had not been contacted by the government in the matter. The statement implied that the negotiations about the commission had been underhanded. On 18 December 1924, the Ukrainian parliamentary representation interpellated the government on the issue, arguing that the

[35] The full text of the resolution appears in Mudryi, *Ukrains'kyi universytet,* pp. 44–45. It was signed by Stefan Smal'-Stots'kyi (Roman's father), Ivan Horbachevs'kyi, Oleksander Kolessa, Kyrylo Studyns'kyi, Stanyslav Dnistrians'kyi, and Stefan Rudnyts'kyi.

[36] The minutes of the meeting appear in document 5, pp. 531–532.

[37] A number of meetings were held, at which resolutions condemning the willingness of the Ukrainian faculty to work with the Poles were passed. The text of one such resolution is given in Mudryi, *Ukrains'kyi universytet,* p. 41.

projected institute at Cracow did not implement the law of 1922 or the promises made to the Allies. Concurrently, faculty of the Prague Ukrainian Free University, the Ukrainian Pedagogical Institute in Prague, and the Agricultural Academy in Poděbrady met with representatives of the Curatoria of the Clandestine University and pledged continued support for that institution.[38]

Meantime, within the Polish government there was an attempt to sabotage the negotiations with the Galician Ukrainians. An offer to create a Ukrainian university in Luts'k, in Volhynia, was made to émigré scholars from the Eastern Ukraine. The offer was not entertained seriously, but it illustrated the lack of goodwill among some Poles. The regime's openly discriminatory policies also discredited the Ukrainian faculty's attempts to meet the Polish government half-way.

The Polish press reflected a whole gamut of opinions. A fair number of newspapers expressed consternation that the university in Lviv had not been formally drawn into the negotiations from the outset. Other Poles objected to the financial aid that the Ukrainian community, including the villages, continued to provide to the Clandestine University.[39] Such articles exacerbated the climate of national hostility.

Some intellectuals tried to mollify the situation. In a long article which ran in *Dilo* from October 10 through 12, the Ukrainian historian Stefan Tomashivs'kyi tried to garner popular support for the projected commission. He gave reasons why Ukrainians should go along with the plan for the time being. Criticizing his countrymen for viewing the university issue primarily from a political angle, he argued that moral and material issues transcending politics were involved. Tomashivs'kyi reduced the issue to two questions: (1) Do Ukrainians in Galicia need a university? (2) Where should it be located? The response to the first was indisputable. There were two answers to the second: the Ukrainians insisted on Lviv, and the Poles proposed a provisional university in Cracow which would later be moved to Lviv. Although the Ukrainians' scepticism over the latter was justifiable, Tomashivs'kyi did not preclude a workable solution. But the tone of his reasoned and well structured article was bittersweet, and it concluded with a quotation from Romain Rolland: "Human reason matters little, when endemic passions hover over the nation."

[38] Mudryi, *Ukrains'kyi universytet,* pp. 46–47.
[39] See, for instance, *Gazeta Poranna,* 22 September 1924; and *Illustrowany Kurier Codzienny,* 1 November 1924.

Ironically the same issue of *Dilo* (12 December 1924) carried an editorial criticism of the project to establish a "Ruthenian Institute in . . . Kazan' . . . pardon, Cracow." Some Polish newspapers, however, welcomed Tomashivs'kyi's moderation: *Rzeczpospolita* (13 October 1924), for example, summarized his article with approbation.

During the fall of 1924, the commission on the Ukrainian university held several meetings, some attended only by the Poles and a few with Smal-Stocki and Studyns'kyi. Jan Łoś, appointed chairman of the commission on October 28, worked on its by-laws and planned its activities. He wanted Studyns'kyi and Tomashivs'kyi to receive appointments at the Jagellonian, but the government, beset by economic and other crises, would not fully and openly back the Ukrainian university, even in the preliminary stages. Łoś's correspondence with the education ministry expressed the exasperation of a man caught in the middle. On the one hand, he did not have the full support of his faculty; indeed, he received hate mail from Poles. On the other hand, he realized the difficult position of the Ukrainian academics who had entered into formal agreements with a Polish government which was reneging on them. He also saw that the government's procrastination was impeding the work of the commission. Indeed, in the end the commission accomplished little. Only at the end of December 1925 were Ukrainian intellectuals invited to participate in its deliberations, and then on the condition of taking an oath of loyalty.

The Poles played for time. Ukrainian intellectuals hesitated to volunteer their services without some sign of goodwill from the government. Both Polish and Ukrainian academics were stymied by the failure of the government to provide at least some pro forma concessions to the minorities. Smal-Stocki tried to move the matter forward, and in the process, conveniently for the Poles, destroyed the chances for any productive action by the commission.

At the beginning of November 1925, Studyns'kyi dictated a letter to Smal-Stocki proposing members for the commission. Knowing that Grabski insisted on assurances of loyalty from the Ukrainians, Smal-Stocki, apparently on his own, wrote a different kind of letter to Stanisław Grabski, then minister of education. In it Smal-Stocki asserted that the Ukrainian scholarly community, deeply concerned about the fate of Ukrainian youth in the Polish state, was willing to cooperate with the Polish government. The young scholar, who tended toward sweeping statements, wrote that "the whole scholarly Ukrainian world, without exception, answers now to the call of the Minister

and the Government with its readiness for sincere and loyal cooperation." The phrasing, totally at odds with Studyns'kyi's simple proposal of Ukrainian members for the commission, played into the hands of its opponents, both Polish and Ukrainian.[40]

Smal-Stocki's letter was leaked to the press. *Dilo* printed it on December 15, in Ukrainian translation and with the date of writing incorrectly given as December 7. Ukrainian activists interpreted Smal-Stocki's assurance that the Ukrainian faculty would work with the Poles and would be loyal to the Polish state as an act of treason. He was publicly boycotted.

Writing to Jan Łoś, Studyns'kyi charged Smal-Stocki with misrepresenting the views of the Ukrainian scholarly community, of acting without authorization, and of destroying the proposed commission and the Ukrainian university altogether. In the same letter, however, Studyns'kyi gave graphic examples of why cooperation with the Poles was virtually impossible:

> Eleven Ukrainian professors and lecturers were terminated from Lviv University — should this strengthen faith in the Polish government's interest in the Ukrainian issue? One-half-thousand Ukrainian schools have been changed into bilingual schools. The achievements wrested during Austrian times have been destroyed by the Polish government. I would like to believe that Poland in its own interest will settle the Ukrainian matter. Facts and reality, however, do not permit me to believe in what Mr. Stocki, in his own as yet unstudied interests, stated in the declaration [i.e., his published letter] as a dogma.[41]

Ukrainian student groups reacted swiftly — they supported the public boycott of Smal-Stocki and accused him of treason. The resolution of the oldest Ukrainian academic society — Sich, in Vienna — was typical:

> The students cannot leave unanswered the declaration of Dr. Roman Smal-Stocki on the matter of the Ukrainian university in Poland. The Society resolves: (1) to brand the action of Dr. Roman Smal-Stocki as a provocation on the part of the Polish Minister of Education Grabski and his weapon [*sic*] Dr. Roman Smal-Stocki to bring dissension and demoralization into the ranks of the whole Ukrainian society; (2) to enjoin all faculty and scholars upon whom Dr. Roman Smal-Stocki based his declaration to make a formal public announcement that they had not authorized Dr. Roman Smal-Stocki to make the above-mentioned declaration and that Dr. Roman Smal-Stocki appears in this matter as an impostor, abusing their good name.[42]

[40] The full text appears in document 11, pp. 540–542.
[41] See document 12, pp. 542–545.
[42] As cited in *Students'kyi vistnyk* (Prague), February 1926. The declaration, dated 26 December 1925, was signed by Iurii Vitoshyns'kyi, vice-president, and

The rector of the Ukrainian university in Prague, Oleksander Kolessa, felt obliged to announce formally that only individual faculty of his university were participating in the Polish-sponsored commission, not the institution itself.

The continued discriminatory policies of the Poles placed Ukrainians willing to work with the Polish government in a very precarious position. Ukrainians especially resented the policy, connected with Grabski himself, of replacing Ukrainian language schools with bilingual or Polish ones. The usually moderate clergyman Tyt Voinarovs'kyi was angered by these shortsighted moves of the Poles. Later in 1925, when Count Stanisław Łoś again raised the issue of a university with Voinarovs'kyi, the prelate refused to pursue the matter: "I told him that in the conditions which now exist in Poland, more appropriate would be a trade school rather than a university, since both the Polish government and the entire Polish society are doing everything in their power not to let a Ukrainian intelligentsia exist in Poland."[43]

The storm caused by Smal-Stocki's letter to Grabski was a convenient pretext for dragging out the whole issue. Meanwhile, the Clandestine University in Lviv, suffering from both government persecution and diminishing community support, was near its end. Educational opportunities for Ukrainian youth became minimal, which contributed to the anti-intellectual fervor of Ukrainian ultra-patriotic organizations.

Crises within the Polish government doomed any attempt to continue work on the Ukrainian university in Cracow. When Ukrainian parliamentary representatives raised the issue of a Ukrainian university again on 5 February 1926, there was no response. The Piłsudski groups that in opposition had toyed with legislative projects which could have facilitated establishing a Ukrainian university proved to be even more intransigent toward the Ukrainians than the preceding governments had been. After May 1926, Poland became an openly authoritarian state and no one even pretended to work on the university issue.

But even in the turbulent 1930s, Ukrainians in Galicia did not lose sight of the issue, and anniversaries of various phases of the university struggle were celebrated. On 19 September 1938, an issue of *Novyi chas* prominently proclaimed the 90th anniversary of the establishment of a chair of Ukrainian language at the university of Lviv.

Boiars'kyi, secretary (whose given name I have been unable to establish). See also Mudryi, *Ukrains'kyi universytet*, pp. 49–50 and 56.

43 Voinarovs'kyi, *Spohady z moho zhyttia*, p. 74.

After the Second World War and the incorporation of most of the territories of Eastern Galicia into the Soviet Ukraine, the university at Lviv ostensibly became Ukrainian and was renamed the Ivan Franko University. Studyns'kyi was appointed rector in 1939 and remained at the post until his death in 1941. The Polish-Ukrainian phase of the struggle for a Ukrainian university in Galicia had ended.

Manhattanville College

APPENDIX

Most of the following documents are being published for the first time; a few were published in slightly different versions in the 1920s. They detail the negotiations between the Poles and the Ukrainians about the establishment of the nucleus for a Ukrainian university in Cracow under the aegis of the Jagellonian University (1923–1925). The documents are taken from the papers of Jan Łoś, then rector of the Jagellonian. Today they are housed in the Manuscript Division of the Jagellonian Library. The file is arranged in roughly chronological order, and I have adhered to that order here. The importance of the material is twofold: it illustrates the tenor and complexities of the relations between the Poles and Ukrainians in the interwar period, and it reflects upon the role academics can play in political affairs.

I am deeply grateful to Władysław Serczyk, formerly director of the Jagellonian and later rector of the university, for helping to make my stay in Cracow pleasant and productive. A grant from the Fulbright Foundation made research in Poland possible. I thank my father, Dr. Daniel Bohachevsky, a graduate of Lviv University, for transcribing the documents, and Dr. Bohdan Struminsky of Harvard University for checking through the transcriptions. Without the encouragement of Professors Omeljan Pritsak and Ihor Ševčenko of Harvard these documents would not appear here.

Document 1: Łoś's note on the attempts to establish a Ukrainian university in 1924–1925.

The Polish government approached Jan Łoś in 1923 about the possibility of establishing either a Ukrainian university or chairs in Ukrainian studies at the Jagellonian in Cracow. That year the Poles secured their eastern borders, but internally the political and economic situation was critical. At the end of November 1923, the prime minister, Wincenty Witos, appointed Stanisław Grabski minister of

education. Grabski remained at the post in subsequent governments, which ostensibly intended to take progressive action that would stabilize the country. Negotiations with the Ukrainians about a university were among such efforts. Łoś wrote this short memoir to preface materials in his files on the role which the Jagellonian could play in founding a higher school for Ukrainians, referred to at times as the Ruthenian Institute.

W roku szkolnym 1923/4 byłem rektorem Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Z inicjatywy P. Prezydenta Ministrów zwołałem naradę dziekanów w przedmiocie zamierzonego przez Rząd założenia katedr ruskich w Krakowie. Wydziały uniwersyteckie d. 21.VI.1924 oświadczyły się za tym, żeby owe katedry ruskie stanowiły osobny instytut czy studium ruskie.

Nastąpiło potem postanowienie Rządu, uznające Lwów za miejscowość nie nadającą się do założenia tam instytutu ruskiego, a natomiast uznano, że instytut ten ma powstać w Krakowie. Rząd zakomunikował swój projekt prof. Smal-Stockiemu Romanowi i Studzińskiemu Cyrylowi, którzy udali się do Pragi, aby tam wysłuchać opinii profesorów-Ukraińców tam zamieszkałych i tych, którzy by do Pragi przybyli. W Pradze odbyły się narady, których rezultat w kilku istotnych punktach nie pokrywał się z zamierzeniami Rządu Polskiego, a zwłaszcza zebrani w Pradze profesorowie ruscy zażądali, aby zawiązek Uniwersytetu Ruskiego powstał nie w Krakowie, ale tymczasowo w Przemyślu lub Stanisławowie.

Ponieważ Rząd Polski nie widział rzeczowych warunków niezbędnych do założenia Uniwersytetu Ruskiego w jednym z powyższych dwu miast, przeto nie mógł przychylić się do żądań profesorów, zebranych w Pradze.

Mimo to, nie porzucając zamiaru jak najrychlejszego założenia Uniwersytetu Ruskiego, zamierzał powołać komisję z udziałem kilku profesorów polskich i kilku uczonych ruskich, aby projekt rządowy jeszcze raz rozpatrzyli i wyrazili Rządowi swą opinię wszechstronną.

Przed powołaniem tej Komisji Rząd zwołał na dzień 5 września 1924 konferencję z przedstawicieli Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Łosia i Zolla, i przedstawicieli uczonych ruskich, R. Smal-Stockiego i Studzińskiego, wreszcie z przedstawicieli Rządu T. Waryńskiego i St. Łosia. Tam jednogłośnie po dyskusji zgodzono się na treść projektu rządowego, ogłoszonego nazajutrz w formie komunikatu rządowego w prasie codziennej. (7. września 1924).

Document 2: Reports of the faculties at the Jagellonian about the plans for Ukrainian university studies.

These reports from faculty members at the Jagellonian University stress financial as well as national considerations. The faculty feared the deflection of funds from their

budget to the Ukrainian project, and some also objected to an increase in the enrollment of foreigners at the university.

SPRAWA UNIWERSYTETU RUSKIEGO

W dniach 20 i 21 czerwca 1924 r. Dziekani Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego zwołali Rady Wydziałowe dla zastanowienia się nad sprawą założenia Uniwersytetu Ruskiego lub katedr ruskich, mających być zawiązkiem przyszłego Uniwersytetu Ruskiego. Inicjatywę do roztrząsania tych projektów dali pp. posłowie Sejmu, również Rektor Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego miał w tym przedmiocie prywatną rozmowę z p. Prezydentem Ministrów, od którego się dowiedział, że katedry ruskie może zostaną założone w Krakowie lub w Warszawie. W tym też przedmiocie podczas pobytu Rektora w Warszawie odbyła się z inicjatywy jednego z posłów sejmowych narada w Magistracie Krakowskim z udziałem Prorektora Natansona i prof. Nitscha. Rektor zaraz po powrocie z Warszawy dla zasięgnięcia opinii w tym przedmiocie zaprosił na naradę wszystkich byłych rektorów Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego jako najlepiej z doświadczenia znających stan i potrzeby Uniwersytetu. Następnie zaniósł tę sprawę pod obrady Senatu Akademickiego, który po dłuższej dyskusji postanowił sprawę oddać do zaopiniowania Radom Wydziałowym, sam zaś ma jeszcze nią się zająć na posiedzeniu dnia 24. czerwca 1924 r.

Oświadczenie Wydziałów:

Wydział Teologiczny oświadcza się za kreowaniem Wydziału Humanistycznego jako zaczątku Uniwersytetu dla Rusinów w jednym z miast Małopolski Wschodniej, w uznaniu, że tylko pod tym warunkiem będzie można bezpiecznie tworzyć inne katedry przy istniejących Uniwersytetach państwowych z tym, by się mogły stopniowo dołączać do kreowanego już Wydziału.

Wydział Prawny ze stanowiska dobra Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego jest przeciwny ewentualności tworzenia szeregu katedr ruskich w ramach tegoż Uniwersytetu. Jednomyślną jego uchwałą pod tym względem powodują li tylko względy uniwersyteckie, a momenty polityczne pozostawiono umyślnie na boku.

Przeciwko takiemu rozwiązaniu sprawy przemawiają według zdania Wydziału Prawnego następujące względy:

(1) Nominacja profesorów ruskich na katedry w Krakowie nie mogłaby nastąpić w drodze autonomicznej, brak bowiem byłoby Wydziałowi możności poznania osobistości przyszłych kolegów i ich wartości naukowej. Narzucenie zaś Wydziałowi przez nominację bez wniosku z jego strony nie dałoby się pogodzić z całym ustrojem uniwersytetów.

(2) Urzędowanie profesorów ruskich — poza wykładami — albo musiałoby się odbywać po polsku, albo też — co jest wykluczone — polski charakter Uniwersytetu musiałby być zniesiony, a Uniwersytet zamieniony na utrakwistyczny. Obie ewentualności są nie do pomyślenia.

(3) Wybór na godności akademickie (Dziekan, Rektorat), udział w posiedzeniach, kwestia głosowań w sprawach spornych — wszystko to dałoby okazje, w których profesorowie-Rusini uzyskaliby wielki wpływ w wewnętrznych sprawach polskiego Uniwersytetu, a nieraz i głos decydujący jako języczek u wagi. Wywołałoby to szereg tarć i nieustannych kolizyj.

(4) To samo odnosi się do ewentualnego dopuszczenia przyszłych profesorów ruskich do kierowania zakładami seminaryjnymi, o ile by miały być wspólne dla młodzieży polskiej i ruskiej.

(5) Dotacje Wydziału i lokale nasze już dzisiaj nie wystarczają na potrzeby polskiej młodzieży; w razie dopuszczenia młodzieży ruskiej w większej ilości, trzeba by wprowadzić numerus clausus ograniczający napływ młodzieży polskiej.

(6) Przewidywać by należało wreszcie pewne kolizje między naszą a ruską młodzieżą, która by wniosła w mury wszechnicy pierwiastek niezadowolenia i szukania powodu do sporu. Wykluczałoby to możliwość spokojnej nauki w murach Uniwersytetu.

Co się tyczy osobnego Instytutu czy studium ruskiego, Wydział nie jest powołany, aby oświadczać się za lub przeciw co do myśli założenia w Krakowie *osobnego* instytutu, mającego tworzyć zawiązek Uniwersytetu Ruskiego; tak samo nie jest powołany, aby oświadczać się co do tego, czy lepiej byłoby założyć taki Instytut w Krakowie, czy też w Warszawie jako stolicy Państwa. Rozstrzygać w tym względzie muszą argumenty polityczno-narodowe, których Wydział z umysłu nie wciąga tutaj pod rozwagę. Gdyby przyszło do założenia takiego Instytutu w Krakowie, rzecz naturalna — musiałoby się wytworzyć jakieś współżycie między Uniwersytetem Jagiellońskim a Instytutem ruskim, choćby nawet ów Instytut stał poza organizacją Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego i nie był z nim administracyjnie złączony. Wymagałoby [to] przeto uregulowania także kwestii jak:

(1) Możliwość dopuszczenia uczniów imatrykulowanych w Instytucie Ruskim na niektóre wykłady w Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim względnie odwrotnie: możność uczęszczania uczniów-Rusinów, wpisanych na Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim, na wykłady odbywane w języku ruskim i uznanie tych wykładów za ważne.

(2) Możliwość dopuszczenia uczniów-Rusinów do korzystania ze zbiorów Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego (Biblioteka Jagiellońska).

(3) Możliwość habilitowania na Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim docentów, którzy by działali potem w owym przyszłym uniwersytecie ruskim.

We wszystkich tych kierunkach należałoby, dla uniknięcia przyszłych kolizyj, dążyć do jasnego określenia stosunku obu zakładów, a mianowicie zostawiając to ich *wzajemnemu porozumieniu*. W razie gdyby wyższe względy narodowe nakazywały obranie Krakowa za miejsce tworzenia Uniwersytetu

Ruskiego, to Uniwersytet Jagielloński i wszystkie jego Wydziały *nie uchyliłyby się na pewno od takiego zgodnego porozumienia.*

Dziekan Wydziału Prawniczego
Stanisław Gołąb — wr.

Wydział Lekarski

Rada Wydziału uchwaliła jednomyślnie następującą ogólną odpowiedź:

O ile Uniwersytet Ruski mógłby być ze względów państwowych umieszczony w Krakowie, to Rada Wydziałowa uważa za właściwe, aby zaistniał on jako odrębny Uniwersytet Ruski obok Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego oraz aby studenci narodowości ruskiej, o ile nie będą mogli z powodu braku sił profesorskich i instytutów przy Uniwersytecie Ruskim uczęszczać na ten Uniwersytet, odbywali studia o [*sic*] charakterze imatrykulowanych studentów Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.

Wydział Lekarski uważa za rzecz pożądaną, aby równocześnie z Uniwersytetem Ruskim w Krakowie zostało przy Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim założone "Studium Słowiańskie."

Rada Wydziałowa wychodzila z tego założenia, że utworzenie kilku katedr ruskich na Wydziałach Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego zupełnie nie zadowolni Rusinów, dalej, że profesorowie tych przedmiotów zasiadaliby i brali udział w posiedzeniach Wydziałów, co nie byłoby pożądane ze względu na możliwość różnych starć, że wreszcie studenci pod wpływem agitacji swoich profesorów mogliby niejednokrotnie wykraczać przeciwko porządkowi obowiązującemu w Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim . . . .

Zawiązek Uniwersytetu Ruskiego miałby swój własny statut i znosił się wprost z władzami wyższymi. Studenci imatrykulowani na Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim zapisywaliby się na wykłady ruskie, które by im były zaliczane do studiów. W każdym razie dążyć należy do tego, aby przy założeniu takiego zawiązku uniwersytetu ruskiego nie ucierpiała nauka polska, by nie zostały w najmniejszym stopniu uszczuplone środki udzielane przez Rząd Uniwersytetowi Jagiellońskiemu.

Co do korzystania katedr ruskich z zakładów uniwersyteckich, przeważa na Radzie zdanie, że wobec stosowanego na wszystkich prawie Wydziałach numerus clausus korzystanie z wielu zakładów, zwłaszcza teoretyczno-praktycznych, będzie bardzo trudne, a nawet niemożliwe. Jedynie korzystanie z bibliotek seminaryjnych byłoby możliwe pod pewnymi ściśle określonymi warunkami.

Ze względów politycznych Rada Wydziałowa uważa raczej za wskazane pomieszczenie zawiązku Uniwersytetu Ruskiego w Krakowie.

Dziekan Wydziału Lekarskiego Maziarski, wr.

Wydział Filozoficzny
Uchwały Wydziału Filozoficznego Uniw.
Jagiel. z dnia 21 czerwca 1924 r.

(1) Rada Wydziału Filozoficznego Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego wyraża przekonanie:

(1) Że należy zaspokoić aspiracje kulturalne narodu ruskiego przez stworzenie dlań osobnego Uniwersytetu w państwie polskim.

Aby Uniwersytet mógł spełniać należycie swe zadania, powinien powstać w części państwa zamieszkałej przez ludność ruską.

(2) Że sprawa wyboru miejsca na umieszczenie pierwszych zawiązków Uniwersytetu Ruskiego należy do rządu.

(3) Że pierwsze zawiązki mające służyć do utworzenia Uniwersytetu Ruskiego jest najwłaściwiej umieścić w jednym z polskich miast uniwersyteckich, które by dawało gwarancję normalnego naukowego rozwoju nowej instytucji.

(4) Że zawiązki samodzielnego Uniwersytetu Ruskiego powinny powstać poza ramami organizacji obecnie istniejących uniwersytetów polskich, a w każdym razie oświadcza się przeciwko utworzeniu katedr w łonie Wydzialu Filozoficznego Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego w Krakowie.

(5) Że sprawa utworzenia zawiązków Uniwersytetu Ruskiego nie stoi wcale w związku z projektowanym Studium Slawistycznym.

Wydział Rolniczy

Wydział oświadcza się, że *nie* jest pożądanym:

(1) Aby katedry z językiem wykładowym ruskim były założone w Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim.

(2) Aby katedry te powstały poza Uniwersytetem Jagiellońskim z tym jednakże, by słuchacze zapisani na wykłady ruskie byli zarazem studentami Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.

(3) Aby słuchacze zapisani na katedry ruskie mogli korzystać z zakładów Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.

Natomiast Rada Wydziałowa wyraża przekonanie, że gdyby zawiązek Uniwersytetu Ruskiego nie mógł być umieszczony we Lwowie, w takim razie należałoby go umieścić w Warszawie jako stolicy Państwa.

Document 3: Minutes of a conference held 11–12 July 1924, at the Polish Ministry of Religions and Education

At the conference, held in Warsaw, it was decided to move forward with Ukrainian university studies. A course of government action was outlined and accepted in principle by the Poles. The administration of the Jagellonian insisted that the

Ukrainian institute be a separate entity. The publication of these documents in Dilo *on 20 September 1924 made negotiatons between the Polish government and the Ukrainian academics difficult.*

Protokół Konferencji z dnia 11 i 12 lipca 1924 r. w Ministerstwie WR i OP w sprawie założenia Uniwersytetu Ruskiego. Przewodniczący: Prof. Dr Jan Zawidzki, dyr. Dep. IV-go Min. WR i OP Biorący udział w posiedzeniu: J. M. prof. Ignacy Łyskowski, rektor Uniw. Warsz., J. M. prof. dr Jan Łoś, rektor Uniw. Jagiell., prof. dr Fryderyk Zoll, prof. Uniw. Jagiell., dr Tadeusz Waryński, naczelnik Wydz WR i OP, p. Leopold Rutkowski, naczelnik Wydz. Min. Spr. Wewn, dr Jan Stanisław Łoś, naczelnik Wydz. Północnego Min. Spr. Zagranicznych.

Zebrani wyrażają jednomyślnie zapatrywania następujące:

(1) Sprawę założenia Uniwersytetu Ruskiego (ukraińskiego) należy traktować lojalnie, otwarcie i szczerze, gdyż tylko ta droga leży w interesie Państwa Polskiego, a Polska zobowiązała się do tego w ustawie z dnia 26 września 1922 r. o zasadach powszechnego samorządu wojewódzkiego, a w szczególności województwa lwowskiego, tarnopolskiego i stanisławowskiego (Dz. U.R.P. N. 90, poz. 829).

(2) Uniwersytet Ruski powinien być instytucją poważną, opartą na obsadzeniu katedr przez siły naukowe należycie kwalifikowane, i dlatego należy go tworzyć w miarę, jak takie siły będą do dyspozycji. Na razie więc można i należy przystąpić do natychmiastowego utworzenia wydziału filozoficznego, przynajmniej humanistycznego, obsadzając te katedry, dla których są poważni kandydaci.

(3) Ten zawiązek Uniwersytetu Ruskiego (Instytut Ruski) ma być prowizorycznie umieszczony w Krakowie, aby mógł znaleźć pomoc w dalszej organizacji ze strony najstarszego uniwersytetu polskiego, który nadto daje najlepsze warunki dla spokojnej pracy organizacyjnej, wolnej od tarć narodowościowych.

(4) Ta pomoc nie może w niczym zacieśnić stanu posiadania Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Wobec tego Instytut Ruski musi powstać jako zupełnie odrębna szkoła z własnymi profesorami, z własną administracją, z własnymi zakładami. Jedynie Biblioteka Jagiellońska, jako instytucja publiczna, dla każdego dostępna, będzie służyć i Instytutowi Ruskiemu.

To zasadnicze stanowisko nie przeszkadza porozumieniom, jakie te dwie instytucje naukowe ułożą między sobą, celem dopuszczenia studentów Instytutu Ruskiego na poszczególne wykłady na Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim i odwrotnie, zdawania egzaminów uzupełniających z tych przedmiotów, których wysłuchali w Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim lub w Instytucie Ruskim. Takie układy niczym nie mogą uwłaczać przepisom ustrojowym i językowym obu uczelni, a podlegają zatwierdzeniu ze strony Ministra WR i OP.

(5) Celem bezzwłocznego założenia Instytutu Ruskiego, zorganizowania go

oraz dalszej jego rozbudowy aż do wytworzenia kompletnego Uniwersytetu Ruskiego ma być powołana do życia "Komisja Organizacyjna." Przewodniczącego tej Komisji i jego zastępcę mianuje Minister WR i OP, a nadto wchodzą w jej skład również mianowani przez Ministra WR i OP czterej profesorowie Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego oraz czterej uczeni ruscy, a nadto stały delegat Wydziału Nauki Ministerstwa WR i OP.

(6) Komisja Organizacyjna jest organem doradczym Ministra WR i OP i jemu podlega. Jej zadaniem jest:

(A) Przedstawianie Ministrowi wniosków o tworzenie katedr w Instytucie Ruskim, o zatwierdzanie habilitacyj, o wyposażanie Instytutu w potrzebne zakłady, o zaspakajanie innych jego potrzeb, a zwłaszcza o organizację jego administracji.

(B) Inicjatywa i pośredniczenie w zawieraniu układów w stosunkach między Uniwersytetem Jagiellońskim a Instytutem Ruskim.

(C) Opracowanie Statutu dla Instytutu Ruskiego, który będzie obowiązywał tak długo, dopóki Instytut nie zostanie przekształcony w Uniwersytet Ruski. W Statucie ma być zapewniona osobowość prawna dla Instytutu Ruskiego. Statut będzie miał moc prawną, odkąd go zatwierdzi Minister WR i OP. Habilitacje w Instytucie będą dopuszczalne z przedmiotów, dla których znajdować się będą w Instytucie profesorowie tych przedmiotów.

(7) Instytut względnie Uniwersytet Ruski ma wyłącznie służyć dla celów kulturalnych ludności ruskiej (ukraińskiej) i dlatego powinien zachować zupełną odrębność wobec Instytutu Słowiańskiego, który ma być założony przy Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim w Krakowie, jak również wobec ewentualnie powstać mogących wyższych studiów w innych językach słowiańskich.

Po powyższych uchwałach zgodzili się obecni jednomyślnie na następujący

PROJEKT USTAWY

o utworzeniu Uniwersytetu z językiem wykładowym ruskim (ukraińskim).

Art. 1. Upoważnia się Rząd do utworzenia Uniwersytetu z językiem wykładowym ruskim (ukraińskim) oraz wydania w tym celu potrzebnych i wskazanych zarządzeń, w szczególności bezzwłocznego powołania do życia Instytutu Ruskiego (Ukraińskiego) z tymczasową siedzibą w Krakowie — jako zawiązku przyszłego Uniwersytetu Ruskiego (Ukraińskiego).

Art. 2. Upoważnia się Rząd do wstawienia do preliminarza budżetowego na rok 1925 i lata następne odpowiednich kredytów dla urzeczywistnienia celów w art. 1 wymienionych.

Upoważnia się Rząd do udzielenia do rozporządzenia Ministra WR i OP funduszu nadzwyczajnego w wysokości . . . . na pokrycie wstępnych kosztów organizacyjnych.

Art. 3. Wykonanie ustawy niniejszej powierza się Ministrowi WR i OP. Dr Jan Stanisław Łoś włr., Nacz. Wydz. w MSZ. Dr Tadeusz Waryński włr., Nacz. Wydz. Dep. IV Min. WR i OP. L. Rutkowski, Nacz. Wydz. Politycznego MSW.. Zoll, włr.

Document 4: Fryderyk Zoll as seen by the Christian Association of National Unity.

Professor Fryderyk Zoll was a prominent member of the government commission on Ukrainian university studies and a vice-rector of the Jagellonian. Before the World War, he had been a vice-president of the Galician School Board and had shown support for education of non-Poles in their native language. Zoll publicly maintained that cooperation between Poles and Ukrainians on a broad range of issues was inevitable and necessary. His conciliatory views made him a ready target for extremists.

To discredit Zoll, and thereby the whole university venture, Polish extremists focused on a memorandum by Zoll in which he had argued for the use of native languages. The full text of the memorandum is not available. Published here is the criticism of Zoll by the rightists, preceded by their accompanying letter.

Lwów, 29. XI. 1924.

J. Wielmożny Panie Profesorze!

Mamy zaszczyt zwrócić uwagę na dziwną notatkę, według której p. Zoll z polecenia Rządu opracowuje plan organizacji "uniwersytetu ruskiego" (*Kur. Por.*, nr 327, *Rzp.* nr 326, *Gaz. Por.* nr 327). Wynikałoby z tego, że rząd mimo powołania bardzo poważnej komisji nie czeka na wybór referenta przez nią, tylko wybiera go sam, choć komisja żadnego posiedzenia nie odbyła i decyzji co do referenta nie powzięła. Wybór na referenta p. Zolla jest niesłychanie szkodliwy (gdyż on jako wiceprezydent rady szkolnej ruszczył szkolnictwo nawet wbrew przepisom, np. wbrew przepisom stworzył czysto ruskie paralelki gimnazjalne w Brzeżanach i Stryju, czysto ruskie kursy seminarialne we Lwowie i Przemyślu, posłał ministerstwu projekt, w którym w ruskich szkołach nie tylko powszechnych, lecz nawet w seminariach naucz. nie dawał nauki języka polskiego nawet jako przedmiotu) i od razu nakreśla kierunek akcji, gdy tymczasem komisja ma przecież prawo wybrać referenta inaczej traktującego kwestię ruską.

Śmiemy zauważyć, że założenie odrębnego ruskiego choćby jednego wydziału, np. filozoficznego, w Krakowie byłoby najcięższą zbrodnią wobec Polski, bo za tym wydziałem musiałyby pójść mechanicznie inne i nie dałoby się to na stałe utrzymać w Krakowie. Wzmianka o uniwersytecie ruskim w ustawie samorządowej z r. 1922 nie ma żadnej wartości prawnej,

nie była niczym związana z samorządem, a zresztą i samą ustawę samorządową już zmieniono pośrednio, bo np. wskutek utrakwizacji gimnazjów nie będzie można poddawać pod władzę sekcji ruskiej zutrakwizowanych gimnazjów i szkół pow., a ustawa przewidywała poddanie szkół w samorządzie wojewódzkim pod odrębne sekcje: polską i ruską. Przy uznaniu granic 15. 3. 1923 powołały się mocarstwa na sprawę samorządu, ale nie na ustawę samorządową z r. 1922 lub na uniwersytet ruski, sejm zaś znosząc odrębne gimnazja ruskie ustawą z d. 31. 7 b. r. przekreślił tym samym kwestię odrębnego uniwersytetu. Skoro zaś Rusini nie chcą tego uniwersytetu w Krakowie i nie można złożyć komisji z profesorów ruskich, jest przecież nie do pomyślenia tworzenie tegoż uniwersytetu przez komisję z profesorów-Polaków. Wprawdzie rząd, nie przewidując odmowy ze strony profesorów ruskich, wstawił niestety do budzetu na r. 1925 kwotę 240,000 złotych na "studium ruskie w Krakowie," ale wobec bierności Rusinów oczywiście powinno się skończyć z forsowaniem tej sprawy w jakikolwiek sposób i kwotę przeznaczyć na instytut słowiański. Od stanowiska komisji będą zależały losy tego zagadnienia, niesłychanie brzemiennego w skutki, dlatego usilnie prosimy o niedopuszczenie żadną miarą do jakichś początków osobnego ruskiego uniwersytetu.

Z wysokim poważaniem
Okręg Lwowski
Chrz. Związek Jedności Narodowej [*seal*]
Sekretarz Prezes
Edward Wójcicki [*illegible*]

L. 271. Lwów dnia 27/XII. 1924

Memoriał Zolla o szkołach ruskich.
Jaśnie Wielmożny Panie Profesorze!

Wobec tego, że p. Zoll był i jest głównym poplecznikiem odrębnego uniwersytetu ruskiego, mamy zaszczyt podać do wiadomości jego memoriał z r. 1919, posłany Ministerstwu, a także i Wydziałowi Krajowemu (4. 2. 1919, L. 105 z r. 1918) — doskonale charakteryzujący autora i pozwalający ocenić, czy autor nadaje się do decydowania w sprawach ruskich. Wobec długości memoriału podajemy go w streszczeniu, cytując dosłownie tylko miejsca ważniejsze — a sam memoriał można odszukać czy w Ministerstwie, czy w Wydziale Krajowym.

Po dziwnym wstępie: "Na zachód od Sanu w niektórych powiatach szkoła walczy już nie tylko z brakiem opału, ale doznaje przeszkód także [*sic!*] wskutek konfliktów między Polakami i Rusinami", mówi już autor o temacie właściwym, tj. o szkolnictwie polsko-ruskim, podając: "Ograniczam się w moim sprawozdaniu jedynie do tego, co *na razie* uważam, że powinno być

zaraz wprowadzone, jako stan przejściowy, dla tworzenia modus vivendi z Rusinami."

Szkolnictwo średnie: Tu żąda zasady, według której "*co najmniej* na każde 200.000 ludności ruskiej przypadałaby jedna państwowa szkoła średnia lub zawodowa." "Wybór kategorii tych szkół i *miejsca* pozostawić by należało reprezentantom narodu ruskiego, na razie członkom ruskiej rady szkolnej krajowej." Nadto chce, by w polskiej szkole uczył Polak, a w ruskiej Rusin i by tak samo ustanawiano wizytatorów, choć nawet za b. Austrii mieli oni rejony terytorialne, a nigdy gimnazja ruskie nie miały odrębnych wizytatorów Rusinów — i wobec tego na jego zarządzenie "Dr Jan Kopacz (narodowości ruskiej) bezzwłocznie objął nadzór nad wszystkimi ruskimi gimnazjami." A więc chce Zoll

(1) Potworzenia znacznej ilości szkół ruskich.

(2) Zostawienia co do tego wyłącznie Rusinom wyboru miejsca, co głównie zemściłoby się na Lwowie, bo gdy do niego Rusini zawsze sztucznie wprowadzają uczniów ze wszystkich powiatów, wtedy prawnie potworzyliby we Lwowie kilka gimnazjów i kilka szkół fachowych ruskich.

(3) Dania do ruskich szkół wyłącznie wizytatorów ruskich dla jeszcze bardziej masowego fabrykowania bez kontroli niedouczonej, a za to niesłychanie rozagitowanej inteligencji.

Seminaria naucz. — Memoriał żąda założenia (po zniesieniu utrakwizmu) 7 seminariów ruskich, a "na razie w seminariach polskich wschodniej Galicji utrzymanoby naukę języka ruskiego, *a w ruskich naukę języka polskiego. To jednak stałoby się zbytecznym,* gdyby w przyszłości ze szkół elementarnych usunięto naukę języka ruskiego, *a w ruskich polskiego.*" Projekt, by nawet w seminarium usunąć całkiem język polski nawet jako przedmiot, jest tak niesłychany, że nie ma potrzeby go charakteryzować. Przecież nauczyciel-Rusin będzie miał do czynienia z władzami, będzie prawie zawsze uczył i dzieci polskie wobec tego, że ludność jest w każdej prawie wsi mieszana, będzie rozmawiał z rodzicami-Polakami — a nawet jako kandydat zawodu nie będzie się w ogóle uczył języka państwowego w państwowej szkole, on, przyszły, urzędnik państwa? To daje pojęcie o autorze memoriału chyba wystarczające i pozwala wysnuć wniosek, czy do rozstrzygania spraw polsko-ruskich wolno go w Polsce używać. (Nawiasem można dodać, że ten sam Zoll, gdy profesorowie przy rozpadaniu się Austrii zaczęli się starać o usuwanie języka niemieckiego, przynajmniej ze szkół ludowych, nazwał to anarchią, bo rzecz była robiona naturalnie bez uchwały parlamentu austriackiego).

Szkoły powszechne: Tu chciał p. Zoll usunąć ze szkół ruskich całkiem j. polski jako przedmiot, jak to wyżej zacytowano. Nadto chce, by nauczyciel-Polak uczył w szkole polskiej, a Rusin w ruskiej, i by to zaraz przeprowadzono tak ściśle, że ma się Polaków uczących w szkołach ruskich przenieść zaraz i umieścić w "Krolewstwie P.," chociażby przez to brakło chwilowo nauczycieli w szkołach ruskich." Oczywiście przez to wyrzuconoby z danych

wsi, wbrew ich woli, wielu nauczycieli-Polaków, przy czym trudno zgadnąć, co zrobionoby w tych licznych wypadkach, gdy w szkole ruskiej uczy mąż-Polak i żona-Rusinka — wyrzucenie zaś planowe nauczycieli-Polaków ze szkół ruskich przyczyniłoby się do ostatecznego zhajdamaczenia szkół ruskich, z ciężką szkodą dla państwa, bo do reszty ułatwionoby w szkołach agitację przeciwpaństwową.

Administracja szkolna: O ile chodzi o Radę Szkolną Krajową, żąda p. Zoll Rusina-wiceprezydenta, dalej, (2) by prócz wspólnych posiedzeń były "osobne posiedzenia sekcyjne polskich czy to ruskich członków Rady," (3) by język urzędowy Rady Szk. Kr. był co do polskich szkół polski, a co do ruskich ruski i by na posiedzeniach pełnych mogli przemawiać Rusini po rusku. W Radach szk. pow. żąda, by w okręgach mieszanych (tj. we wszystkich między Zbruczem a Sanem) byli: inspektor jednej narodowości, a zastępca drugiej *i każdy kierował szkołami swej narodowości.*

Na końcu zaś pisze p. Zoll: "Nadto podnoszę jeszcze jeden wzgląd. Na wypadek oderwania Galicji wschodniej od Polski wprowadziłoby się przez stworzenie takiego stanu przejściowego ważny precedens obrony praw mniejszości, na który Polacy mogliby się później powoływać w obronie własnych praw mniejszości" — pisze to wtedy, gdy każde dziecko wiedziało, że Rusini nie pozwolili na istnienie choćby jednej szkoły prywatnej polskiej i ścigali aresztami uczenie prywatne nawet w Stanisławowie, gdzie jako w swej "stolicy" starali się postępować choć trochę prawnie, a gdzie przecież przed ich napadem były wszystkie szkoły wyłącznie polskie.

Przedstawiając treść owego memoriału, który niewątpliwie zasłużył na pewnego rodzaju sławę, poddajemy pod łaskawą rozwagę, czy jego autor może mieć decydujący głos w sprawach tworzenia uniwersytetu ruskiego, zwłaszcza, że utworzenie odrębnego wydziału ruskiego (a nie katedr ruskich przy jakimś uniwersytecie polskim, i to wyłącznie katedr rutenistyki) uważamy za niesłychanie ciężki cios dla państwa, tym więcej, że nie ma mowy, by taki wydział osobny w Krakowie mógł tam zostać na stałe, a przeniesiony później na kresy, byłby rozsadnikiem agitacji przeciwpaństwowej i zaciekłej walki z polskością — do czego chyba dopuścić Polakom nie wolno.

Z wysokim poważaniem
Okręg Lwowski
Chrz. Związek Jedności Narodowej
Sekretarz Prezes
Kazimierz Bryński [*illegible*]

Document 5: Minutes of the meeting of 9 September 1924.

The following contain the major points on Ukrainian university studies agreed upon by the Polish government, represented by Stanisław Łoś and Tadeusz Waryński, the Jagellonian University, represented by Jan Łoś and Fryderyk Zoll, and Roman Smal-Stocki and Kyrylo Studyns'kyi as representatives of the Ukrainian academic community. These proceedings were made public, but point D of article 3 was deleted.

Obrady odbyte d. 9. września 1924 r. w biurze Prezydium Ministrów w Warszawie. Wzięli w nich udział prof. Łoś i Zoll, ze strony ukraińskiej prof. Roman Smal-Stockij i prof. Cyryl Studziński, ze strony Rządu dr Waryński i dr Stanisław Łoś. Po dyskusji zgodzono się na następujące punkty:

Wykonując ustawę z d. 26. IX 1922 r. (Dz. Ust. R. P. Nr 90) o zasadach powszechnego samorządu wojewódzkiego zlecającą Rządowi przystąpienie do założenia uniwersytetu ruskiego (ukraińskiego), którego zadaniem będzie zaspakajanie kulturalnych potrzeb ukraińskiego społeczeństwa wschodnich województw, Rząd poczynił następujące przygotowania:

(1) Minister Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego jako przewidziany ustawowo bezpośredni i najwyższy zwierzchnik powstać mającego uniwersytetu powoła Komisję Organizacyjną tego uniwersytetu z tymczasową siedzibą w Krakowie

(2) W skład Komisji, której członków zamianuje w najbliższym czasie Minister Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego, wejdą w równej liczbie profesorowie Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego w Krakowie i uczeni ukraińscy, posiadający stopień profesora uniwersytetu, a nadto stały delegat Ministerstwa Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego. Przewodniczącego Komisji i jego zastępcę mianuje sposród jej członków Minister Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego.

(3) Do kompetencji Komisji należeć będzie:

(a) Opiniowanie wniosków ustawodawczych i przedłożeń rządowych związanych z powołaniem do życia uniwersytetu.

(b) Stawianie wniosków do tworzenia katedr i ich obsady, podawanie wniosków na zatwierdzenie habilitacji, wyposażania uniwersytetu w potrzebne zakłady, zaspakajania wszystkich jego potrzeb, organizacji oraz administracji. Następnie wnioski na udzielanie urlopów, na wyznaczanie stypendiów dla przygotowania habilitacji oraz propozycje na suplentury.

(c) Stawianie wniosków odnośnie do utworzenia Komisji kontrolujących mających orzekać w wypadkach wątpliwych o ważności studiów wyższych odbytych w warunkach anormalnych.

(d) Stawianie wniosków co do powołania do życia kursów uniwersyteckich [*crossed out*].

Protokół (z wykreśleniem punktu 3 d) podpisali wszyscy obecni, mianowicie: J. Łoś, Fr. Zoll, R. Smal-Stockij, C. Studziński, T. Waryński, St. Łoś.

Protokół ten jako komunikat rządowy został ogłoszony w prasie i tekst jego telegraficznie przesłano ministrowi Skrzyńskiemu do Genewy.

Document 6: Letter of Jan Łoś to Tadeusz Waryński.

Writing to Waryński at the Ministry of Education at the end of September 1924, Jan Łoś commended the activities of Stanisław Łoś and urged quick action to capitalize on Smal-Stocki and Studyns'kyi's agreement to participate in the negotiations on a Ukrainian university. He also suggested that two representatives from Lviv University be co-opted for the commission before its Ukrainian members were announced, so as to placate Polish public opinion.

This text is the rough draft of the letter. A sentence deleted from the final version expresses Łoś's amazement that the press has taken a conciliatory stance toward Studyns'kyi. Łoś foresees that the Ukrainians would insist on Lviv as the permanent site of the university.

Do Pana Naczelnika Wydziału Ministerstwa WR i OP, Dra Tadeusza Waryńskiego w Warszawie.

Jako jedyny dotychczas mianowany przez Pana Ministra WR i OP (pismem z d. 9. lipca 1924 Nr 7716–IV/24) członek Komisji mającej się zająć pracą organizacyjną dla utworzenia Uniwersytetu z językiem wykładowym ruskim, poczuwam się do obowiązku zdania Ministerstwu sprawy z dotychczasowych mych czynności.

Na konferencji odbytej w Warszawie pod przewodnictwem p. Dyrektora Departamentu prof. Dra Jana Zawidzkiego w dniach 11 i 12 lipca r.b. otrzymałem od Ministerstwa mandat, polecający mi zaproszenie do rzeczonej Komisji na jej członków następujących profesorów Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego: pp. Kumanieckiego, Chrzanowskiego, Sinki, Semkowicza i Zolla. Wystosowałem do nich zaproszenia na piśmie, otrzymałem zaś ustną odpowiedź od pp. Kumanieckiego i Zolla, że zgadzają się wejść do Komisji w charakterze jej członków, natomiast pp. Chrzanowski, Sinko i Semkowicz listownie odpowiedzieli, że w Komisji udziału nie wezmą. Pierwszy motywuje swą odmowę względami na brak czasu i nawał zajęć, dwaj drudzy odpowiedzieli, że w tym tylko razie weszliby do Komisji, gdyby jej zadaniem było zorganizowanie Uniwersytetu z ruskim językiem wykładowym od razu we Lwowie.

Z wymienionych osób dotychczas bardzo czynny udział w pracach przygotowawczych do przedwstępnego porozumienia się z przedstawicielami uczonych ruskich brał prof. Zoll, który wzywany był kilkakrotnie do Warszawy i

razem z tamtejszymi czynnikami rządowymi przygotowywał grunt do obrad polsko–ruskich w sprawie uniwersytetu. Obrady te odbyły się w Warszawie w biurze p. Prezydenta Ministrów dnia 4. września r.b., przy czym ze strony polskiej [Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego — *crossed out*] wzięli udział: niżej podpisany i prof. Zoll, a ze strony Rusinów prof. Smal-Stocki i prof. Studziński przy współudziale przedstawicieli Rządu.

Wynikiem tych obrad był podpisany zarówno przez profesorów polskich jak i ruskich oraz przez przedstawicieli Rządu protokół identyczny z komunikatem rządowym ogłoszonym d. 5 września.

Protokół ten jest aktem, mającym bardzo doniosłe znaczenie polityczne, gdyż skoro go podpisali dwaj wybitni i kompetentni delegaci sfer profesorskich ruskich, stał się przez to dokumentem stwierdzającym nie tylko dobrą wolę Rządu, który treść protokółu zawarł w swym komunikacie, ale także solidarność umiarkowanych sfer narodu ruskiego z programem rządowym, mającym na celu założenie Uniwersytetu Ruskiego.

Z aktu tego trzeba wyciągnąć wszystkie możliwe konsekwencje, a więc przedewszystkim powołać do Komisji organizacyjnej Uniwersytetu Ruskiego nie mianowanych dotychczas członków. Komisja, jako organ doradczy Rządu, ma się składać według brzmienia protokołu z równej liczby profesorów-Polaków i uczonych ruskich, posiadających stopień profesorów uniwersytetu, a nadto ma wejść do niej delegat Ministra Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego.

Na konferencji lipcowej w Warszawie miano na uwadze założenie na początek tylko jednego, humanistycznego wydziału ruskiego, i dlatego zamierzono powołać do Komisji czterech profesorów-humanistów polskich i tylko dwu prawników do opracowania prawniczej strony organizacji uniwersyteckiej. Ponieważ teraz w protokóle z posiedzenia d. 4. września jest mowa o założeniu uniwersytetu, a nie "zaczątku" uniwersytetu, jak o tym radzono w lipcu, powstał przeto plan otwarcia na początku dwu wydziałów ruskich, tj. humanistycznego i prawniczego. Wobec tej zmiany słusznym by było, by do Komisji weszli trzej humaniści i trzej prawnicy polscy.

Dalej z powodu, że plan założenia uniwersytetu ruskiego bardzo zainteresował i zaniepokoił profesorów Uniwersytetu Jana Kazimierza we Lwowie, którzy by również w tej sprawie czynny udział wziąć chcieli, należałoby dla nich przeznaczyć dwa miejsca w Komisji. Wskutek nieprzyjęcia mandatów przez trzech profesorów krakowskich można by bez pomnożenia członków Komisji zadośćuczynić wszystkim tym postulatom. Proponowałbym zatem powołać do Komisji z humanistów krakowskich oprócz mnie, już mianowanego, jeszcze prof. Jana Rozwadowskiego, a z prawników prof. Kumanieckiego i prof. Zolla; ze Lwowa zaś humanistę prof. Lehra-Spławińskiego i prawnika prof. Władysława Abrahama. Z ust prof. Rozwadowskiego i Lehra-Spławińskiego mam ich oświadczenie, że przyjęliby ewentualne powołanie ich na członków Komisji, o prof. Abrahamie nie wiem na pewno, ale mam

niejakie podstawy do sądzenia, ża przyjąłby takie powołanie. Gdyby Ministerstwo życzyło sobie powiększyć liczbę członków Komisji, proponowałbym wtedy wzięcie w rachubę prof. Halbana ze Lwowa.

Dobrze by było, gdyby te nominacje nastąpiły *jeszcze przed* zgłoszeniem ruskich kandydatów do Komisji. Jednoczesnie też Ministerstwo zapewne mianuje i swego przedstawiciela do Komisji.

Jak postąpią w dalszym ciągu przedstawiciele sfer naukowych ruskich — nie wiem, ale [o ile mogę wnosić z ostatniego listu, pisanego przez prof. Studzińskiego do prof. Zolla, o czym donoszę ściśle poufnie, nie jest wykluczone —*crossed out*] ale mam niejakie podstawy do przewidywania, że [tamta strona zajmie — *crossed out*] zajmą stanowisko nieprzejednane: albo Lwów jako siedziba uniwersytetu ruskiego bez żadnych stadiów przejściowych, albo nic. [Wobec tego ze zdziwieniem czytaliśmy dzisiejsze telegramy w gazetach o ugodowym stanowisku prof. Studzinskiego i jego towarzyszy — *crossed out*].

Przypuszczam, że nawet w razie odmowy ze strony ruskiej Ministerstwo zamianuje członków Komisji, a w szczególności polskich, przed ewentualną tą odmową i wezwie [ich na konferencje — *crossed out*] Komisję na posiedzenie do Warszawy.

Ze strony ruskiej mamy wszak członków Komisji w osobach prof. Smal-Stockiego [*three lines written over and crossed out — completely illegible*].

[*marked as insert in letter draft*]

W razie, gdyby profesorowie ruscy postawili nowe żądania niezgodne z kontekstem protokółu i niemożliwe do przyjęcia, albo gdyby wcale nie przyszli na posiedzenie Komisji, to [*instead of* a] my ze swej strony okazalibyśmy gotowość lojalnego spełnienia swych zobowiązań, to na nich spadłaby odpowiedzialność za to, iż spelzła na niczym rzecz, przedsięwzięta przez nas w najlepszych zamiarach i z szczerą chęcią doprowadzenia jej do pomyślnego wyniku. Miałoby to znów dla nas bardzo doniosłe znaczenie polityczne.

W końcu pragnę poruszyć jeszcze jedną sprawę, a czynię to z pewnym zaambarasowaniem, gdyż chodzi tu o mojego imiennika. Jeżeli protokół z d. 4. września został podpisany przez obu biorących udział w posiedzeniu przedstawicieli sfer profesorów ruskich, jest to w bardzo znacznej mierze zasługą Dra Stanisława Łosia, ktory w wielu trudnych punktach zawsze umiał użyć argumentów rzeczowych, przekonywających, skutecznie pomagał do utrzymania spokojnego tonu dyskusji, a z profesorem Smal-Stockim, który największą powagą cieszy się wśród profesorów ruskich, utrzymuje bliskie stosunki. Byłoby bardzo pomyślną dla sprawy naszej rzeczą, gdyby Ministerstwo WR i OP zechciało obmyślić jakiś sposób, dzięki któremu Komisja mogłaby korzystać z dalszego współpracownictwa Dra Stanisława Łosia. Przypuszczam, że i ruscy członkowie komisji chętnie by z jego pośrednictwa korzystali.

Śmiem prosić najuprzejmiej Pana Naczelnika o łaskawe zakomunikowanie treści tego referatu Panu Ministrowi Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego

W Krakowie d. 24. IV 1924
Jan Łoś

Document 7: Studyns'kyi's letters to Jan Łoś.

Kyrylo Studyns'kyi, a prominent historian and president of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, was a prime candidate for a position in Ukrainian studies. Studyns'kyi was also under consideration for a regular appointment at the Jagellonian, but his nomination was running into administrative problems. Minister Grabski not only procrastinated on the appointment, but went out of his way to antagonize Studyns'kyi by offering him a lower position than the one he had held under the Habsburg government.

Studyns'kyi appreciated Łoś's support and, despite misgivings about his own chances of teaching at Cracow, helped to build the Jagellonian Library's holdings in Ukrainian studies. These letters testify to Studyns'kyi's tact, moderation, and willingness to compromise even in trying personal circumstances.

Chmielowskiego 15.

Wasza Magnificencjo!

Na uprzejme pismo Pana Rektora mam zaszczyt odpowiedzieć, że reflektuję tylko na zwyczajną profesurę. Gdy dzisiaj egzystuję we Lwowie przy zaliczce na płacę, to tylko dlatego, że mam pomieszkanie, którego w Krakowie nie dostanę. Więc tylko przy poborach pełnych zwyczajnego profesora mógłbym przejść do Krakowa i prowadzić dwa względnie trzy domy (syn kończy studia w Gracu [= Graz], ja w Krakowie, żona we Lwowie). Proszę łaskawie oświadczyć, że ja o kontraktową posadę nie ubiegałem się i jej nie przyjmę.

Przykro mi, że za moją zgodę na Kraków spotykają mnie przykrości. Proszę prosić Pana Dziekana, by pisma do mnie w sprawie posady kontraktowej nie wysyłał względnie, by wysłane pismo uważał za niebyłe, bo chyba nie przewiniłem się niczym, by mnie Wydział deprecjonował.

Uważam, że rzeczą najodpowiedniejszą byłoby, gdyby Wydział względnie Senat zwrócił Ministerstwu propozycję jako niewykonalną ze względu na moją osobę jako zwyczajnego profesora.

W sprawie uniwersyteckiej zrobiłem wiele, przeprowadziłem wybór komisji z ukraińskiej strony, mam jednak ciągłe troski, że do zniewag, jakich doświadczyłem przed rokiem, dołączą się nowe, gdyż stoję ciągle pod wrażeniem, iż rząd na serio sprawy nie traktuje.

Dowodem chociażby głośno zareklamowany fakultet prawosławny teologiczny w Warszawie. Od 2 lat nie ma żadnych mianowań, z wyjątkiem jedynego kuratora i profesora w jednej osobie, metr. Dionizego. Zwracano się do profesora Łotockiego w Pradze. Ten dał swoją zgodę na objęcie profesury i po dzień dzisiejszy nie mianowany. Wzywano do Warszawy p. Ohijenkę, lecz także jego nie mianowano. Profesorowie Rosjanie odmówili przyjęcia katedr, więc, jak chodzą wieści, pojechał z Warszawy dziekan Jarza (?), by ich pozyskać na katedry itp.

Ja bynajmniej nie myślę wpływać na decyzje Waszej Magnificencji i p. Rektora Zolla, lecz podaję swoje wątpliwości.

Osoba obecnego ministra oświaty nie budzi wielkiego zaufania, żeby myślał na serio o sprawie ukraińskiego uniw., a gdyby miała wyjść karykatura uniwersytetu, to lepiej, żeby go nie było, a szanowne nazwiska Zollów i Łosiów chyba za drogie, by je mieszano do spraw niepoważnie traktowanych. Może też i ja za stary, bym był igraszką w czyichkolwiek rękach.

Robię wszystko, żeby mi nie czyniono niesłusznego zarzutu, że ja grzebię sprawę uniw. ukraińskiego, lecz po prostu nieraz opadają mi ręce, gdy widzę, że najpoważniejszy polski uniwersytet Jagielloński spotyka się z odmową na mianowanie zwyczajnym profesorem wybranego zwyczajnego profesora. Czy to poważne załatwienie sprawy? Pisał mi Stocki, że profesorowie gimnazjalni obsiedli wysokie stanowiska referentów ministerialnych i że to ich zasługa. Lecz znowu wpada mi na myśl, że prof. Stan. Grabski lekkomyślnie nie zgodził się na kontraktową posadę, lecz że to z góry obmyślane, by mnie dokuczyć. Wytrzymałem dużo, wytrzymam i to, lecz po cóż wtedy mnie angażować do uniw. ukr. sprawy, skoro mi podrywa się grunt pod nogami? Przecież inny wpływ miałbym śród swego społeczeństwa na tok całej sprawy, gdybym był mianowany na katedrę w Jag. Uniw. i gdyby mnie nie uważano za człowieka, który czyha na katedrę w ukr. uniwersytecie.

Może Pan Rektor innego zdania, lecz ja swoje myśli wypowiadam szczerze, bez ogródek. Nie nauczyłem się w życiu ani chytrzyć, ani kłamać. Łamano mnie w życiu, ale nie złamano. Karku nie ugnę, bo to wszystko, co mnie i moim dzieciom było [drogim], [i] zostanie zawsze drogim.

Zostaję z głębokim szacunkiem dla Waszej Magnificencji i kreślę się sługą.

27. X. 1925 r.

C. Studziński

Chmielowskiego 15.

WASZA MAGNIFICENCJO.

Na list Pana Dziekana Siedleckiego odpowiedziałem wczoraj rekomendowanym listem. Opisałem w nim moje dzieje z ostatnich sześciu lat. Obawiam

się jednak, czy ten list nadaje się do przesłania Ministerstwu, chociaż nie ma w nim niczego, co by kogokolwiek mogło dotknąć. Jeśliby potrzeba wysłać krótkie oświadczenie dla Ministerstwa, ja gotów to uczynić.

Cała sprawa kosztowała mnie dużo nerwów.

Dostałem w tej chwili list od p. Stockiego z Warszawy, w którym donosi mi, że był u p. St. Grabskiego hr. St. Łoś i że on poruszył moją sprawę. P. Grabski postanowił załatwić sprawę zgodnie z wnioskami krakowskiego Senatu.

Że sprawa odwlecze się — nie zaszkodzi, gdyż chcę wykończyć jubileuszowe wydania i zlikwidować mój stosunek przewodniczącego w Nauk. Tow. im. Szewczenki. Walne zgromadzenie przypada na grudzień. Dużo zrobiłem, lecz nie mało jest jeszcze do wykończenia.

Trafiają się tutaj od czasu do czasu kupna książek bardzo rzadkich. Czy rozporządzają Panowie jakimi pieniędzmi? Zaproponowałbym rzeczy bardzo potrzebne dla ukrainistów.

Łączę wyrazy głębokiej czci

sługa

29/X. 1925 r. Studziński

Document 8: Łoś's letter about Studyns'kyi's candidacy.

Jan Łoś tried to settle the matter of Studyns'kyi's appointment at the Jagellonian before the commission was convened, for fear that Studyns'kyi's refusal to accept a lower position at the university would jeopardize the work of the commission.

[*illegible*] [Lublin, Hotel Victoria]

23. X. 1925.

JWielmożny Panie Profesorze!

Jeżeli mnie informacje nie mylą, Senat Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego postawił swego czasu wniosek o powołanie na katedrę przy tymże uniwersytecie prof. dra Studzińskiego, niegdyś ze Lwowa.

Senat miał przy tym mieć ma myśli powołanie p. Studzińskiego jako profesora zwyczajnego. Tymczasem Ministerstwo Wyznań Religijnych i OP dało swą zgodę na mianowanie prof. Studzińskiego tylko w charakterze profesora kontraktowego, czego znowu prof. Studziński przyjąć nie chce.

Ponieważ Min. Grabski zamierza powołać w pierwszych dniach grudnia Komisję dla uniwersytetu ruskiego, boję się, by to nieporozumienie nie wpłynęło ujemnie na rozwój tak pilnej, a tak niestety przewlekającej się sprawy.

Byłbym zatem Waszej Magnificencji szczerze zobowiązany, gdyby zechciała łaskawie zwrócić się do Min. Grabskiego może listem prywatnym lub też spowodować jako referent sprawy prof. Studzińskiego zwrócenie się ze strony Senatu, zwracając Ministrowi uwagę na rozbieżność między wnioskami Senatu a załatwieniem Ministerstwa.

Rozmawiałem już o tym z min. Grabskim, i zainteresował się tą sprawą; rozumiem, że można być oszczędnym w obietnicach, lecz raz danych trzeba dotrzymywać, czego niestety nasza polityka stale zapomina. Otóż Min. Grabski mówił z prof. Studzińskim o jego powołaniu na katedrę w Krakowie, o ile Senat akademicki na to przystanie, zresztą propozycja kontraktu jest w stosunku [do] starego ordynariusza niezrozumiała, być może że nawet nieco uwłaczająca.

Jestem przekonany, że odezwanie się Waszej Magnificencji wpłynie niewątpliwie na rewizję decyzji Ministerstwa, co znowu ze swej strony przyczyni się do uzdrowienia atmosfery.

Przy tej sposobności łaczę wyrazy głębokiego poważania i polecam się łaskawej pamięci Pana Profesora.

Stanisław Łoś

Document 9: Projected statute of the commission on a Ukrainian university.

Jan Łoś and his colleagues at the Jagellonian and in the Polish ministry strived to work out the competencies of the commission. Its statute was drafted in handwritten form, and then edited and typed. The file contains both the handwritten draft and the typed revision; the latter is published here. A list of Ukrainian candidates for membership on the commission was included. The statute's subsequent fate is unknown.

STATUT KOMISJI ORGANIZACYJNEJ UNIWERSYTETU RUSIŃSKIEGO [*typescript*]

(1) Komisja Organizacyjna jest organem doradczym Ministra WR i OP i jemu podlega. Miejscem jej urzędowania jest Kraków, może jednak odbywać posiedzenia także w Warszawie.
(2) Członków Komisji oraz jej Przewodniczącego i jego zastępcę powołuje i mianuje Minister WR i OP. W skład tej Komisji wejdą w równej liczbie profesorowie uniwersytetów polskich i uczeni rusińscy, posiadający stopień profesora uniwersytetu, a nadto stały delegat Ministra WR i OP.
(3) Zadaniem Komisji organizacyjnej jest:

(a) Przedstawianie Ministrowi WR i OP wniosków dotyczących miejscowości, gdzie ma być założony uniwersytet czy to prowizorycznie, tj. na pewien czas, czy też na stałe.

(b) Opiniowanie wniosków ustawodawczych i przedłożeń rządowych związanych z powołaniem do życia Uniwersytetu.

(c) Przedstawianie Ministrowi WR i OP wniosków o tworzenie katedr w Uniwersytecie i powoływanie sił w tym Uniwersytecie wykładających, a w tym celu zasięganie opinii zawodowców o naukowych kwalifikacjach kandydatów na katedry.

(d) Ogłaszanie w razie potrzeby konkursów na obsadzenie katedry.

(e) Podawanie wniosków o zatwierdzanie habilitacyj oraz o wyznaczanie stypendiów dla przygotowania habilitacyj i propozycje na suplentury.

(f) Przedstawianie Ministrowi WR i OP wniosków mających na celu zorganizowanie studiów na Uniwersytecie, a więc wyposażenie Uniwersytetu w potrzebne zakłady i środki naukowe, jako też zorganizowanie jego administracji.

(g) Przedstawianie wniosków dotyczących budżetu uniwersyteckiego.

(h) Stawianie wniosków odnośnie do utworzenia Komisji kontrolujących, mających orzekać w wypadkach wątpliwych o ważności studiów wyższych odbytych w warunkach anormalnych.

(i) Inicjatywa i pośredniczenie w zawieraniu układów Uniwersytetu Rusińskiego z Uniwersytetem Jagiellońskim, o ile by Uniwersytet Rusiński miał być prowizorycznie umieszczony w Krakowie.

(4) Przewodniczący Komisji w miarę potrzeby zaprasza jej członków na posiedzenia, przy czym członkom zamiejscowym delegat Ministra wydaje asygnaty na zwrot kosztów podróży i diety.

(5) Statut otrzymuje moc prawną z chwilą zatwierdzenia go przez Ministra WR i OP.

ZAŁĄCZNIK

Dla Pana Ministra.

Ewentualny skład Komisji Organizacyjnej Instytutu Ruskiego w Krakowie:

(1) Przewodniczący — Rektor prof. Dr Jan Łoś,
(2) Zastępca Przewodniczącego — prof. Dr Kumaniecki,
(3) Członkowie: Prof. Dr Ignacy Chrzanowski,
Prof. Dr Sinko,
Prof. Dr Semkowicz,
Prof. Dr Fryderyk Zoll.
(4) Delegat Wydzialu Nauki.

Wysuwane nazwiska uczonych ruskich:

p. Small-Stocki [*sic* — Smal-Stocki],
p. Cyryl Studziński,
p. prof. Łoski,
p. dr. Koczuba [*sic* — Kostruba],
p. dr. Iwan Kowacz [*sic* — Kopacz],

p. Kolessa,
p. Werchanowski [*sic* — Werhanowski],

Document 10: Studyns'kyi's letter to the Polish Ministry of Education.

On November 5, Studyns'kyi, as chairman of the university committee at the Shevchenko Scientific Society, formally proposed Ukrainian members for the commission on "the university with Ruthenian (Ukrainian) as the language of instruction." Studyns'kyi did not send the letter directly to the ministry, but dictated it to Smal-Stocki, who sent it along with his own controversial letter.

ODPIS

L 596/25 Lwów dnia 5. listopada, 1925 r.

Jaśnie Wielmożny Panie Ministrze!

Nawiązując do protokółu wspólnej konferencji z dnia 3. IX. 1924 r. w sprawie założenia Uniwersytetu z językiem wykładowym ruskim (ukraińskim) podpisanego przeze mnie i dra Romana Stockiego z ukr. strony i przez Magnif. rektora Jana Łosia, prorektora dra Fr. Zolla, Dyrektora Departamentu Spraw Zagranicznych, Hr. St. Łosia, Dyrektora Dep. Min. Oświecenia dra Zawidzkiego i szefa kancelarii Pana Premiera, dra Rawicza jako przedstawicieli Rządu, mam zaszczyt jako przewodniczący uniw. Komisji Naukowego Towarzystwa im. Szewczenki przedłożyć do zamianowania na członków rządowej, organizacyjnej komisji profesorów i docentów:

dra Aleks. Kolessę dra Stan. Dniestrzańskiego dra Stefana Rudnickiego	Praga
dra Cyryla Studzińskiego dra Wł. Werhanowskiego i dra Hil. Święcickiego	Lwów

Przy tej sposobności łączę wyrazy głębokiej czci dla Pana Ministra.

(-) Prof. Cyryl Studziński

Document 11: Smal-Stocki's letter to Grabski.

Smal-Stocki's letter of 9 November 1925 became a cause célèbre *among Ukrainians.* Dilo *published it on December 15, in Ukrainian translation, with a few stylistic changes from the Polish original and the incorrect date of December 7.*

Smal-Stocki informs Grabski of the readiness of the Ukrainians to support the efforts of the government to establish a Ukrainian university. In response to

Grabski's request for Ukrainian pledges of loyalty, he declares the Ukrainians' readiness to cooperate with the Polish government despite any possible repercussions. The letter's publication destroyed the delicate negotiations on the university issue.

Published here is the typed original of Smal-Stocki's letter, which Grabski surely sent on to Jan Łoś. The letter of Studyns'kyi to which Smal-Stocki refers is the preceding document 10.

Stocki Warszawa, dnia 9. listopada 25.

. . . . 14a/7

Wielce Szanowny Panie Ministrze!

W ciągu bieżącego roku miałem zaszczyt być wezwanym przez Waszą Ekscelencję dla obznajmienia się z poglądami Pana Ministra i Rządu na sprawę organizacji uniwersytetu z językiem wykładowym ruskim (ukraińskim).

Sprawa ta nie była mi już obcą, gdyż blisko od roku pracowałem nad nią na mocy pisemnego upoważnienia poprzednika Waszej Ekscelencji, p. Ministra Miklaszewskiego; starania moję podówczas doprowadziły do podpisania protokółu z dnia 3.IX 24.r., zaaprobowanego przez Pana Prezesa Rady Ministrów, mocą którego ogół uczonych ruskich (ukraińskich) miał przedstawić kandydatów, spośród których Pan Minister Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego miał dokonać mianowania członków Komisji Organizacyjnej.

Nieprzewidziane okoliczności sprawiły, że z naszej strony nie stało się dotychczas zadość pomienionemu warunkowi, zmiana zaś dokonana na stanowisku Ministra Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego nakazała mi wstrzymać się w moich zabiegach aż do chwili, gdy Pan Minister był tak łaskaw powiadomić mnie, że uważa za pożądane zwołać na początek grudnia br. Komisję Organizacyjną.

Obecnie mam zaszczyt przedłożyć Panu Ministrowi w załączeniu pismo prof. Cyryla Studzińskiego, Prezydenta Naukowego Towarzystwa im. Szewczenki, członka Ukraińskiej Akademii Umiejętności w Kijowie, zawierające listę proponowanych z naszej strony kandydatów. Pismo to prof. Studziński wystosował do Waszej Ekscelencji na mocy jednogłośnego upoważnienia tak ze strony Komisji Uniwersyteckiej Towarzystwa Naukowego im. Szewczenki we Lwowie, jak i gremium b. austriackich profesorów uniwersytetu, skupionych obecnie na uniwersytecie ukraińskim w Pradze czeskiej.

Zdając sobie w pełni sprawę z doniosłości tego wyrażenia, mogę zapewnić Waszą Ekscelencję, że cały bez wyjątku świat naukowy ukraiński odpowiada obecnie na wezwanie Pana Ministra i Rządu gotowością do szczerej i lojalnej współpracy.

Decyzję w tym kierunku idącą powzięli nasi uczeni po długiej i gruntownej

rozwadze i w pełni świadomi odpowiedzialności, jaką zaciągają wobec własnego sumienia, wobec rodzimej nauki i swego narodu.

Zespół naszych uczonych składa się wyłącznie z jednostek, których uczucia narodowe nie mogą podlegać wątpliwości, dowiedli ich bowiem pracą całego życia poświęconą rozwojowi narodowej nauki i kultury tak podczas ery pokojowej, jak i obecnie na emigracji, korzystając z bratniej gościnności czechosłowackiego narodu.

Więc jeżeli grono tych samych mężów oddaje się jednomyślnie do dyspozycji Pana Ministra, czynią to dlatego, że miłość swego narodu i odpowiedzialność za jego przyszłość, za przyszłość jego młodzieży i nauki każą im tak postąpić. W granicach Rzeczypospolitej żyje wielomilionowy odłam naszego narodu i jego losy i rozwój związane są z dobrobytem i potęgą państwa polskiego. Ze wszystkich bowiem państw, w których żyje nasz naród, Polska jest jedynym obok Czechosłowacji, które opiera się na zasadach chrześcijańskiej nauki, na zasadach praworządności, na ideałach zachodniej demokratycznej cywilizacji. Lecz dobrodziejstwa z tych zasad płynące mogą tylko wtedy stać się pełnym udziałem naszego narodu, jeżeli szczerze i bezwarunkowo stanie on na podstawie polskiej państwowości i zasługami położonymi dla rozwoju państwa i rozwoju własnego pozyska sobie pełne zaufanie Rządu i polskiego społeczeństwa.

To są powody, które przechyliły szale rozważań naszych uczonych i tymi uczuciami ożywieni pragną oni pod Wysokim Kierownictwem Waszej Ekscelencji przyczynić się w miarę sił i możności do zgodnego współżycia i współpracy obu zamieszkujących Rzeczpospolitą słowiańskich narodów.

Składając Panu Ministrowi jak powyżej sprawozdanie z mej całorocznej działalności, którą pojmowałem jako skromny przyczynek z mej strony dla dobra Rzeczypospolitej i mego narodu, pozwalam sobie dać na ręce waszej Ekscelencji wyraz zaufania, że Rząd i polskie społeczeństwo przyjmą do wiadomości krok naszych uczonych w pełnym zrozumieniu i uznaniu uczuć i motywów, które nimi kierowały.

Raczy Pan Minister przyjąć wyrazy głębokiej czci i poważania.

(-) Smal Stocki

Document 12: Correspondence between Łoś and Studyns'kyi about Smal-Stocki.

In a letter to Studyns'kyi, Jan Łoś commented that he could not understand the Ukrainians' indignation over Smal-Stocki's letter, for when the Ukrainian university were established, in whatever form, the faculty would be obliged to take an oath of loyalty.

Studyns'kyi, in turn, complained that Smal-Stocki had acted on his own and that

his indiscretion had torpedoed the project. He writes that Smal-Stocki wanted to retract his declaration, but Grabski had informed Smal-Stocki that the commission would not be convened without a pledge of loyalty such as he had made.

According to Studyns'kyi, the Galician Ukrainian faculty in Lviv considered Smal-Stocki's move disloyal to the Ukrainian cause, especially in view of the Polonization of Ukrainian schools and the dismissal of Ukrainian faculty members from Lviv University. In a later letter to Jan Łoś, Studyns'kyi again attributed to Smal-Stocki the demise of the Ukrainian university issue.

18. I. 1926 Kopia.

Wielce Szanowny Panie Kolego!

Miałem dawno napisać do Wielce Szanownego Pana Kolegi z powodu pewnego ustępu Pańskiego listu — mianowicie zdania o deklaracji p. Smal-Stockiego. Otóż ja mam takie wrażenie, że nie jest to list osobisty, ale oświadczenie, zrobione w porozumieniu przynajmniej z kilku kolegami, które powinno by dodatnio wpłynąć na sprawę uniwersytetu ruskiego. Nie rozumiem, dlaczego "Diło" tak się na niego obruszyło, bo przecież w razie założenia uniwersytetu wszyscy profesorowie przez złożenie przysięgi służbowej uroczyście tylko stwierdzą to, co w owej deklaracji wyrażone zostało, tj. że stoją na gruncie państwowości polskiej.

Łączę wyrazy poważania

Jan Łoś

Wasza Magnificencjo!

Od 11. stycznia byłem chory na przekrwawienie opłucnej i dlatego dopiero dzisiaj odpowiadam na łaskawe zapytanie w sprawie pisma p. Stockiego.

Pan Stocki bawił we Lwowie od dnia 1–6 listopada w celu zakupna książek dla słow. seminarium w Warszawie. Wtedy zabrał ode mnie list do p. min. Grabskiego, w którym proponowałem członków komisji do mianowania.

Pan Stocki przetrzymał mój list kilka dni u siebie i, *nie upoważniony przez nikogo,* złożył p. min. Grabskiemu od siebie znaną Waszej Magnificencji deklarację, *o czym mnie post festum zawiadomił.* Stało się to między 10–12 listopada 1925 r.

Kiedy zwróciłem p. Stockiemu uwagę że postąpił nielojalnie, wystawiając za nas i bez nas weksel, który w razie publikacji rozbije sprawę uniwersytecką, p. Stocki zatelegrafowat mi, że swoją deklarację cofnie.

Przyjechał następnie 4. XII do Lwowa i oświadczył, że deklarację cofnął, lecz tylko dlatego, by ją zmienić, bo p. Grabski inaczej Komisji nie zwoła. Następnie prosił, by jego deklarację uważać *za prywatne pismo, za które on przejmuje pełną odpowiedzialność.* Zwróciłem mu jeszcze raz wobec członków komisji lwowskiej uwagę, że jego list wywoła ferment pośród ukraińskiego społeczeństwa i unicestwi sprawę, że my także nie możemy

traktować jego deklaracji inaczej jak tylko za jego prywatne pismo i że za niego żadnej odpowiedzialności nie przejmiemy. Sam p. S. też przyszedł ze zmianami deklaracji, które my przeczytaliśmy, nie myśląc o tym, że p. Stocki zechce następnie zrzucić ze siebie odpowiedzialność na nas.

Krok ten p. Stockiego uznaliśmy za wysoce nielojalny i ja osobiście zaprzestałem z nim dalszej korespondencji. Lepiej byłoby dla niego samego, żeby zaprzestał dalszego pośrednictwa, o które my go nie prosiliśmy, a które dotychczas przynosiło same niepowodzenia. Zamiast bawić się w pośrednictwo, lepiej byłoby dla niego, gdyby oddał się rzetelnej naukowej pracy i został "wybitnym uczonym," na którego p. min. Grabski już teraz jego promował.

Na pytanie, co razi "Diło" w tej deklaracji, odpowiem krótko: ton niegodny uczonego. Ukraińskich profesorów i docentów w liczbie 11 usunięto z uniwersytetu lwowskiego — czy to ma wlewać wiarę, że polski rząd załatwi sprawę ukraińską rzetelnie? Półtora tysiąca szkół ukraińskich zutrakwizowano. Zdobycze wywalczone za Austrii rząd polski zbagatelizował i zniszczył. Chciałbym mieć tę wiarę, że Polska we własnym interesie załatwi sprawę ukraińską, lecz fakty i rzeczywistość nie pozwalają mi wierzyć w to, co p. Stocki w osobistych, niezbadanych dotychczas interesach swoich własnych postawił w deklaracji jako dogmat. W każdej enuncjacji trzeba mieć szacunek dla siebie i dla swego narodu. Pan Stocki na ten szacunek nie zdobył się. Miałbym jeszcze dużo do pisania, lecz wolę o tym pomówić przy sposobności.

Faktem jest, że p. Stocki rozbił uniwersytecką sprawę, i ja obecnie stoję bezradny, co dalej z tym fantem robić? Dzisiaj całe ukr. społeczeństwo dzięki deklaracji p. Stockiego zajęło stanowisko, że uniwersytet może być tylko we Lwowie i, nim uczeni zjadą się na wspólną naradę, istnienie uniwersytetu musi być ustawowo zabezpieczone.

Dla słow. seminarium w Krakowie zbieram książki od moich uczniów. Chcę temu Uniwersytetowi, na którym stawiałem swoje pierwsze kroki, okazać bodaj tą drogą moją szczerą wdzięczność.

Łączę dla Waszej Magnificencji wyrazy głębokiej czci.

3. II. 1926 C. Studziński

Wasza Magnificencjo!

W najbliższych dniach wysyłam pod adresem Seminarium słowiańskiego:

"Записки" 136–7, 138–40, 141–43, jeden egz. dla Pana Rektora, drugi dla Seminarium. Prócz tego załączam mojej najnowszej pracy o "Antigrafe" Smotrzyskiego (1608 r.) jeden egz. dla prof. Tadeusza Grabowskiego, drugi dla prof. Stan. Kota, gdyż oni tym periodem zajmują się. Resztę książek, które mam pod ręką, przeznaczam dla Seminarium. To tylko początek. Później wyślę więcej.

Nareszcie skończyłem jubileuszowe wydania. Za [*sic*] dwa lata wydałem 3620 stronic. Kronika, która wyniesie około 140 str., bez żadnych subwencyj. Kronikę wyślę, skoro tylko będzie gotowa.

W międzyczasie wysłałem 4 prace o Dragomanowie do kijowskiej Akademii Nauk, gdzie będą w najbliższym czasie drukowane. Mam więc dużo pracy i nie darmuję. Walne Zgromadzenie Tow. im. Szewczenki odbędzie się dnia 30 maja 1926 r.

Odgraża się Stocki, że nie będę zatwierdzony na profesurę w Krakowie z powodu mego stanowiska w uniw. sprawie. Na każdy sposób było one lojalne i uczciwe. Cieszyłoby mnie, gdyby p. Stocki mógł to samo powiedzieć o sobie. Głową muru nie mogłem rozbić. Skoro jednak idą represje, więc trzeba być na przyszłość bardzo ostrożnym. A p. Stockiemu niech Bóg wybaczy za to, że sprawę uniwersytecką swoją nierozwagą i nielojalnością wobec nas rozbił.

Łączę wyrazy głębokiego szacunku dla Waszej Magnificencji i kreślę się sługą

Cyryl Studziński

Lwów dnia 25. IV. 1926 r.

P.S. Proszę uprzejmie polecić bibliotekarzowi, by mi doniósł, co posiada Seminarium z moich prac? Uzupełniłbym zbiór, o ile mam jeszcze książki. Wczoraj wybraliśmy naszym członkiem prof. Balcera. Przedtem pytaliśmy się o zgodę. Bardzo mile to przyjął, że *ukr.* Tow. uczciło także w ten sposób jego jubileusz. Są miejsca, na których możemy zejść się.

Prostuję mój list o tyle, że "Zapisek" Nr. 136–7 posyłam tylko jeden tom, gdyż wcześniej już dla Pana Rektora ten tom wyekspediowano.

REVIEWS

NAČALO KNIGOPEČATANIJA V MOSKVE I NA UKRAINE. ŽIZN' I DEJATEL'NOST' PERVOPEČATNIKA IVANA FEDOROVA: UKAZATEL' LITERATURY, 1574–1974. [By *E. L. Nemirovskij.*] Moscow: [Gosudarstvennaja ordena Lenina Biblioteka SSSR im. V. I. Lenina. Otdel redkix knig], 1975. 197 pp. 1,100 copies. 40 kopecks, mimeograph.

Evgenij L'vovich Nemirovskij is perhaps the most prolific Soviet Russian student of Slavic books of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. His bibliographical work under review here attempts to update and supplement the de visu bibliography of 523 items of Russian and foreign Fedoroviana (published between 1632 and 1932) compiled by A. P. Lebedjanskaja in 1934. In addition to supplementing Lebedjanskaja's coverage by searching through such materials as library reports, Nemirovskij claims to have examined items that Lebedjanskaja did not.

Like the earlier compilation, Nemirovskij's is arranged chronologically and alphabetically within each year, with works in Cyrillic script listed first, followed by works published in languages of the peoples of the Soviet Union and in Latin. His bibliography thus contains 1,754 items published between 1574 and 1974. The majority, however — 1,165, to be exact — were published after the Revolution.

Recent Soviet bibliographies of this kind are very difficult to evaluate. On the one hand, Nemirovskij has undoubtedly performed a service in collating and integrating the references found in the works by Kameneva (1959), Maxnovec (1960), and Droblenkova (1961), as well as those which appeared in *Kniga* (1961–). Yet the result of his efforts is a somewhat haphazard and occasionally unpalatable mixture of "cabbage and peas."

First, there are the simple errors that litter the compilation (e.g., in items 50, 317, 737, 953, 1487). Second, and more detrimental, is the unfortunate choice of material. Important works on Fedorov (item 1639) are found alongside peripheral items (1638). Basic reference works are not differentiated from sources and secondary studies. A surprising omission is the special issue of *Recenzija* (vol. 5, no. 1) devoted to the quatercentenary of book printing in the Ukraine, which contained an annotated bibliography of items dealing with the old Ukrainian book.

Although certainly Nemirovskij deserves admiration for his industry, he could have done far better in providing specialists in this field with a basic classified checklist and chronological index.

Edward Kasinec
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ETUDES UKRAINIENNES: PETIT GUIDE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE. By *Françoise de Bonnières.* Paris: Réunion des bibliothèques universitaires de Paris, 1979. iii, 35 pp.

This brief French bibliographic guide to Ukrainian studies provides basic bibliographical information on over 400 monograph and serial titles. It forms part of a series in which two previous guides have been published: *Etudes tchèques* and *Etudes bulgares.* Organized into a dozen subject areas, it includes sections on bibliographies (and generalities), encyclopedias, language and literature, geography, ethnography and folkore, history, economy, archaeology, art, religion, and philosophy.

The author, Françoise de Bonnières, is in charge of the Slavic collections (Conservateur du Service slave) at the Ecole des langues orientales in Paris, and she has brought a considerable expertise in Slavic bibliography to this volume. Her two previous publications in Slavic studies, *Guide de l'étudiant en russe* (Paris, 1977; 220 p.) and *Histoire de la bibliographie russe des origines à 1917* (Paris, 1978; 324 p.), were published in the series Documents pedagogiques de l'Institut d'études slaves. Since the publication of this Ukrainian guide, she has also produced *Guide de l'étudiant en Polonais* (Paris, 1980, 139 pp.).

The preface states that the guide is based on the holdings of the Bibliothèque des Langues orientales and was designed to be of assistance to students at the Institut national des Langues et civilisations orientales. Apparently, the bibliographer did not intend to create a full scholarly bibliography. The size and contents of the volume reflect to some degree the limited holdings of the library or the limited needs of the students. The volume lacks an index and, for the most part, there are no annotations. Scholars searching for a good bibliographic survey of materials in French on Ukrainian studies will find this work inadequate. For instance, Borschak's excellent, *L'Ukraine dans la littérature de l'Europe occidentale* (Paris, 1935), which Bonnières herself lists, is a much better source on older material. No modern scholarly bibliography of the Ukraine in French language publications has yet been published, so it is regrettable that Bonnières's work is not on a larger scale.

Overall the presentation of the bibliographical data is good, and the accur-

acy is adequate. A few errors do occur: under Andrusyshen (p. 4), Saskatchewan is misspelled; under Beauplan (p. 18), the publisher should be J. Techener and the preliminary paging (xv) has been omitted; on the same page, the volumes of Scherer have 328 and 384 pages, not 320 and 390; under Bréhèret (p. 22), "Les corps d'elite" should be "Le corps"; under Elwood (p. 22), the date of publication 1874 should be 1974; in *Heohrafia* by Kubijovyč (p. 15), the date of publication should be 1938, not 1958; under Markus (p. 23), the title has been taken from the cover rather than the title page.

The bibliography includes a good selection of Soviet Ukrainian publications, some recent and older Russian titles, as well as Western publications. Most surprising is the omission of titles which should appear even in a bibliography on this small a scale. For example, the two serials *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* (Cambridge, Mass.) and *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* (Toronto) deserve inclusion. Two bilingual French and Ukrainian dictionaries, by T. Naumenko (1948) and by P. Petrenko (1934), are not mentioned. The section on dissidents omits the works of Ivan Dzyuba and Petro Grigorenko. The fundamental work *Early Ukrainian Settlements in Canada,* by V. J. Kaye (University of Toronto Press, 1964), is not included. *The Cathedral of St. Sophia in Kiev,* by O. Povstenko (New York, 1956), is missing, and the first edition of Hrushevs'kyi's *Abrégé de l'histoire de l'Ukraine* (Paris, 1920) is not mentioned although the second edition is noted (p. 19).

Although this bibliography has its value, there is a need for a much fuller bibliography of French Ukrainian materials than Bonnières has provided.

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MELETIJ SMOTRYC'KYJ JAK PYS'MENNYK. By *M. M. Solovij.* 2 vols. Analecta OSBM, ser. 2, sect. 1, vols. 36 and 37. Toronto and Rome. Vol. 1 (1977), 275 pp. Vol. 2 (1978), 450 pp.

Father Solovij's monograph on the life and works of Meletij Smotryc'kyj (ca. 1577–1633) is a welcome addition to studies on this important writer. The author has incorporated many of the formulae of the specifically Ukrainian and Uniate historiographic traditions. Accordingly, particular emphasis is placed on Smotryc'kyj's conversion from Orthodoxy to the Uniate church, and the conversion is presented in a positive light. Smotryc'kyj's work is examined, moreover, within the context of the Ukrainian cultural tradition.

The study consists of two volumes. Volume 1 is an examination of Smotryc'kyj's life and his times. Chapter 1 discusses the state of the church in the

Ruthenian lands of the sixteenth century (pp. 13–45). Chapter 2 surveys theological and polemical writings on Ruthenian questions and the Union of Brest up to the appearance of Smotryc'kyj's first works (pp. 46–125). The remainder of the volume (chapters 3 through 5) is a lengthy biography of Smotryc'kyj. Father Solovij draws primarily on the Latin *vita* of J. Susza (*Saulus et Paulus ruthenae unionis . . .* , Rome, 1666) and several other seventeenth-century sources, and discusses many of the statements and interpretations of subsequent biographers. Chapter 3 (pp. 126–178) gives an account of Smotryc'kyj's youth and education at the Orthodox school of Ostrih, the Jesuit Academy of Vilnius, and various universities and academies of Protestant Germany. There follows a discussion of Smotryc'kyj's pedagogical and literary activities from 1608 to 1620, when he was appointed archbishop of Polock and archimandrite of the Holy Spirit Monastery in Vilnius. Chapter 4 (pp. 179–225), which deals with the years 1620 to 1628, describes Smotryc'kyj's trip to Constantinople (ca. 1623–25) to meet with Patriarch Cyril Lukaris, his conversion, and the Kiev Council of 1628, where Smotryc'kyj was censured and pages from his *Apologia* were burned. The last chapter (pp. 226–269) narrates the events of the final years of Smotryc'kyj's life, with special emphasis on his attempts to create an independent Kiev patriarchate.

Volume 2 examines Smotryc'kyj's works. This is not a discussion, but rather a retelling of the contents of each work through extensive paraphrases or citations in Ukrainian translation. Chapter 1 (pp. 1–63) deals with *Antigraphē* (Vilnius, 1608), and chapters 2 (pp. 64–127) and 3 (pp. 128–176) with *Threnos* (Vilnius, 1610). Chapter 4 (pp. 177–204) presents the polemical responses to *Threnos* and gives a general introduction to Smotryc'kyj's *Hrammatyky Slavénskyja právylnoe Sýntagma* (Vevis, 1619). Chapters 5 (pp. 205–256) and 6 (pp. 257–306) outline the contents of the polemical works which followed the controversial appointment of Orthodox bishops in 1620. Of these, Father Solovij attributes to Smotryc'kyj *Verificatia niewinności* (Vilnius, 1621), *Obrona verificaciey* (Vilnius, 1621), *Elenchus pism uszczypliwych* (Vilnius, 1622), *Justificatia niewinności* (Vilnius, 1623) and, on one occasion, *Supplicatia.* Chapter 7 (pp. 307–351) deals with Smotryc'kyj's "Uniate" works, i.e., *Apologia* (Lviv, 1628), *Protestatia* (Lviv, 1628), *Paraenesis* (Cracow, 1629), and *Exaethesis* (Lviv, 1629). In chapter 8 (pp. 352–390) Solovij reviews past evaluations of Smotryc'kyj's life and works and gives his own characterization of Smotryc'kyj the writer. The volume concludes with an English résumé (pp. 391–418), a bibliography of primary and secondary sources (pp. 415–429), and an index of names and places for both volumes.

The first volume is the more useful of the two, for it represents the most extensive biography of Smotryc'kyj written to date. It should be noted, however, that some of the sources, especially the *vita* of J. Susza, are used uncritically. Moreover, it is sometimes difficult to determine the source upon which a given assertion is based.

Lack of information about the editions used as sources diminishes the usefulness of the second volume. Judging by the footnote references, one may infer that Father Solovij did not have access to the original editions and so relied on copies and reprints. For *Threnos,* he used a manuscript copy, now in the library of the Sorbonne, whose accuracy is unconfirmed. The chapters devoted to *Threnos* are nonetheless valuable because the work is relatively inaccessible. For *Antigraphē, Verificatia niewinności, Obrona verificaciey, Elenchus pism uszczypliwych, Justificatia niewinności, Supplicatia,* and *Protestatia* the author had recourse to well-known reprints of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. One should bear in mind, however, that these reprints contain many errors. It seems that he did not have access to copies of *Apologia, Paraenesis,* or *Exaethesis* (which have not been reprinted), but drew his information from Susza and recent studies of Smotryc'kyj. Further research should check the validity of this information.

The second volume is further weakened by the lack of information about the corpus of Smotryc'kyj's works. The Ruthenian version of Smotryc'kyj's *Kazan'e* (Vilnius, 1620) is available in a reprint and was cited in the bibliography, but there is no mention of it elsewhere. The Polish version of *Kazanie* (Vilnius, 1621) and the *Evangelye učitelnoe* (Vevis, 1616) are perhaps Smotryc'kyj's least known works and are not readily available, so their absence here is not surprising. Father Solovij bases his discussion of *Verificatia niewnności* on the reprint of the first edition, although Smotryc'kyj published a much modified second edition very soon after the appearance of the first.

Antigraphē and *Supplicatia,* on the other hand, are of uncertain authorship. Father B. Waczyński ("Czy Antigrafe jest dziełem Maksyma [Melecjusza] Smotryckiego?," *Roczniki Teologiczno-Kanoniczne,* vol. 1, Lublin, 1949) has demonstrated convincingly that Smotryc'kyj should not be considered the author of *Antigraphē.* It is possible that Smotryc'kyj wrote *Supplicatia,* but no direct evidence for the attribution has been found. In general, the article by Father Waczyński provides solid guidelines for a discussion of the corpus of Smotryc'kyj's works. Yet, for some reason it has not received due attention, so that scholars continue to base their work on erroneous assumptions. For example, the most recent work on Smotryc'kyj (M. Smotryc'kyj, *Hramatyka,* ed. V. V. Nimčuk, Kiev, 1979) again makes the usual attribution of *Antigraphē* to Smotryc'kyj. Father Solovij outlines all of Waczyński's points without giving any counter arguments of his own, yet continues to accept the traditional attribution.

Despite these shortcomings, Father Solovij's work will be of use to a wide range of scholars. It is the most ambitious study of Smotryc'kyj to date, and the first large-scale attempt to characterize the whole of the writer's life and works. Its compilation of passages from both primary and secondary sources

serves as a general introduction to Meletij Smotryc'kyj and gives the reader an idea of the history of the studies and current critical opinions.

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THE AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS, 1776–1848: SOCIO-POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS. Edited by *Jaroslaw Pelenski.* Proceedings of the Second [Bicentennial] Conference of Polish and American Historians. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1980. 424 pp. $17.50.

These sixteen conference papers by Polish and American historians are grouped into five sections dealing with, in order, the American Revolution, American perceptions of Poland in the revolutionary era and later, the French Revolution, revolutionary traditions in East Central Europe, and a single final essay on how art reflected politics in the revolutionary period. The conference itself should have been useful, given the eminence of the contributors and the need for better communications between American and East European scholars, but one wonders why the conference papers were published, and for what audience.

The authors seem to have written for various purposes. If the aim of the conference (and of the book, presumably) was to provide a representative sampling of Polish and American historical research, then each contributor should have written briefly about his or her own research. Some contributors did precisely this. Although sacrificing breadth of coverage and almost inevitably duplicating material already published, this approach yielded the best results: essays that are clear, well-focused, based on extensive primary research, and innovative in methodology and analysis. Particularly successful are Linda Kerber's essay on the politicization among women during the American Revolution, Stow Persons's discussion of ethnic relations in the American revolutionary era (with German population in Pennsylvania as a case study), Robert Forster's study of the effects of the French Revolution on the ruling elite in France to 1850, and Alan Spitzer's examination of the political results of that revolution's "total" politics. Each of these is useful not only for its own subject, but also suggests analogous study of other revolutions. Also excellent, because they provide valuable insights into East European events too often ignored by Western scholars, are the chapter from Istvan Deak's book on the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, Andrzej Walicki's essay on Polish revolutionary thought in 1831–1849, and Jaroslaw Pelenski's review of the Haidamak insurrections in the Right-Bank Ukraine from 1734 to 1768.

A number of other authors chose to produce a survey of the literature or a synthesis on a broader topic. The problems in this approach are evident even in Pelenski's essay, which treats in rapid succession (within 20 pages) the social composition of the Haidamak forces, the role of the clergy and of the Russian government in the uprisings, and the rebellion's impact on Poland and Polish-Ukrainian relations. The discussion is well informed, but lacks intensive analysis, conclusive results, and a unifying theme. The result is less satisfactory than the more focused review essay by Zenon Kohut on the same subject which appeared in 1977.*

When the subject surveyed is as broad and frequently investigated as the French Revolution, the difficulties of the broad approach become more obvious. Bogusław Lesnodorski's rambling discussion of some of the classic issues of the French Revolution is perhaps the weakest essay in the volume; it ignores a great deal of new research, dismisses other works out of hand, and contributes little new information itself. Covering a larger geographical area but devoted to a narrow theme, Jan Białostocki's survey of the changes in how political events were portrayed in "high" art (as opposed to broadsides) is more successful. He has produced a coherent, if not radically original, account of the gradual politicization of art, based on evidence from America, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe (primarily Poland). The only essay with equally broad geographical coverage is Jerzy Topolski's on "revolutionary consciousness," which is more a contribution to the Marxist theory of history than an attempt to explain events in (or evidence about) the past. The somewhat amorphous concept of "revolutionary consciousness" would allow the Marxist historian to weigh political thought almost as heavily as economic conditions in explaining revolutions, and thus to incorporate much useful Western scholarship on ideology. Whether the approach abides by the canons of orthodox Marxism I leave to others to judge.

The least successful section of the book is the three discussions by American historians of Eastern Europe of "Polish-American relations in the revolutionary era." Although they do offer occasional new perspectives, the authors tended to follow the beaten path and to rely heavily on secondary sources, particularly the work of Miecislaus Haiman.

Taken together, then, the volume neither attempts nor succeeds in having any one strategy. It does not provide the broad coverage found, for instance, in R. R. Palmer's *The Age of the Democratic Revolution.* The editor's introduction provides a brief discussion of the various typologies of revolution, but the typologies have little to do with most of the essays. Furthermore, the four-year interval between the conference and the publication of the papers

* Zenon E. Kohut, "Myths Old and New: The Haidamak Movement and the *Koliivshchyna* (1768) in Recent Historiography," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1, no. 3 (September 1977): 359–378.

inevitably detracts from the novelty of the ideas presented. Finally, one wonders whether the publication of this collection merited an NEH subvention (under the Program for Research Tools and Reference Works). The most successful essays are often to be found in fuller form elsewhere, whereas the less successful have the same defect as this review: they try to cover too much disparate material in too short a space.

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AUFBRUCH UND NEUBEGINN: HEIMATBUCH DER GALIZIENDEUTSCHEN. Part 2. Edited by *Julius Krämer,* with *Rudolf Mohr* and *Ernst Hobler.* Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Hilfskomitee der Galiziendeutschen, 1977. xvi, 672 pp.

Islands of German settlement scattered throughout eastern Europe were a common phenomenon from medieval times until at least the middle of our own century. On the old territory of the pre-World War I province of Galicia there were two distinct waves of German colonization. The first, occurring in the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, was associated with invitations offered by Polish kings to settle first western and later eastern Galicia. These early settlers were primarily artisans who settled in Cracow, Lviv, and other cities, but by the sixteenth century they had largely become assimilated with the ruling Polish urban elite.

The second wave of German colonization began after 1772 when Galicia became part of the Austrian Empire. Already between 1781 and 1785, under Emperor Joseph II, more than 15,000 German settlers were brought to Galicia from the Palatinate and other southwest German states. More colonists followed in the early nineteenth century, attracted by the land and other special privileges offered by the Austrian government. Unlike their medieval predecessors, this new wave of Germans settled in rural Galician villages where they had their own schools, cooperatives, cultural organizations, and churches, and where they led a life marked by little contact with the surrounding Polish or Ukrainian communities. Their numbers increased steadily, by 1900 reaching 75,000, but thereafter the population declined (due mainly to emigration to Germany and the New World), so that by the 1930s less than 50,000 remained. Throughout this whole period, about two-thirds of the German settlements were in the eastern, Ukrainian half of Galicia.

German life in eastern Galicia came to an abrupt end in 1939–1940. Following the Nazi-Soviet destruction of Poland, the Soviets allowed Hitler to resettle the Germans of Soviet-held eastern Galicia (incorporated into the

Ukrainian SSR) on "purer" German soil — actually, the so-called Warthegau region of West Prussia. Later, in 1944, when the Red Army returned to the area, the Germans of western Galicia also fled, settling wherever possible in what became the four military zones of postwar Germany.

The present volume is a collection of 140 short reminiscences by former Galician Germans. They are arranged into five sections: (1) the impact of the German-Polish war of September 1939, including the internment of many Germans in the Polish camp at Bereza Kartuska; (2) the exodus from eastern Galicia in 1939; (3) the resettlement in 1939–1940; (4) the flight from western Galicia in 1944; and (5) the life (*Neubeginn*) of Galician Germans in their new postwar homes. Many of the brief reminiscences are of a very personal character, but they do contribute new details to the already extensive literature on Galician Germans in the twentieth century.

Of particular interest are the accounts, however brief, of the life of Galician German immigrants in present-day West and East Germany, Austria, Sweden, the United States, and Canada, as well as the descriptions by a few individuals who recently returned to their former native villages in the Ukrainian SSR. Of historiographical value are the descriptions of archives in the West on Galician Germans, and of the West German-based Committee for Aid to Galicia's Germans, and the biographies of several scholars, including the group's leading historian Sepp Müller (1893–1977). This informative volume concludes with several photographs and an excellent fold-out map of German settlements in Galicia as of 1939, with indication of regional origin (Palatinate, Bohemia, Swabia) and religion (Evangelical, Catholic, Mennonite).

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PROPAM"IATNA KNYHA HIMNAZII SESTER VASYLIIANOK U L'VOVI. Edited by *Wasyl Lew, Anna Kobrynska, Dora Rak, Stefania Bernadyn, Lidia Diachenko, Olha Dziadiw*. Shevchenko Scientific Society, Ukrainian Archives, vol. 22. New York, 1980. 334 pp.

This book has a dual purpose: as part of the Ukrainian Archives series, it is to provide source material on Ukrainian history; as the commemorative book of the girls' secondary school run by the Basilian sisters in Lviv, it is to provide nostalgia for its graduates. On the whole, the volume succeeds better in its second purpose.

The contents include brief essays on Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi and educa-

tion, a useful history of the school, including discussion of the curriculum, vignettes of the teachers and some students, recollections of memorable events, and many photographs (some items are reprinted from Galician and émigré Ukrainian newspapers). The volume also contains speeches delivered at a reunion of graduates in Kerhonkson, New York, in 1978, with a brief report about a commemorative book, presumably the one under discussion here. The book is well printed and bound, and the photographs are, for the most part, clearly reproduced.

The memoirs offer descriptions of the lives of young Galician Ukrainian middle-class women between 1906 and 1944. The reminiscences are often idealized, but even so, they provide insights into important facets of Galician society. Among topics discussed or intimated are class differences, romanticism, patriotism, Polish harassment of Ukrainians, as well as the level of study at the school and the nature of its faculty. The information on extracurricular activities is of particular interest.

All this material, however, is presented in a vacuum. It is stated that the school offered the best education for Galician Ukrainian girls at the time. That may be self-evident for those who grew up regarding the *himnaziia* as the "culmination of the striving of the Ukrainian women's emancipation movement" (p. 272), but for others, the assertion should have been supported by facts. Anyway, such a sweeping statement is simply not true.

Much of the writing is laced with clichés. On the other hand, potentially interesting material is undeveloped. For instance, I would be curious to know something more about the Jewish girl who became Mother Severyna Paryllie, OSBM, one of the school's most prominent teachers, than that "God so guided her life that she and her brothers accepted the Christian faith" (p. 77). Surely, too, statements like the one about Iryna Knysh, "now considered the ideologue of Ukrainian womanhood" (p. 155), deserve some elaboration.

The editorial staff should have given more attention to each contribution and to its place within the whole. Any collection of reminiscences about one institution, especially one with a history of less than forty years, will be repetitive. The historical analyses, however, particularly those by the former faculty, should have been edited to avoid repetition of details and to provide background information.

Even with its limitations, however, the book has some value for historians of education and of Galician Ukrainian society.

Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak
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Ukrainian Canadians, Multiculturalism, and Separatism: An Assessment. Edited by *Manoly R. Lupul.* Edmonton: Published for The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies by The University of Alberta Press, 1978. 177 pp. $4.95, paper.

Changing Realities: Social Trends among Ukrainian Canadians. Edited by *W. Roman Petryshyn.* Edmonton: The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980. 249 pp. $7.95, paper.

The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies has initiated annual conferences to promote the study of Ukrainian Canadians. The two books under review contain the proceedings of the first such two conferences sponsored by the institute.

The theme of the first conference, "Ukrainian Canadians, Multiculturalism, and Separatism: An Assessment," held 9–11 September 1977 at the University of Alberta, was occasioned by the Party Québécois victory in the Quebec provincial elections (15 November 1976). By choosing to assess its impact on the future of Canada generally and on Ukrainian Canadians specifically, the conference organizers attracted considerable interest. Representing Québécois sentiments was Camille Laurin, Minister of Cultural Development in Quebec. Representing the Federalist point of view was Keith Spicer, former Commissioner of Official Languages in Ottawa. Other participants were Ukrainian Canadian academics from Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec.

The first volume commences as if it were a transcript of the conference, with a brief introduction to the volume and opening remarks by Manoly R. Lupul, director of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. Addressing the conference on Québécois policies, Minister Laurin spoke about misrepresentations by the anglophone press, and then responded to questions about the future of French Canadians outside Quebec, minorities inside Quebec, and the province as a whole.

Of the formal presentations, Ivan M. Myhul spoke on "Ethnic Minorities and the Nationality Policy of the Parti Québécois." Roman Serbyn gave a complimentary analysis entitled "Quebec's Ethnic Communities in the Wake of the Péquiste Electoral victory." Roman Petryshyn, describing "Ukrainian Canadians in Social Transition," linked the dynamics of assimilation to social stratification. In "The Federal Policy of Multiculturalism and the Ukrainian-Canadian Community," Bohdan Bociurkiw described the interplay between politicians and influential Ukrainian Canadians in shaping the federal multicultural policy. The discussions arising from these four papers are not included in the publication.

The remaining text reverts to informal presentations. Keith Spicer, in the banquet address, presented the federalist view of the Canadian government's official languages policy and commented on future political development.

Walter S. Tarnopolsky in his address, "Multiculturalism — The Basic Issues," indicated that independence for Quebec would jeopardize multiculturalism in what remained of Canada. Manoly R. Lupul concluded the presentations with a talk on "Canada's Options in a Time of Political Crisis and Their Implications for Multiculturalism." He argued that separatism would break up Canada, while the present federal policy of multiculturalism within the bilingual framework would continue to antagonize Quebecers and breed indifference to multiculturalism. Only regional federalism, in which bilingualism outside Quebec refers to all languages other than English, is, according to Dr. Lupul, a viable option. Finally, a panel discussion elaborated on the main idea presented at the conference — namely, that Canadians can best achieve a sense of national unity through diversity.

The second conference, "Social Trends Among Ukrainian Canadians," was occasioned by the completion (1977) of the "Statistical Compendium on the Ukrainians in Canada, 1891–1976" which provides much data for analysis. The published proceedings of the conference, convened at the University of Ottawa, 15–16 September 1978, includes eleven papers and an address.

The editor, Roman Petryshyn, introduces the collection by placing Ukrainian Canadians within the context of the Canadian multicultural mosaic. In part 1, "Ethnicity and the Census," William Darcovich introduced the Statistical Compendium and summarized the basic trends its data reveal. John M. Kralt surveyed the definitions of ethnic origin applied in Canadian censuses from 1871 to 1981.

In part 2, "Economic Status," Oleh Wolowyna analyzed "Trends in the Socio-Economic Status of Ukrainians in Canada, 1921–1971." He observed an inverse relationship between upward social mobility and language assimilation. In a related study, added to the volume after the conference, Warren E. Kalbach and Madeline A. Richard used the Individual File of the 1971 Census of Canada Public Use Sample Tapes to find that Ukrainian Canadians who move away from their ethnic churches are more likely to lose the Ukrainian language and become upwardly mobile. Wsevolod W. Isajiw examined the comparatively low number of Ukrainians in business occupations in Canada.

In part 3, "Social Trends," Leo Driedger, presenting "Urbanization of Ukrainians in Canada: Consequences for Ethnic Identity," concluded that urbanizing Ukrainians are losing ethnic identity more rapidly, but suggested that they may be shifting their identity to new institutional and symbolic factors. Olga M. Kuplowska analyzed the data of the Non-Official Languages Study of the federal government to describe "Language Retention Patterns Among Ukrainian Canadians." Jean E. Wolowyna described "Trends in Marital Status and Fertility of Ukrainians in Canada" (unfortunately, her analysis was marred by a graphic error: the tabulated data show that religion rather than place of residence was the greatest independent variable affecting family size). Marusia K. Petryshyn, speaking on "The Changing Status of

Ukrainian Women in Canada, 1921–1971," concluded that the three constraints facing Ukrainian women were low social status at immigration, noncharter group ethnicity, and sex discrimination.

Part 4, "Political Participation," contains only two papers. Roman R. March analyzed data on the political mobility of Ukrainians in Canada, but failed to compare it to that of other ethnic groups. Ivan Myhul and Michael Isaacs's discussion "Postwar Social Trends Among Ukrainians in Quebec" was included here inexplicably; moreover, its comparisons present a distorted picture, inasmuch as Ukrainians in Quebec are predominantly urban Montrealers, and should be compared to other urbanites of Quebec.

In the banquet address, Charles Keely of the Population Council, New York, noted the pitfalls in examining trends unrelated to processes and cautioned against the use of "Ukrainian Canadians" as a blanket term for all Ukrainians in Canada.

The first volume, focusing on the key Canadian political conflict, demonstrates both that it is crucial to Ukrainian Canadians, and that they can influence its resolution. The second volume provides a preliminary quantitative assessment of social trends among Ukrainian Canadians, but points out the need for careful studies of the processes involved.

Ihor Stebelsky
University of Windsor

CANADIAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE VIII INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF SLAVISTS (ZAGREB-LJUBLJANA 1978): TRADITION AND INNOVATION IN SLAVIC LITERATURES, LINGUISTICS AND STYLISTICS. Edited by *Z. Folejewski* and *E. Heier, G. Luckyj, G. Schaarschmidt.* Ottawa: Canadian Association of Slavists, 1978. 194 pp.

According to the editor's preface, "The organizing principle in this volume has been the theme of tradition and innovation in language and literature and in scholarly approaches to language and literature." While the organization principle is sound, the results can only be called mixed, with the better papers calling to mind Romeo's first impression of Juliet: "So shows a snowy dove trooping with crows."

The collection does contain some excellent papers. Richard W. F. Pope's "On the Comparative Literary Analysis of the Patericon Story (Translated and Original) in the Pre-Mongol Period" compares two similar stories and draws on work by Leskov and Tolstoj, in addition to Pope's own extensive work in the field. Constantine Bida's "Vestiges of Antiquity in Ukrainian Baroque Literature" recycles a good deal of his earlier work on "Galatovskyj" (his

spelling), but also brings out some astounding rhetorical characteristics of Ukrainian baroque literature. Part 1 (Literature) also includes articles by N. and J. Kolesnikoff on "Leo Tolstoj and the Doukhobors," by Z. Folejewski on "The Place of Futurism in West and South Slavic Poetry" (with South occupying 2 pages of 14!) and by E. Możejko on "Russian Literary Constructivism: Towards a Theory of Poetic Language."

Part 2 (Sociolinguistics) contains "Present Trends in North American Ukrainian" by I. Gerus-Tarnawecka — a well-organized presentation of the Canadian situation and the type of contribution especially appropriate at an international gathering. Y. Grabowski's "Some Recent Changes in Canadian Polish" suffers grievously by comparison. The section's final article, "Sociolinguistic Dimensions of Respectful Address: A Comparative Study of Native and Immigrant Croatian," by Ž. B. Juričić and J. F. Kess, concludes that there is no substantial difference in the respectful forms of address between the two variants of Croatian (causing one to wonder why the article was written).

Part 3 (Linguistics and Stylistics) contains two excellent articles. G. Schaarschmidt's "On the Typological Variability of Argument Regrouping in the Slavic Languages" continues the discussion of passivization in Slavic (specifically in Russian, Bulgarian, Czech and Upper Sorbian) and offers evidence for the separation of processes of passivization in the four languages. Tom M. S. Priestly's "Affective Sound Change in Early Slavic" opens with the acknowledgement that "there is a wastebasket in historical phonology which bears the label affective." He then goes on to examine the role of affective sound change diachronically (dubious) and synchronically. V. Grebenščikov's attempt at a transformational approach to Bunin and Šoloxov is interesting as an intellectual exercise, but otherwise rather forced (it appears in Russian; elsewhere Cyrillic is transliterated). Also included is a study of "Stylization and Its Function in Postwar Polish Poetry" by B. Czaykowski.

Unfortunately, the technical level of the volume — misspellings, inconsistent editing, and three title pages — corresponds to its general scholarly level, certain exceptions notwithstanding. Professionally, Canadian Slavists deserve better representation; technically, it is a shame the volume got such short shrift.

Robert F. Allen
Richmond, Virginia

BOOKS RECEIVED

BESEMERES, John F. Socialist Population Politics: The Political Implications of Demographic Trends in the USSR and Eastern Europe. White Plains, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1980. 373 pp. $25.00.

Bojkivščyna: Monohrafičnyj zbirnyk materijaliv pro Bojkivščynu z heohrafiji, istoriji, i pobutu. Philadelphia, 1980. 521 pp.

BROWN, Deming. Soviet Russian Literature since Stalin. Cambridge, London, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1978. 393 pp.

BUGANOV, V. I. Otečestvennaja istoriografija russkogo letopisanija: Obzor sovetskoj literatury. Moscow: "Nauka," 1975. 342 pp.

COHEN, Stephen F. et al., eds. The Soviet Union since Stalin. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980. 342 pp. $22.50 cloth; $7.95 paper.

DAVIES, R. W. The Industrialization of Soviet Russia. Vol. 1: The Socialist Offensive: The Collectivization of Soviet Agriculture, 1929–1930. Vol. 2: The Soviet Collective Farm, 1929–1930. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980. Vol. 1 —416 pp.; vol. 2 — 178 pp. $35.00.

DOBCZANSKY, Jurij, trans. and ed. Vasyl Romanyuk: A Voice in the Wilderness. Wheaton, Ill.: Society for the Study of Religion under Communism, 1980. 126 pp.

DUSHNYCK, W. Ukraine in a Changing World: Papers presented at the Conference Dedicated to the 30th Anniversary of the Founding of the *Ukrainian Quarterly*. New York: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1977. 291 pp.

FEDIUK, Pavlo Ionatan. Svjatyj Vasylij Velykyj i xrystyjans'ke asketyčne žyttja. Rome and Toronto: PP. Basiliani, 1978. 230 pp.

FITZPATRICK, Sheila, ed. Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928–1931. Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1978. 352 pp. $17.50.

FRANK, Joseph. Dostoevsky: The Seeds of Revolt, 1821–1849. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. 401 pp. $24.00 cloth; $7.95 paper.

FRANKO, Ivan. The Master's Jests. Translated by Roman Tatchyn. Shevchenko Scientific Society Ukrainian Studies, vol. 37; English section, 14. New York, Paris, Sydney, Toronto, 1979. 133 pp.

GARDNER, Johann von. Russian Church Singing. Vol. 1: Orthodox Worship and Hymnography. Translated by Vladimir Morosan. Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1980. 146 pp.

HAIMSON, Leopold H., ed. The Politics of Rural Russia, 1905–1914. Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1979. 309 pp. $19.50.

HOSKINS, Janina W., comp. The USSR and East Central and Southeastern Europe: Periodicals in Western Languages. 4th ed. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1979. 87 pp. $3.75, paper.

HUMESKY, Assya. Modern Ukrainian. Edmonton, Alberta: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980. 438 pp.

Istorija i istoriki: Istoriografičeskij ežegodnik. 1975. Moscow: "Nauka," 1978. 366 pp.

KANN, Robert A. A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526–1918.

Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974. ix, 646 pp. $10.95.

KIPARSKY, Valentin. Russian Historical Grammar. Vol. 1. Translated from the German. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Ardis, 1979. 186 pp. $8.95.

KOSTJUK Hryhorij. Okajanni roky: Vid Luk"janivs'koji tjurmy do Vorkuts'koji trahediji (1935–1940). Toronto: "Diyaloh," 1978. 165 pp. $6.00, paper.

LERSKI, George J. Herbert Hoover and Poland: A Documentary History of a Friendship. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977. 144 pp. $10.95.

LINDEN, Ronald H., ed. The Foreign Policies of East Europe: New Approaches. New York: Praeger, 1980. xii, 322 pp.

LUPUL, Manoly R., ed. Ukrainian Canadians, Multiculturalism and Separatism: An Assessment. Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press, 1978. 177 pp. $4.95, paper.

MASTNY, Vojtech. Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941–1945. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979. 409 pp. $20.00.

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MÜLLER, Sepp. Von der Andseidlung bis zur Umsiedlung das Deutschtum Galiziens, inbesondere Lembergs, 1772–1940. Marburg/Lahn: 1961. x, 256 pp.

MYTROPOLYT ILARION. Etymolohično-semantyčnyj slovnyk ukrains'koji movy. Vol. 1: A–D. Winnipeg, Manitoba: "Volyn'," 1979. 365 pp.

PARRY, Milman et al., comps. Bihaćka Krajina: Epics from Bihać, Cazin, and Kulen Vakuf. Edited by David E. Bynum. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980. 529 pp. $18.50.

PETRYSHYN, W. Roman, ed. Changing Realities: Social Trends Among Ukrainian Canadians. Edmonton, Alberta: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980. viii, 249 pp. $7.95, paper.

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SOLOVIJ, M. M. Meletij Smotryc'kyj jak pys'mennyk. 2 vols. Analecta OSBM, ser. 2, sect. 1, vols. 36 and 37. Toronto and Rome: 1977 and 1978. Vol. 1 —275 pp.; vol. 2 — 450 pp.

STAAR, Richard, ed. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1980. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1980. xxxi, 486 pp. $35.00.

STOJKO, John. Letters to God's Eye: The Voynich Manuscript for the First Time Deciphered and Translated into English. Los Angeles and New York: Vantage Press, 1978. 90 pp. $5.95.

SWYRIPA, Frances. Ukrainian Canadians: A Survey of Their Portrayal in English Language Works. Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press, 1978. xiii, 167 pp.

SYDORENKO, Alexander. The Kievan Academy in the Seven-

teenth Century. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1977. xv, 194 pp.

TAYLOR, Richard. The Politics of the Soviet Cinema, 1917–1929. Cambridge University Press, 1979. xvi, 214 pp. $19.95.

THEEN, Rolf H. Lenin: Genesis and Development of a Revolutionary. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979. 193 pp. $13.50 cloth; $4.95 paper.

TÖKÉS, Rudolf L. Opposition in Eastern Europe. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979. 306 pp. $22.50.

Ukrainian Dumy. Translated by George Tarnawsky and Patricia Kalina. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1979. 219 pp. $9.95 cloth; $5.95 paper.

VERBA, L. ed. The Human Rights Movement in Ukraine. Documents of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, 1976–1980. Baltimore and Toronto, 1980. 277 pp.

WALICKI, Andrzej. A History of Russian Thought: From the Enlightenment to Marxism. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979. 456 pp. $25.00.

WEBER, Harry B., ed. The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet Literature. Vols. 1–4 [A-Co]. Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1977–1981.

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The lists of Books Received that have appeared in the March, June, and December issues of this volume represent titles that have been received from publishers and booksellers since the journal's inception. Beginning with the March 1982 issue, titles will appear here as currently received.

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